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Summary 
The Dutch government has started a process of reformation in the Dutch healthcare. 
The goal of this reformation is cost efficient healthcare in the Netherlands. Hospitals and 
health insurance companies in the Netherlands experience changes in regulations and 
funding. They are expected to negotiate about the price and quantities of hospital care. 
A product-price system for hospital care, called DBC, has been introduced by the govern-
ment to support these negotiations.
This study shows that transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 
are not coordinated efficiently. Hospitals and health insurance companies are looking for 
more cost efficient ways to coordinate their transactions and organise their contracting 
process in a deregulated environment. Their experience is limited to the regulated hybrid 
contracting process. Scientific research on this topic is limited which supports the added 
value of this study with the next aim:
Formulate recommendations for the management of hospitals and the management 
of health insurance companies and policy makers, in order to (re) align the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies with an efficient governance structure 
in a more market oriented, deregulated, environment.
In this study Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is used to describe and analyse the transac-
tions between hospitals and health insurance companies and to develop recommenda-
tions for an efficient governance structure in a deregulated environment.
TCE is concerned with efficient governance structures for transactions. Williamson (1996, 
p. 46) describes as the main hypothesis of transaction cost economics: “align transactions 
(which differ in their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in their costs and 
competencies) in a discriminating (mainly transaction cost economising) way.”
TCE features three generic clusters of governance which can be used to coordinate trans-
actions: (1) markets, (2) hierarchies and (3) hybrids.
(1) In a market the coordination of transactions is established horizontally between organisations 
with the price.
(2) In a hierarchy the coordination of transactions is established vertically within one 
organisation with administrative controls.
(3) A hybrid is a governance structure in which both horizontal and vertical coordination is 
used for the transactions between two separate organisations.
Organisational failures can result in behavioural uncertainties and financial losses for eco-
nomic actors. These expected losses are hazards related to a transaction. An important ba-
sic assumption in TCE is that economic actors use farsightedness (instead of myopia) when 
contracting. Individual economic actors are assumed to calculate the expected financial 
loss due to opportunistic behaviour of contract partners before concluding a contract.
Identified hazards can be mitigated with safeguards. Economic actors can reduce the 
expected loss by mitigating the hazards with an appropriate governance structure with 
safeguards. Safeguards are the increase of vertical coordination by supplementing the 
classic contract (with only the price) with credible commitments and credible threats or 
the insource of production resulting in a hierarchy.
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SUMMARY
The final conclusion of this study is that ultimately the classic hospital with 
a full range of services and products which contracts health insurance 
companies for all hospital products will disappear. The costs related to 
the coordination of transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies with a hybrid will increase in a deregulated environment 
as the (impact of ) hazards increase(s). Weaknesses in the environment 
are not expected to disappear. Economic behaviour of hospitals and 
health insurance companies in a deregulated environment can result 
in segmentation, specialisation and selective contracting. Large health 
insurance companies are recommended to vertically coordinate segments 
of hospital care in a hierarchy. All-in-one contracts and shared ownership 
are efficient alternatives for large health insurance companies in a hybrid 
governance structure. Health insurance companies with a limited number of 
transactions are recommended, from an economic point of view, to use a lean 
hybrid governance structure or even a classic contract (similar to the Dutch 
restitution system). However market governance has the disadvantage that 
instability in transactions is expected and eventually results in financial losses. 
The next three questions are starting point for this study:
How can we describe the transactions between hospitals and health insurance compa-1. 
nies and their governance structure in a regulated environment?
Which hazards can be identified for the transactions between hospitals and health 2. 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment?
Which governance structure is most suitable, from an efficiency analysis3. 1 perspective, 
for the transactions between Dutch hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
deregulated environment?
(1) The results of this study confirm the dominant role of rules and regulations in the 
determination of the transactions and contracting process between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a regulated environment (before 2005).
(2) Several hazards can be identified for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment. These hazards differ across hospital 
care, resulting in four segments of hospital care.
1  Williamson (1996, p. 307) gives the next defi nition of effi  ciency analysis: “effi  ciency analysis properly encompasses governance 
costs as well as production costs”. Also costs due to excesses of waste, bureaucracy, slack, and the like are addressed as they are 
related to the alignment problem (Williamson, 1996, p. 311).
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1. Hospital care with weaknesses 
in the environment.
2. Hospital care with weaknesses 
in the environment and measure-
ment hazards.
3. Hospital care with weaknesses 
in the environment and malad-
aptation hazards.
4. Hospital care with weaknesses 
in the environment, measure-
ment hazards and maladaptation 
hazards.
Figure S1 Segmentation of hospital care on identified hazards.
The transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies experience hazards 
due to weaknesses in the institutional environment. These weaknesses are caused by: 
(1) the elusiveness and limited predictability of rules and regulations and (2) the direct 
influence of individual hospitals and health insurance companies on politics and the 
Ministry of Health.
Measurement hazards are identified for hospital care with high variety in treatment, high 
risks in outcome and with requirements for specific knowledge to review the quality of the 
delivered hospital care.
Both weaknesses in the environment and measurement hazards result in information 
asymmetry. A safeguard for these hazards is complete contracting, which is however 
expensive. Incomplete contracting increases the chance of opportunistic behaviour which 
results in instability.
Maladaptation hazards are identified for hospital care with limited competition and/
or asset specific investments2. Both result in an imperfect market with uni- or bilateral 
dependency which requires coordinated adaptation between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies. Autonomous adaptation is realised through the price system but is only 
suitable in perfect markets. In imperfect markets coordinated adaptation is required which 
is more complex as it requires coordination between two organisations (Williamson 1996).
(3) The efficiency of governance structures differs across segments of hospital care and 
depends on the share of the health insurance company in the relevant market.
A market governance structure was found to be inappropriate for hospital care due to 
the weaknesses in the environment. Health insurance companies with a limited number 
of transaction are recommended, from an economic point of view, to use a lean govern-
ance structure and if possible a classic contract. In the Netherlands this is fits with the 
`restitution` system. Eventually these transactions will however experience instability as 
the identified hazards are not mitigated properly with the governance structure. When 
weaknesses in the environment dissolve in the next years there are more possibilities for 
2  Asset specifi c investments are investments which cannot be redeployed without loss of productive value if contracts should be 
interrupted (Williamson 1975). 
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SUMMARY
efficient coordination of transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 
with a classic contract. However the expectation of both hospitals and health insurance 
companies is that this will not happen. Hospital care which experiences problematic 
measurement and maladaptation hazards is most efficiently organised in a hierarchy. Pre-
condition is that the health insurance company is able to achieve the necessary economies 
of scale in the production of hospital care.
In a hybrid the commonly used detailed contract will result in high transaction costs for 
the coordination of transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies. 
Alternatives like all-in-one contracts and shared investments/ownership are recom-
mended. All-in-one contracts are used for transactions with high variety or complexity. In 
these contracts all treatments for a certain patient group or a specialism are contracted 
to prevent hospitals selecting only the profitable treatments. All-in-one contracts include 
agreements about average performance, contract ending and renewal, financial punish-
ments or hostages for underperformance and regular audits.
Literature used in this study shows that the effectiveness of benchmarking as instrument 
to support the coordination of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies is controversial. Quality certificates can be helpful for complex care but in-
crease transaction costs. Voicing on reputation effects can be used as credible threats but 
are less suitable for contract partners with dependency issues as they results in conflicts 
and rivalry.
Shared investments, shared ownership and certain types of leasing are efficient safeguards 
for hazards caused by asset specificity.
Weaknesses in the environment can be mitigated in a hybrid with a contract includ-
ing possible future scenarios in rules and regulations taking into account the financial 
consequences for hospitals and health insurance companies. These contracts should 
include credible commitments like punishments or hostages. Also agreements should be 
made about the use of individual influence on politics. How more detailed the contract the 
higher the transaction costs. An alternative mitigate this hazard is to use shared invest-
ments resulting in shared interests.
Transaction Cost Economics and more specific the three layers model as presented by Wil-
liamson (1996) were used in this study to describe the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies and to identify the hazards. Data gathered with desk research 
and additional interviews, case studies and a questionnaire were used to describe and 
analyse the layers and the parameters and variables in the three layers model. The model 
was appropriate to describe and analyse the transactions in a regulated environment. The 
model was made more specific to describe and analyse the transactions between hospi-
tals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment. This resulted in an 
extended model which is based on TCE principles.
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Figure S2 The extended three layers model. 
The results of this study show that an analysis of the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies with an extended TCE model was appropriate for the aim of 
this study. The recommendations can be used to transform the current regulated hybrid 
governance structure into an efficient governance structure for different segments of 
hospital care in a deregulated environment.
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SAMENVATTING
Samenvatting 
De overheid is gestart met de hervorming van het Nederlandse zorgstelsel. Het doel van 
deze hervorming is een efficiënt en betaalbaar zorgstelsel. Ziekenhuizen en zorgverzeke-
raars in Nederland ondervinden veranderingen in regels en bekostiging. Zij moeten gaan 
onderhandelen over de prijs en volumes van ziekenhuiszorg. Een product-prijs systeem 
voor ziekenhuiszorg, genaamd DBC´s, is door de overheid geïntroduceerd om deze onder-
handelingen te ondersteunen.
Deze studie laat zien dat transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars niet efficiënt 
worden gecoördineerd. In deze veranderende omgeving zijn ziekenhuizen en zorgverze-
keraars op zoek naar efficiëntere manieren om de transacties te coördineren en de con-
tractering te organiseren. In Nederland hebben zowel ziekenhuizen als zorgverzekeraars 
beperkte ervaring met het coördineren van transacties in een gedereguleerde omgeving. 
Wetenschappelijk onderzoek is beperkt beschikbaar wat de toegevoegde waarde van deze 
studie, met volgend doel, onderschrijft:
Formuleer aanbevelingen voor het management van ziekenhuizen, het management van 
zorgverzekeraars en beleidsmakers om de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzeke-
raars te stroomlijnen met efficiënte coördinatie mechanismen in een meer marktgerichte, 
gedereguleerde omgeving.
De transactiekosten theorie wordt in deze studie gebruikt om de transacties tussen 
ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars te beschrijven en te analyseren en om aanbevelingen te 
ontwikkelen voor efficiënte coördinatie mechanismen in een gedereguleerde omgeving.
De transactiekosten theorie houdt zich bezig met efficiënte coördinatie mechanismen 
voor transacties. Williamson (1996, p.46) geeft als belangrijkste hypothese van de transac-
tiekosten theorie: “stroomlijn transacties (met verschillende kenmerken) met coördinatie 
mechanismen (die verschillen in kosten en competenties) op onderscheidende (hoofdza-
kelijk transactiekosten efficiënte) manieren.”
De transactiekosten theorie onderscheidt drie hoofdcategorieën voor de coördinatie van 
transacties: (1) markt, (2) hiërarchie en (3) hybride.
(1) In een markt wordt de coördinatie van transacties tussen organisaties horizontaal gerealiseerd 
met de prijs.
(2) In een hiërarchie wordt de coördinatie van transacties verticaal gerealiseerd binnen 
één organisatie met administratieve maatregelen.
(3) Een hybride coördinatie mechanisme heeft zowel horizontale als verticale coördinatie 
mechanismen om transacties tussen twee organisaties te coördineren.
Het falen van coördinatie mechanismen kan resulteren in niet gecontroleerd gedrag en 
financiële verliezen voor economische actoren. Deze verwachte verliezen zijn knelpunten 
gerelateerd aan een transactie. Economische actoren kunnen de verwachte verliezen 
reduceren door deze knelpunten weg te nemen met geschikte coördinatie mechanismen 
(veiligheidsmaatregelen).
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Een belangrijke basis veronderstelling binnen de transactiekosten theorie is dat econo-
mische actoren vooruit denken als zij contracteren. Voordat zij een contract afsluiten be-
rekenen individuele economische actoren de verwachte financiële verliezen ten gevolge 
van opportunistisch gedrag van contract partners. Geïdentificeerde knelpunten kunnen 
worden weggenomen met veiligheidsmaatregelen. Veiligheidsmaatregelen kunnen zijn: 
(1) het verhogen van de verticale coördinatie door het klassieke contract aan te vullen met 
geloofwaardige afspraken en geloofwaardige dreigementen of (2) het binnen de organisa-
tie brengen van de transacties (insourcing).
De conclusie van deze studie is dat de klassieke ziekenhuizen met een volledig 
productenpakket dat volledig door zorgverzekeraars wordt gecontracteerd 
gaan verdwijnen. De kosten gerelateerd aan de coördinatie van transacties 
tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars met een hybride structuur zullen 
stijgen in een gedereguleerde omgeving omdat de (impact van) knelpunten en 
risico´s voor contractpartners toeneemt. De verwachting is dat de zwakheden 
in de huidige institutionele omgeving niet zullen verdwijnen. Economisch 
gedrag van ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars in een gedereguleerde 
omgeving kan resulteren in segmentatie, specialisatie en selectieve 
contractering. Grote zorgverzekeraars wordt geadviseerd om delen van de 
ziekenhuiszorg in de eigen organisatie onder te brengen (hiërarchie). Alles-in-
één contracten en gemeenschappelijk eigendom zijn efficiënte alternatieven 
voor grote zorgverzekeraars in een hybride structuur. Zorgverzekeraars met 
een beperkt aantal transacties wordt vanuit een economisch perspectief, 
geadviseerd om beperkte hybride coördinatie mechanismen of zelfs een 
klassiek contract te gebruiken (vergelijkbaar met het restitutie systeem). 
Een markt structuur heeft echter het nadeel dat de knelpunten niet worden 
weggenomen en instabiliteit te verwachten is wat uiteindelijk tot financiële 
verliezen leidt. 
In deze studie staan drie vragen centraal:
Hoe kunnen we de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars en de ge-1. 
bruikte coördinatie mechanismen in een gereguleerde omgeving beschrijven?
Welke knelpunten treden op in de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars 2. 
in een gedereguleerde omgeving?
Welke coördinatie mechanismen zijn efficiënt voor de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen 3. 
en zorgverzekeraars in een gedereguleerde omgeving?
(1) De resultaten van deze studie bevestigen de dominante rol van regels voor de trans-
acties en de contractering tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars in een gereguleerde 
omgeving (voor 2005).
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(2) In een gedereguleerde omgeving kunnen verschillende knelpunten worden onder-
scheiden voor de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars. Deze knelpunten 
variëren binnen de ziekenhuiszorg wat resulteert in vier segmenten.
1. Ziekenhuis zorg 
met zwakheden in de 
omgeving.
2. Ziekenhuiszorg met 
zwakheden in de omgeving 
en meetproblemen.
3. Ziekenhuis zorg met 
zwakheden in de omgeving 
en aanpassingsknelpunten. 
4. Ziekenhuiszorg met 
zwakheden in de omge-
ving, meetproblemen en 
aanpassingsknelpunten. 
Figuur S1 Segmentatie van ziekenhuiszorg op basis van geïdentificeerde knelpunten.
Knelpunten in de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars ontstaan door zwakheden in 
de institutionele omgeving. Deze zwakheden zijn het gevolg van: (1) onduidelijkheden en beperkte 
voorspelbaarheid van wet- en regelgeving en (2) de directe invloed die individuele ziekenhuizen en 
zorgverzekeraars hebben op de politiek en het Ministerie van VWS.
Meetproblemen zijn het gevolg van de hoge variëteit in behandelingen, hoge risico´s in de uitkom-
sten en de specifi eke kennis die noodzakelijk is om de prestaties van een ziekenhuis te beoordelen.
Zowel de zwakheden in de omgeving als de meetproblemen resulteren in informatie asymmetrie. 
Dit knelpunt kan worden weggenomen door een compleet contract af te sluiten. Dit is kostbaar 
maar incomplete contracten verhogen de kans op opportunistisch gedrag wat resulteert in insta-
biele transacties.
Transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars waar beperkte concurrentie en/of transactie 
specifi eke investeringen3 een rol spelen resulteren in aanpassingsknelpunten. Dit heeft éénzijdige 
of bilaterale afhankelijkheid tot gevolg. Dit knelpunt kan worden weggenomen door aanpassingen 
tussen contractpartijen te coördineren. Autonome aanpassingen (met de prijs) zijn alleen bruikbaar 
in perfecte markten. In imperfecte markten is coördinatie tussen organisaties nodig om aanpassin-
gen te realiseren. Gecoördineerde aanpassingen compliceren de transacties (Williamson 1996).
(3) In een gedereguleerde omgeving varieert de effi  ciency van coördinatie mechanismen tussen 
verschillende segmenten van ziekenhuiszorg en is afhankelijk van het aandeel van de zorgverzeke-
raar in de relevante markt.
3  Transactie specifi eke investeringen zijn investeringen die als het contract wordt beëindigd niet voor andere doeleinden 
kunnen worden gebruikt zonder dat de productiewaarde daalt (Williamson 1975). 
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De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat ziekenhuiszorg door de zwakheden in de omgeving 
geen perfecte markt is. Zorgverzekeraars met een beperkte afname van een ziekenhuis worden, 
vanuit een economisch perspectief, geadviseerd om beperkt coördinatie mechanismen in te zetten 
of mogelijk zelfs een klassiek contract. Dit laatste is in Nederland vergelijkbaar met het restitutie 
systeem zoals dat door bepaalde zorgverzekeraars wordt gehanteerd. Beiden leiden echter tot 
instabiliteit in de transacties omdat de knelpunten en gevaren die gerelateerd zijn aan de transac-
ties niet worden weggenomen door adequate coördinatie mechanismen.
Meer mogelijkheden om transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars effi  ciënt te coördi-
neren met een klassiek contract ontstaan als de zwakheden in de omgeving in de volgende jaren 
verdwijnen. De verwachting van zowel ziekenhuizen als zorgverzekeraars is echter dat dit niet gaat 
gebeuren.
Ziekenhuiszorg met meetproblemen en aanpassingsknelpunten kan effi  ciënt worden gecoördi-
neerd binnen een hiërarchie. Voorwaarde is dat de zorgverzekeraar voldoende schaalvoordelen kan 
realiseren in de productie van de ziekenhuiszorg.
In een hybride structuur worden vaak gedetailleerde contracten gebruikt. Deze resulteren in hoge 
transactiekosten voor de coördinatie van transacties. Goedkopere alternatieven die gebruikt kun-
nen worden voor de coördinatie van de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars met 
een hybride structuur zijn (1) alles-in-één contracten en (2) gemeenschappelijke investeringen of 
eigendom. Bij alles-in-één contracten worden contracten afgesloten voor transacties met een grote 
variëteit of complexiteit. Over de volle breedte van een patiëntengroep, aandoening of specialisme 
wordt gecontracteerd om te voorkomen dat ziekenhuizen alleen de winstgevende behandelingen 
uitvoeren. In deze contracten worden afspraken opgenomen over de gemiddelde prestaties, de 
contractduur en vernieuwing, fi nanciële gevolgen bij onderpresteren en reguliere audits.
Literatuur waaraan in deze studie wordt gerefereerd laat zien dat de eff ectiviteit van benchmar-
king als instrument om de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars te ondersteunen 
controversieel is. Kwaliteitscertifi caten kunnen de coördinatie van complexe ziekenhuiszorg 
ondersteunen maar verhogen de transactiekosten. Het gebruik van pers en media om de reputatie 
van partijen te beïnvloeden kan door zowel ziekenhuizen als zorgverzekeraars worden gebruikt als 
geloofwaardige bedreigingen. Reputatie-eff ecten zijn echter minder geschikt voor contractpartijen 
die van elkaar afhankelijk zijn omdat het gebruik ervan leidt tot confl icten en competitie.
Knelpunten of gevaren die het gevolg zijn van transactie specifi eke investeringen kunnen worden 
weggenomen door (1) gemeenschappelijke investeringen, (2) gemeenschappelijk eigendom en 
(3) bepaalde soorten van leasing.
De knelpunten die het gevolg zijn van zwakheden in de omgeving kunnen worden weggenomen 
in een hybride met contracten waarin toekomstige scenario´s van wet- en regelgeving en de fi nan-
ciële gevolgen hiervan voor ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars zijn opgenomen. Deze contracten 
moeten worden aangevuld met geloofwaardige afspraken over strafmaatregelen bij het niet nako-
men van de afspraken. Tevens zouden ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars afspraken moeten maken 
over hoe ze hun invloed richting de overheid en politiek gebruiken. Transactiekosten worden hoger 
naarmate de contracten gedetailleerder worden. Gemeenschappelijke belangen die ontstaan door 
bijvoorbeeld gezamenlijk investeringen kunnen de gevaren van de zwakheden in de omgeving 
voor de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars reduceren.
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In deze studie is de transactiekosten theorie en meer in het bijzonder het drie lagen model zoals 
gepresenteerd door Williamson (1996) gebruikt om de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgver-
zekeraars te beschrijven en inzicht te krijgen in de knelpunten en gevaren voor contractpartijen 
gerelateerd aan deze transacties.
Data voor deze studie zijn verzameld met bureau-onderzoek aangevuld met interviews, geval-
studies en een vragenlijst. Op basis van deze informatie zijn de lagen en parameters in het 
drielagen model ingevuld voor de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars. Het 
drielagen model was geschikt om de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars in een 
gereguleerde omgeving te beschrijven. Om de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars 
te beschrijven en te analyseren in een gedereguleerde omgeving is voor deze studie het drielagen 
model op bepaalde punten aangevuld. Dit heeft geresulteerd in een uitgebreid drielagen model 
gebaseerd op de principes van de transactiekosten theorie.
Figuur S2 Het uitgebreide drielagen model. 
De resultaten van deze studie laten zien dat een analyse van de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en 
zorgverzekeraars met een uitgebreid drielagen model gebaseerd op de transactiekosten theorie 
geschikt is voor het doel van deze studie. De aanbevelingen geven voldoende aanknopingspunten 
om de gereguleerde hybride coördinatie van de transacties tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzeker-
aars te transformeren naar effi  ciënte coördinatie mechanismen voor verschillende segmenten van 
ziekenhuiszorg in een gedereguleerde omgeving. 
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Chapter 1 Research Problem and Design
1.1 Introduction of the study
In the Dutch health care system the relationship between hospitals and health insurance 
companies is heavily regulated. The government has started a reform process to establish 
deregulation and more market mechanisms in the health care market. These changes have 
an effect on the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies. Before 
2005 health insurance companies were obliged to contract all hospitals to divide the 
national budget for hospitals as set by the government. Changes in rules and regulations 
since 2005 have given health insurance companies the opportunity to selectively contract 
hospitals (Brandenburg 2007).
The complexity of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
dynamic institutional environment is an interesting empirical object for a transaction cost 
economic analysis. The discussions between experts in the field about the advantages and 
disadvantages of the introduction of a more market oriented system for hospital care and 
the ambiguity of the future transactions between hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies were the most important triggers for this study.
1.2 Practical relevance of the study
A short introduction to the Dutch situation concerning hospitals and health insurance 
companies and their transactions is given below to explain the practical relevance of this 
study1.
Hospitals and health insurance companies are separated organisations in the Netherlands. 
Nearly 100% of the provided hospital care is insured. Patients are free to choose a hospital. 
Hospital care bills are restituted by health insurance companies to the insurant or paid 
directly to the hospital. Health insurance companies have an annual contract with hospi-
tals to ensure that their insurants receive the necessary hospital care. The transactions are 
governed by rules and regulations set by the government, which restrict the degrees of 
freedom for hospitals and health insurance companies to realign transactions.
During the past decades the health care system in the Netherlands has developed itself 
into a complex hybrid system. This complexity is the result of the many rules and regula-
tions concerning the funding of hospitals. Political movements to increase efficiency and 
quality of the Dutch hospital care system push for deregulation and a more competitive, 
market oriented system. These changes have a major impact on the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies and the way they are coordinated. Examples of 
these changes are:
1  Verschuren and Doorewaard (1995) call this “probleem signalering”. Probleem signalering describes the problem itself, to 
whom it is a problem and why it is a problem.
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The introduction of an output oriented system (diagnose behandel combinaties• 2 
or DBC) in the negotiation and contracting process between hospitals and health 
insurance companies;
Phasing out of the contract obligation between health insurance companies and • 
hospitals and the regulated price system for hospital products. 
Introduction of a basic insurance• 3. One insurance system has replaced the private 
and social health insurance system in the Netherlands.
In 2008 the future position of between hospitals and health insurance companies is still 
anyone’s guess and will depend on future political choices. The environment is in turmoil 
as a result of the gradual transformation towards a more market oriented health care 
system:
There are plans to change rules and regulations to allow hospitals to distribute profi ts • 
to shareholders4. The execution of this plan will however depend on the results of 
the next elections.
It is not clear which part of hospital care will be deregulated move to free price • 
negotiation and free contracting. 
The impact of a more market oriented system for the overall costs of hospital care • 
in general and the financial situation of hospitals in particular are not yet clear. For 
instance the plan is that the costs for hospital buildings will not longer be budg-
eted in 2009 but have to be covered with the product price. Before the costs for 
hospital buildings were compensated with a budget system and not with an output 
oriented system. The financial consequences of this plan are high for hospitals with 
new buildings. It is not yet clear whether the government will compensate these 
hospitals.
The role of health insurance companies is changing. Historically health insurance • 
companies were organisations focused on rules and regulations and administration 
processes. With the deregulation and introduction of more market mechanisms they 
are developing themselves into a new business partner for hospitals.
Hospitals move from a budget to an output oriented system with DBCs. This system • 
is very detailed and there is doubt about its functionality in the negotiations with 
health insurance companies. In 2006 the Ministry of Health has announced a process 
of redefinition to create an aggregated DBC system. The goal is to develop a DBC 
system which results in less administration costs and which is less time consum-
ing and more effective in the negotiations between hospitals and health insurance 
companies. The plan is to implement this new DBC system in 2009. However at the 
beginning of 2008 parties are still working on fundamental parts of the new system.
Both policy makers and the management of hospitals and health insurance supported 
this study. It will increase our understanding of the contracting process between hospitals 
and health insurance companies and the related costs. The aim of this Transaction Cost 
Economics study is in line with the ultimate goal of deregulation: a better and cheaper 
health care system.
2  DBCs, comparable with the American DRG (diagnose related groups) system.
3  This is called “basisverzekering” in the Netherlands.
4  The minister of Health has announced the allowance of shareholders in hospitals in 2012.
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Most research in the Netherlands on competition in health care is done on a national 
policy level. Several committees have been installed the last decades by politicians to 
report their findings concerning different topics in the reform process of the Dutch health-
care system.
Many studies, including field research as well as case studies, are concerned with the 
efficiency and quality of hospital care. No research data are available about the changes 
in the contracts between hospitals and health insurance companies and the impact of a 
more market oriented environment. The results of this study will close this gap.
1.3 Research aim 
Verschuren (1991) claims that the research problem includes a research aim and research 
questions. The research aim is described in this section.
The practical relevance of this study can be found in the fact that the management of 
hospitals, health insurance companies and government are interested in an efficient gov-
ernance structure for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 
in a more market oriented environment. Governance structures are instruments which 
are used to coordinate the transactions necessary for the production of goods or services 
(Coase 1991b). This can be within an organisation or between separate organisations. 
Diversity in costs related to this coordination determines the effi  ciency of a governance 
structure. These costs are called transaction costs (Williamson 1996). The aim of this study is:
Formulate recommendations for the management of hospitals and the 
management of health insurance companies and policy makers, in order to 
(re) align the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 
with an efficient governance structure in a more market oriented, deregulated, 
environment.
The aim of this study makes it a practical study. A practical study is not focused on gather-
ing knowledge just because of the knowledge but because of the added value it has for an 
intervention in the current practice (Verschuren and Doorewaard 1995). The intervention 
in this study is the (re)alignment of transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies.
Van Aken (2004) claims that the academic management research tends to be description-
driven (explanatory paradigm). The utilisation problem of this research can be mitigated 
with additional prescription-driven research (design paradigm) with research strategies 
including field testing.
A design process is necessary for the research aim of this study. A design process is a 
systematic and creative process to deliver a future system in a defined environment which 
exposes the performance as planned taking into account the restrictions. The definition 
for a design used in this study is (De Leeuw 1996, p.57):
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“A design is a model of a future system that will expose the expected behaviour.”
The critical success factors of a design study are adequate problem recognition and 
-definition and a clear diagnosis of the problem. To the extent these have not been made 
clear in earlier research; these have to be explored during the study. As Verschuren and 
Doorewaard (1995, p. 32-33) state: “Especially the origin of the problem can provide 
important clues for the solution of the problem.” The transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies in the Netherlands and accompanying transaction costs are 
quite unexplored. Therefore explorative or positive research5 is used to assure a proper 
diagnosis of the problem.
1.4 Scientific relevance of this study
In recent years many articles have been published around management control and 
governance issues within a hospital organisation. The state of the art scientific literature 
on management control studies around governance and control in healthcare has resulted 
in recent articles like “the average hospital” of Sue Llewelllyn and Deryl Northcott (2005) 
and “The relation between cost-system design, managers´ evaluations of the relevance 
and usefulness of cost data, and financial performance: an empirical study of US hospitals” 
of Mina Pizzini (2006). Both studies are bothered with the performance of hospitals as a re-
sult of the incentives given by performance information and funding of the hospital. These 
studies provide us with good understanding of how performance information interferes 
with the behaviour and (long term) performance of hospitals. However efficiency is not 
only relevant on the level of the organisation but also between organisations. Transaction 
cost economics uses the transaction as the unit of analysis. Efficiency is related to the way 
transactions are coordinated. Transactions can be coordinated within an organisation 
(hierarchy) or between organisations (market or hybrid). The transaction costs determine 
the efficiency of the governance structure and are a result of the characteristics of the 
transactions, the institutional environment en the individual actors.
Transaction Cost Economics analysis of the efficiency of hospital care to scientific literature 
has scientific relevance. Which also contributes to the scientific relevance is the design 
oriented part of this study in which efficient governance structures are described for 
hospital care.
5  Explorative or positive research is used to achieve the goal of this study and to make a clear diagnosis of the problem. 
Explorative research is appropriate when attempting to describe an unstudied phenomenon (Seaman 1987, see also Van Aken 2004). 
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1.5 Theoretical framework
Using TCE is quite an obvious choice as TCE is concerned with efficient governance 
structures for transactions. Williamson (1996, p.46) describes as the main case hypothesis 
of transaction cost economics: “align transactions (which differ in their attributes) with 
governance structures (which differ in their costs and competencies) in a discriminating 
(mainly transaction cost economising) way.”
There are two important reasons why TCE and the assumptions of Williamson are chosen 
as a theoretical framework for this study:
TCE focuses on the level of governance, which is the subject of this study. Williamson 1. 
gives an extensive description of governance structures and their risks and costs 
which provides a feasible framework for this study6. TCE provides explanations for 
purposeful behaviour which are used in this study as design guidelines.
TCE is well equipped to determine the efficiency of the governance structures for a 2. 
specific transaction. The current governance structure used for the transactions be-
tween hospitals and health insurance companies in the Netherlands is a hybrid7. This 
hybrid structure is compulsory and is prescribed in detail by rules and regulations. 
However further deregulation may offer hospitals and health insurance companies in 
the future the opportunity to realign their transactions with other (hybrid) govern-
ance structures. 
The three layers of organisation model (figure 1.1) as presented by Williamson (1996) is 
used in this study as theoretical framework. Williamson presents in his three layers model 
an institutional environment8, a governance layer and an individual layer9. The efficiency 
of the governance structure is determined by the characteristics of transactions10, the 
institutional environment (shift parameters) and individual actors (behavioural attributes). 
Based on these characteristics hazards can be identified which have to be coordinated 
with an appropriate governance structure. TCE can be used to compare the efficiency 
of different governance structure in mitigating the identified hazards. This process is 
called by Williamson (1996, p.14) the “identification, explication and mitigation of hazards 
through governance”.
The mitigation of hazards can be the source of mutual gain of involved individual actors 
(Williamson 1996). It results in stability for the transactions as opportunistic behaviour 
is controlled. The three basic governance structures (market, hybrid and hierarchy), as 
distinguished by Williamson (1996), have their strengths and weaknesses concerning the 
mitigation of hazards11.
6  Some critics claim that TCE is not easy to use for empirical research (see also Masten 1994, Masten 1996 and Simon 1991). 
However Klein and Shelanski (1996) give several examples of applications of TCE which support the use of TCE in empirical 
research. 
7  TCE distinguishes three basic governance structures: a hybrid, hierarchy and market. In a perfect market the price of a product 
or service includes all information. Therefore the governance structure of a market knows only a neoclassical contract. The 
governance structure of a hybrid knows a contract and additional institutional arrangements. TCE is also well equipped to 
determine the effi  ciency of various institutional arrangements used within a hybrid (Williamson 1996).
8  In the institutional environment there are the rules of the game which infl uence the governance structure with so-called shift 
parameters. Shift parameters are for instance rules and regulations concerning property rights (Williamson 1996). 
9  The individual layer infl uences the governance layer with two behavioural attributes: bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour (Williamson 1996). 
10  The characteristics of the transaction are asset specifi city, complexity and frequency (Williamson 1996).
11  Hazards can be caused by opportunistic behaviour or adaptation problems.
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Figure 1.1 Three layers of organisation (Williamson 1996)
In chapter 2 TCE and the three layers of organisation model is described in more detail and 
a justification is given for the choice of the three layers model as the theoretical framework 
of this study.
For the aim of this study both positive and design oriented research are used. In the posi-
tive part the three layers model is used to describe and analyse the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies, the institutional environment in which they 
operate, the transactions and governance structure and the individual actors with their 
behavioural attributes. Basic knowledge of the Dutch hospital care and findings during the 
positive part of this study are used to point the three layers model to the aim of this study. 
This resulted in an extended three layers model which is based on TCE but with certain 
specifications for the characteristics of the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies, the instititutional environment in which they are organised and the 
individual hospitals and health insurance companies involved in the transactions. With this 
extended model hazards are identified for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment. The identified hazards are used for 
the design oriented part of this study, resulting in recommendations for (re)aligning the 
transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies.
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1.6 Research questions
Based on the aim of this study and the theoretical framework the following main question 
and sub questions are defined.
Main question:
Which governance structure is used for the transactions between Dutch hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a regulated environment and which governance structure is most 
appropriate from a transaction costs economic view to mitigate the hazards occurring in a 
deregulated environment?
The main question contains positive and design oriented research. The positive part 
(description of transactions and governance structure) is covered by two sub questions. 
The design oriented part (most efficient governance structure according to TCE) is covered 
by the third sub question.
Sub questions: 
How can we describe the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 1. 
and their governance structure in a regulated environment?
Which hazards can be identified for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-2. 
ance companies in a deregulated environment?
Which governance structure is most suitable, from an efficiency analysis3. 12 perspective, for 
the transactions between Dutch hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated 
environment?
1.7 Research model
The research model represents the way in which the goals of the research are realised and 
questions are answered (Verschuren and Doorewaard 1995). It concerns the methods used 
to answer the research questions.
In this research transaction cost economics is used as theoretical framework to observe 
the empirical reality. Data are gathered with desk and field research to gain an under-
standing of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
regulated and deregulated environment. Based on these empirical findings the three 
layers model was made more specific for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment. This resulted in an extended three lay-
ers model. Sub question 1 covers the regulated environment and was answered using the 
three layers model. The extended three layers model was used to answer sub question 2 
and 3 which are concerned with the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a deregulated environment.
TCE is accepted in advance by this research as a valuable theory to gain a better under-
standing of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in the 
12  Williamson (1996, p. 307) gives the next defi nition of effi  ciency analysis: “effi  ciency analysis properly encompasses governance 
costs as well as production costs”. Also costs due to excesses of waste, bureaucracy, slack, and the like are addressed as they are 
related to the alignment problem (Williamson 1996, p. 311).
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Netherlands. The specifications made to the TCE model do not withdraw TCE as an appro-
priate theory for this study but are made only for the subject of this study.
Several research methods were used during this study to collect data. Desk research and 
interviews with policymakers did provide general information. Two case studies were 
performed to gain detailed information about the transactions between a hospital and 
a health insurance company in a competitive (case study A) and in a less competitive 
(case study B) environment. With the findings a description was made of the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies using the layers as presented by 
Williamson (1996) in the three layers model: institutional environment, governance and 
individual. With the results of desk research, interviews and case studies the first sub ques-
tion is answered. In addition a questionnaire was organised which inquired hospitals and 
health insurance companies about the expected changes in the institutional environment 
(deregulation), transactions, transaction costs, hazards and the governance structure. 
The results of the questionnaire were discussed and verified in an expert meeting. This 
resulted in a good understanding of the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies in a deregulated environment. With this information hazards for these 
transactions are identified. To answer sub question 2 an overview of the identified hazards 
is presented for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
deregulated environment.
Design oriented research is used to answer sub question 3. The efficiency of governance 
structures on the highest level (market, hybrid or hierarchy) and lowest level (hybrid with 
institutional arrangements) to mitigate hazards are compared. Recommendations are 
given for coordinating the transactions between hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies efficiently in a deregulated environment.
1.8 Structure of this thesis
In this first chapter the research problem, the theoretical framework, methodology and 
structure of this thesis have been outlined.
Chapter 2 describes TCE and justifies TCE as theoretical framework for this study. The three 
layers of organisation model is elaborated and extended in this chapter.
In chapter 3 the research methods of this study are described. An outline is given of the 
different data gathering techniques: desk research and expert interviews, case studies, 
questionnaire and expert meeting.
The institutional environment in which the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies are organised is described and analysed in chapter 4. A description 
is given of the rules and regulations and recent changes in some important laws. Also out-
line is given of the expected process of further deregulation. Sub question 1 is answered in 
this chapter.
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The governance layer (layer 2) and the individual layer (layer 3) are described and analysed 
in chapter 5. This results in a description of the characteristics of the transactions, the 
governance structure and the behavioural attributes.
In chapter 6 hazards are identified for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies in a deregulated environment (sub question 2). Recommendations are 
given for realigning the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in 
a deregulated environment (sub question 3).
The conclusion, general discussion, limitations of the study and recommendations for 
future research are presented in chapter 7.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
In this study considerations of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and more in particular 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) are used to describe and analyse the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies and formulate recommendations for 
aligning the transactions with an efficient governance structure.
In this introduction the main concept of NIE and more particular TCE and the appropriate-
ness of these concepts for this study are described. In the other sections of this chapter an 
outline is given of the theoretical framework of this study.
NIE raises the question why organisations emerge like they did and not otherwise (Scap-
ens 1994, Scott and Meyer 1991, Arrow 1987, Scapens and Arnold 1986). Not so much the 
organisation itself but the boundaries and transactions (“relationship” between organisa-
tions) are subject of study.
NIE has three cornerstones: (1) property rights, (2) agency theory and (3) transaction cost 
economics (Groenewegen 2004, Douma and Schreuder 2002, Hazeu 2000).
(1) The economics of property rights claims that for efficient performance of an economic 
system it is necessary to have a clear system of property rights and related public and legal 
organisations. The design of organisations and the coordination of transactions (in house 
or on the market) are determined by the risks and possibilities of the system of property 
rights in a country. Weak property rights increase the risk of financial loss for a company 
which outsources the production of certain products or parts to a production company. 
The production company has the opportunity to sell the product without restriction or 
penalties to competitors of the company which outsourced the production. Companies 
will in general not outsource the production in an environment with weak property rights 
to avoid the risk of these financial losses.
(2) Agency theory is concerned with a special contract in which one partner has the prop-
erty (principal) and delegates tasks to another (agent).
(3) Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), the third cornerstone of NIE, is concerned with 
transactions and the way they are coordinated. TCE is focused on getting the governance 
structure right: “organise transactions as efficient as possible”. The governance structure is 
a tool to mitigate hazards and reduce the risk of opportunism resulting in order and stabil-
ity in transactions (Williamson 1996, 1985, Blois 1996, Ronen and McKinney 1970). The 
transaction is the central unit of analysis to determine the efficiency of different modes of 
governance1 (Williamson 1996, 1975).
1  Modes of governance or governance structures recognised within TCE are markets, hierarchies and hybrids.
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A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically sepa-
rable interface (Williamson 1985, p.1). A transaction can be a transfer between organisa-
tions but also between departments in one organisation (hierarchy). When transactions 
are organised in two separate organisations they are coordinated with a classical 
contract (market structure) or with a contract and additional institutional arrangements 
(hybrid governance structure). A classical contract is appropriate to coordinate transac-
tions when the price contains all the information. Complexity and uncertainties related 
to the transaction request more coordination resulting in a hybrid governance structure 
with a contract and additional institutional arrangements. Institutional arrangements 
are included in the governance structure and determine the way economic units (or ac-
tors) cooperate and/or compete. Examples of institutional arrangements are contractual 
agreements about quality, performance reporting, shared investments, innovations and 
duration of the contract.
The three cornerstones of NIE are found on different layers in the four layer scheme as 
presented by Williamson in 1998. With the four layer scheme Williamson puts TCE into 
perspective with other theories within NIE (property rights, transaction cost economics 
and agency theory), neo classical economics and social theory. He calls this scheme “The 
economics of institutions”. Institutions, with different meanings, are found on the differ-
ent layers in the scheme. There is no simple and agreed definition of “institution”2 within 
NIE (Williamson 1996 and Scapens 1994). In this study institutions in the institutional 
environment and institutions in the governance layer are relevant. In the institutional 
environment institutions are found like rules and regulations. Institutions at the govern-
ance layer are also called institutional arrangements. These arrangements are additional 
instruments to the classic contract to coordinate transactions.
2  Douglass North (1991, p.97) calls institutions: “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interactions. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” A second description North gives (1984, p.8):
“institutions consist of a set of constraints on behaviour in the form of rules and regulations; and fi nally, a set of moral, ethical, 
behavioural norms which defi ne the contours and that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are specifi ed and 
enforcement is carried out.”
Allan Schmid (1972, p.893) defi nes institutions as:
“Sets of ordered relationships among people which defi ne their rights, exposures to the rights of others, privileges, and 
responsibilities.
The institutionalist Walton Hamilton uses the next defi nition for an institution (1932, p. 84; see Hodgson 1993)
‘An institution is a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group 
or the customs of a people”.
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Figure 2.1 Economics of institutions (Williamson, 1998) or four layer scheme
The institutional environment, including property rights is found on layer 2 in the scheme. 
The institutional environment itself is embedded in informal institutions, traditions, values 
and so on, which differ across societies (Layer 1). This layer is covered by social theory. An 
example of this social embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) related to hospital care is the 
“social value” solidarity. The rules and regulations in most European countries are based on 
solidarity in healthcare. This social value is less present in countries like the United States, 
resulting in different “rules of the game” for hospitals and health insurance companies.
The institutional environment contains, besides property rights a set of other fundamental 
political, social and legal ground rules. These institutions create the “rules of the game” 
and establish the basis for economising on transaction costs by means of governance (see 
also Davis and North 1971), which is found on layer 3. Layer 4 covers the topics of resource 
allocation and employment. Agency theory and neoclassical economics are found in this 
layer.
Why is TCE appropriate for this study?
The central unit of analysis in this study is the transaction between hospitals and health 
insurance companies and the aim is to formulate recommendations for an efficient gov-
ernance structure. NIE raises the question why hospitals and health insurance companies 
are organised as they are. TCE raises the more particular question whether transactions are 
coordinated efficiently with an appropriate governance structure. This governance struc-
ture can be either a market in which hospitals and health insurance companies use a clas-
sic contract, a hierarchy in which hospitals and health insurance companies are integrated 
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into one organisation or a hybrid governance structure. This corresponds with the research 
aim of this study which makes TCE an appropriate theory for this study.
The current mode of governance for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies is a hybrid. Hospitals and health insurance companies are separate 
organisations and use additional institutional arrangements to the classic contract to 
coordinate their transactions.
This study has a positive and a design oriented part for which both TCE can be used:
In the positive part a by TCE informed description is given of (a) the current transactions 1. 
between hospitals and health insurance companies and their governance structure in a 
regulated environment and (b) the hazards in a deregulated environment. 
In the design oriented part TCE is used to compare the efficiency (or appropriateness) 2. 
of different kinds of governance structures for the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies taking into account the hazards in a deregulated 
environment. 
In this study the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are stud-
ied in the Dutch institutional environment3, embedded in the Dutch informal institutions, 
customs, traditions and norms. Therefore the recommendations can not be transferred, 
just like that, to other countries.
2.2 Governance 
Governance within TCE is concerned with the coordination of transactions. Governance 
structures are instruments for accomplishing coordination of production (Coase 1991b). 
Diversity in transactions costs are within TCE principally responsible for choosing one 
mode of governance rather than another (Williamson 1996). Three generic clusters of 
governance are featured by TCE: markets, hierarchies and hybrids. Markets and hierarchies 
are polar modes, a hybrid is found in between (Williamson 1996).
(1) In a market the coordination is established horizontally between organisations with the 
price. A classic contract leaves no room for interpretation and includes the price and all 
rights and obligations (for instance delivery time and quality) which are necessary to coor-
dinate the transaction. Incentives for organisations to deliver high performance in quality 
and costs are strong in markets. In a market the contract partner can continuously change 
of contract partners. A supplier with bad performance is immediately confronted with 
financial losses and in the end bankruptcy. High performance is rewarded with contracts 
and sales for the supplier (private benefits).
3  The “rules of the game” in the Dutch institutional environment for hospitals and health insurance companies and their 
transactions are currently in a transition phase. Major changes in laws and deregulation have been accomplished the last years 
and expected in the coming years. The ultimate goal of the government with this reform process, in which deregulation and 
the increase of market incentives are central, is an increase in effi  ciency. 
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(2) In a hierarchy coordination is established vertically within one organisation with ad-
ministrative controls. In a hierarchy there is no price mechanism as there is no possibility 
to change contract partners. This may result in a low intensity of incentives for suppliers 
to deliver high performance in quality and costs. Market incentives are however not the 
only instrument to coordinate transactions and achieve high performance and low costs. 
Administrative controls like monitoring (Speklé 2001, Williamson 1996), career rewards 
and punishments (Grossman en Hart 1986) are used in hierarchies to coordinate transac-
tions efficiently. Administrative controls are weak in a market as the classic contract does 
not incorporate these controls.
(3) Speklé (2001) gives the next definition of a hybrid: “a hybrid is a relational form of 
governance in which the main instrument of control is an explicit contract which specifies 
as fully as possible the details of the transaction and its execution”. However this definition 
is not clear about the nature of coordination of a hybrid as the definition is focused on the 
instruments used for coordination. In a hybrid both vertical and horizontal coordination 
of production is present. Horizontal coordination is necessary as production is organised 
in separate organisations. The price plays an important role in the selection of a contract 
partner. However horizontal coordination is not as strong as in a market which has two 
main reasons (both will be described in detail in the next section of this chapter):
The price does not include all information which results in incomplete contracting 1. 
and reduces the strength of the price mechanism and market incentives.
There can be limitations in the selection of a new contract partner due to for ex-2. 
ample the contract period. This increase in dependency between contract partners 
reduces the strength of the prices mechanism and market incentives. 
There is a need for additional coordination of transactions in a market when price mecha-
nisms do not work properly. This coordination can be realised with additional institutional 
arrangements to the classic contract like credible commitments. This additional coordina-
tion has the same nature as vertical coordination of transactions in one organisation. The 
next definition of a hybrid will be used in this study: “a hybrid is a governance structure 
in which both horizontal and vertical coordination is used to coordinate the transactions 
between two separate organisations”.
A market or hybrid is transformed into a hierarchy by vertical integration. Vertical integra-
tion is either backward in the supply chain or forward. An example of vertical integration is 
a health insurance company which insources certain hospital care or starts to offer certain 
hospital care itself.
Horizontal and vertical coordination are presented by Williamson in the next figure as 
important differences between the three generic governance structures by using the 
strength of the incentive intensity (in a market) and the administrative controls (in a 
hierarchy). Williamson also identifies differences in adaptation and contract law between 
the three governance structures.
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Figure 2.2 Differences between governance structures (Williamson 1996, p. 105).
Contract law, being part of the institutional environment, has effect on the governance 
structure as described in the first section of this chapter. Markets work out of strong 
contract regimes as penalties are present when contract partners breach the contract. 
Hierarchies are efficient governance structures in countries with a weak contract law. In 
semi-legalistic contract law regimes hybrids are appropriate governance structures (Wil-
liamson 1996).
Adaptations in organisations are necessary as a consequence of change (Hayek 1945). 
These changes can be a result of for instance technological innovation. In a perfect market 
changes in the demand or supply are reflected in price changes and individual actors can 
“take the right action” (Hayek 1945). Buyers can show there preferences by selectively buy-
ing products. An increased demand of products increases the volumes sold and/or prices 
of these products. Suppliers who loose contracts and/or see prices drop for their products 
will change their products or go bankrupt. Williamson (1996) calls this process autono-
mous adaptation. This is the neoclassical ideal in which suppliers and buyers respond 
independently on price changes to maximise respectively their utility and profits.
Autonomous adaptation fails when individual economic actors recognise signals to 
change differently (Williamson 1996). Price is not sufficient anymore and additional 
information is necessary to redirect divergent expectations (Malmgren 1961). This situa-
tion requests coordinated adaptation. Markets are weak in coordinated adaptations which 
can result in imperfect alignments, additional costs and delays associated with strategic 
bargaining (Williamson 1996, p. 102). Hierarchies have strong internal coordinating 
mechanisms to adapt (Barnard 1938). The authority relation (fiat) and other administrative 
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controls have adaptive advantages for transactions requesting more coordination (see also 
Williamson 1996)4.
In a hybrid co-ordinated adaptations can be supported by the administrative controls 
arranged in the contract between economic actors.
2.3 Incomplete contracting: organisational failures and hazards 
In a perfect, transparent market horizontal coordination of production between organisa-
tions is suffi  cient. A market structure is an effi  cient governance structure for the transactions 
between these organisations. A classical contract is used in which the price carries all infor-
mation and transaction costs are zero. However most markets are not perfect and transpar-
ent and the price does not carry all information. In these markets failures occur and stronger 
coordination of the production is necessary resulting in hierarchies and hybrids.
Williamson (1983) describes with his “organisational failures framework” why certain 
markets do not work properly. In the organisational failure framework bounded rational-
ity, opportunistic behaviour, uncertainty/complexity, information impactedness and small 
numbers are identified by Williamson as main sources of organisational failures. Bounded 
rationality and opportunism of economic actors are the basic assumptions in this frame-
work. Without these basic assumptions no organisational failures would exist.
Williamson (1975) mentions the “atmosphere” in his organisational failure framework. In 
later work the atmosphere is called embeddedness, including informal institutions like 
customs, traditions, values and norms (see also layer 1 in the Economics of institutions, 
figure 2.1).
Figure 2.3 The organisational failure framework (Williamson, 1975).
4  Barnard (1938) gives some examples of the advantage of a hierarchy for transactions requiring coordinated adaptations: 
(1) contracts in hierarchies are in general less detailed and therefore require less changes (due to the adaptations) and changes 
are realised by fi at, (2) solving confl icts resulting from proposed or initiated adaptations is quicker and less costly in a hierarchy 
(Scott 1987).
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Next a description is given of the elements in the organisational failure framework.
1. Bounded rationality is based on the insight that man has no means to simultaneously 
consider all the possible alternative solutions to a problem, rank them according to 
their relative merits and pick the one and only best. Instead, he considers but a few 
alternatives, and usually the more obvious ones too, and chooses one that is good 
enough (Simon 1976). This is a rational choice as actors have a limited ability to pro-
cess information and processing information is costly. The next definition of bounded 
rationality is used in this study: “behaviour that is intended rational but only limitedly 
so” (Simon 1957)5.
2. Complexity and/or uncertainty are related to bounded rationality and information im-
pactedness in the organisational failure framework. (a) A transaction is complex when 
the performance of the transaction is difficult to measure due to its variety, uncer-
tainty or highly specialised knowledge it requests and the number of possibilities and 
decisions to be taken are numerous (Williamson 1975, p.23-24). Complex transactions 
can result in measurement hazards due to the bounded rationality of economic actors 
(Holmstron and Milgrom 1991). Problems with searching costs occur when the costs of 
measuring the performance of a contract partner becomes problematic for the transac-
tion. Kenney and Klein (1983) call this oversearching (see also Barzel 1982). (b) Uncer-
tainty exists when the alternatives in the environment cannot all be considered by the 
economic actors in their decisions due to their bounded rationality. Uncertainty in the 
institutional environment can be caused by weak property rights or unpredictability. 
Highly dynamic environments know frequent and significant changes in circumstances. 
These changes can be unforeseen due to the bounded rationality of economic actors.
3.  Information impactedness is a derived condition that arises mainly because of un-
certainty and opportunism, though bounded rationality also plays a role. Information 
impactedness is the result of a complex transaction or uncertainties in the institutional 
environment in combination with opportunism. Information impactedness occurs 
when circumstances relevant to a transaction are known to one or more parties but 
cannot be discerned without costs by or displayed to others. Williamson distinguishes 
ex ante (during negotiations about the contract) and ex post (during the course of 
contract execution) information impactedness. Information asymmetry (see also Arrow 
1969) occurs when information is distributed asymmetrically between parties in an 
exchange (caused by for example a contract partner who deliberately withholds infor-
mation from another contract partner). Problems do not occur as a result of information 
asymmetry but as a result of information asymmetry related to high costs to achieve 
information parity and the proclivity of parties to behave opportunistically (Williamson 
1975). Information problems can develop even when parties have identical informa-
tion. This occurs when one party makes representations about the true state of the 
world that are different than both parties know it to be and if it is costly for an arbiter 
to discern which party is lying. An uncertain, unpredictable institutional environment 
increases this opportunity for economic actors.
5  The sociologists Powell and DiMaggio (1991 p. 3) give the following characterisation of bounded rationality: “Individuals 
attempt to maximise institutional behaviour over stable and consistent preference orderings, but they do so in the face of 
cognitive limits, incomplete information and diffi  culties in monitoring and enforcing agreements”.
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4. Opportunistic behaviour, also called opportunism is defi ned in this study as “self interest 
seeking with guile”. Opportunism refers to “the incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or 
otherwise confuse” (Williamson 1985, p. 47). An economic actor behaves opportunisti-
cally when the penalty of for instance breaching the contract is less than the gain. 
Some actors might not breach the contract but it is costly to find out
. 
5. Small numbers refers to a limited number of available contract partners in a certain 
market. Small numbers can occur ex ante or ex post (Williamson, 1975). In markets 
with a limited number of contract partners and high entry barriers and/or non homo-
geneous products ex ante small numbers occur. Ex post small numbers occur when a 
large-number exchange condition is transformed during contract execution into a small 
numbers exchange relations. This happens for example with a long term agreement or 
idiosyncratic experience during contract execution (see also asset specificity).
Small numbers give economic actors limited possibility to select another contract partner 
and results in uni- or bilateral dependency (monopoly). This diminishes competition result-
ing in weak price mechanism and market incentives.
Another example of dependency between contract partners is a situation in which an 
economic actor has a competitive advantage like a unique location or differential skill or 
has made asset specific investments (Williamson 1975) 6. Asset specific investments are 
investments which cannot be redeployed without loss of productive value if contracts 
should be interrupted7 (Williamson 1975).
Contracting for goods and services that are produced with the support of transaction spe-
cific assets can pose serious problems when not coordinated properly (Williamson 1996):
Investments are postponed resulting in production with out of date equipment and • 
techniques.
Products which need high investments are not longer produced or supplied.• 
Investments are made in more generic equipment which reduces the financial risk • 
but also reduces efficiency and/or quality of delivered products. 
The organisational failures framework shows that several elements can result in behav-
ioural uncertainties and financial losses for economic actors. These expected losses are 
hazards related to a transaction. Economic actors can reduce the expected loss by mitigat-
ing the hazards with an appropriate governance structure (safeguard). An important basic 
assumption in TCE is that economic actors use farsightedness (instead of myopia) when 
contracting. Individual economic actors are assumed to calculate the expected financial 
loss due to opportunistic behaviour of contract partners before concluding a contract.
6  In the light of asset specifi city it is interesting to refer to the concept of “relative value” as described by Nooteboom (1994) in 
the light of competition. Relative value is the surplus value of an organisation for its preferred partner compared to alternative 
partners. The relative value for a partner may be based on assets such as technological skills, production facilities, market 
knowledge, access to distributions channels or intangible assets such as image or brand name. The more unique and crucial 
these assets are to a partner, the higher the relative value is. This results in dependency between contract partners.
7  Williamson (1996) distinguishes several kinds of asset specifi city. The most common categories are site specifi city and physical 
asset specifi city. Site specifi city makes it possible to economize on inventory and transportation expenses. Physical asset 
specifi city occurs for instance when specialized dies that are required to produce a component.
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The aim of this study is to formulate recommendations to (re)align the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies with an efficient governance structure. 
This requests the identification and explicitation of hazards related to the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies. A “hazard identification framework” is 
developed based on the organisational failures framework. This framework presents haz-
ards as a result of the behavioural uncertainties that arise when incomplete contracting 
and asset specificity are joined (Williamson 1996, p.60). Incomplete contracting is a result 
of a complex transaction or uncertainties in the environment (in relation with bounded 
rationality). Behavioural uncertainties or a high risk of opportunistic behaviour increase 
the chance of financial losses and therefore create hazards.
The “hazards identification framework” is presented below.
Figure 2.4 Hazard identification framework
Identified hazards can be mitigated with safeguards. These safeguards can have many 
forms. This can be illustrated with an example of safeguards used to mitigate hazards 
related to asset specificity:
1. Use an alternative in supply technology;
2. Calculate a price for the product which represents the perceived fi nancial loss when losing the 
contract and;
3. Increase vertical coordination by supplementing the classic contract with credible 
commitments and credible threats. Credible commitments additional to other institu-
tional arrangements in a contract cover reliable compensation should a contract partner 
prematurely terminate or otherwise alter the agreement (Williamson 1996). Commitments 
are only credible when they are guided by guarantees and/or hostages8. Guarantees and 
hostages included in contracts reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour as the financial 
8  A hostage is for instance a penalty clause. When a contract partner fails to perform as contracted, he has to pay a substantial 
fee to its contract partner.
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advantage of opportunism is compensated by the financial loss resulting from the guaran-
tee or hostage (Klein and Leffler 1981, Telser 1981, Williamson 1983).
Credible threats are also a safeguard for opportunistic behaviour especially when reputa-
tion effects are high. In a hybrid they can be useful additional to or instead of the credible 
commitments. Reputation effects and voice threats are credible threats which can be used 
by economic actors as unilateral efforts to pre-empt an advantage (Kreps and Wilson 1982, 
Milgrom and Roberts 1982, Williamson 1982). Therefore credible threats appear often in a 
context of conflict and rivalry (Williamson 1996, p. 120).
4. Increase vertical coordination by insourcing the production, resulting in a hierarchy.
This example shows that many safeguards are found in the governance structure. Wil-
liamson (2000) uses a simple contracting schema to give an overview of the possibilities 
in contracting taking into account hazards and safeguards. This overview shows that 
Williamson (1996, 1975) recommends using effective, but minimum vertical coordination. 
Vertical coordination increases transaction costs (bureaucratic costs) due to limited market 
incentives and flexibility (autonomous adaptation).
Figure 2.5 Simple Contracting Scheme (Williamson 2000).
The contracting schema shows that a transaction without hazards results in a market (as 
most efficient governance structure). When hazards occur economic actors can choose 
to accept unrelieved hazards in the market. When economic actors want to mitigate the 
hazard additional vertical coordination is necessary. The first alternative is to increase the 
coordination with credible commitments as safeguard (resulting in a hybrid). The second 
alternative is to integrate and use administrative controls as safeguard (resulting in a 
hierarchy).
h=0 
s=0 
h>0 
s>0 market safeguard 
administrative 
A (unassisted market) 
B (Unrelieved hazard) 
C (Credible commitment) 
D (Integration) 
h=hazard 
s=safeguard 
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2.4 Theoretical model in a regulated environment
The first part of the positive research in this study (sub question 1) requires a theoretical 
model based on TCE which results in a description of the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies and its governance structure in a regulated environment.
The model presented by Williamson (1996) as the “three layers of organisation” will be used 
as theoretical framework for this part of the study. In this model the governance structure 
is centrally positioned between the institutional environment and the individual economic 
actors. The institutional environment and individual actors have a direct influence on the 
governance structure used to coordinate the transactions.
Figure 2.6 Three layers of organisation (Williamson 1996).
The impact of the institutional environment on the governance layer is represented in the 
model with shift parameters. The influence of individual economic actors on the transac-
tions and governance structure is represented in the three layers model with the behav-
ioural attributes: opportunistic behaviour and bounded rationality. The shift parameters 
and behavioural attributes are the primary effects in the three layers model. Secondary 
effects are called endogenous preferences and strategic or instrumental effects. William-
son (1996, p.225) states that transaction cost economics often relates to these secondary 
effects but that other modes of analysis are often more pertinent. A strategic effect is 
the influence of the governance structure on the institutional environment. An example, 
given by Williamson (1996, p.225), is an improvement in contract law, brought about at 
the request of parties who find that existing law is poorly suited to support the integrity of 
contracts. Strategic effects could also take the form of protectionist trade barriers against 
domestic or foreign competition. Williamson (1996, p.295) describes strategic behaviour 
as: “behaviour by one firm that influences the choice set of another”.
Endogenous preferences are found in the influence of the institutional environment and 
governance structure on the individual economic actor. Feedback effects from governance 
to the level of the individual can be interpreted as “endogenous preference formation” 
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(Bowles and Gintis 1993) due to advertising or other forms of “education”. The influence 
of the environment on the individual economic actors results in endogenous preferences, 
which is the product of social conditioning. The circular arrow within governance reflects 
the proposition that organisation, like law, has “a life of his own” (Williamson 1996, p.223). 
The influence of individual economic actors on the institutional environment is neglected 
in the three layers model.
The three layers model can be used as theoretical framework to give a TCE-informed 
description of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies.
The institutional environment in which hospitals and health insurance companies oper-
ate is dominated by rules and regulations. The transactions and governance structure are 
regulated in detail. Based on this basic knowledge of the Dutch healthcare the expectation 
is that shift parameters have a dominant impact on the governance structure and the 
behavioural attributes and other indirect influences have a minor role in determining the 
governance structure. This results in the model as presented below. This model is applied 
to describe and analyse the transactions between hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies in a regulated environment using the data gathered with desk research, case studies 
and a questionnaire. The results are presented in chapter 4 and sub question 1 of this 
study is answered.
Figure 2.7 Framework to describe and analyse the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies and its governance structure in a regulated environment.
2.5 Theoretical model in a deregulated environment
For the second part of the positive research in this study (sub question 2) also the three 
layers model will be used as starting point. The second part covers a description of the 
hazards which can be identified for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies in a more market oriented environment with less regulation.
In a more market oriented environment the dominant influence of the rules and regula-
tions on the governance structure is expected to disappear. With the three layer model 
it results in the expectation that also the behavioural attributes (individual layer) will 
determine the governance structure.
Institutional 
environment 
Governance 
 
Shift 
parameters 
Dutch Hospital Care   43 02-07-2008   13:48:25
Process Black
44
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
With some basic knowledge about the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies in the Netherlands some adjustments in the three layers model will in-
crease the appropriateness and added value of the model as theoretical framework. Some 
variables which are implicitly mentioned within TCE need explicit formulation and also an 
extension to TCE is necessary to the three layers model. This “extended” model will support 
the identification of hazards for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a less regulated environment. These extensions were not relevant for the 
first part of the positive research in this study as in this part the governance structure is 
expected to be determined by rules and regulations. The extended model is applied in this 
study to describe and analyse the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies using data gathered by desk research, case studies and a questionnaire.
Explicit formulation 1: Lack of competition: ex ante small numbers.
In TCE the assumption is made that in the institutional environment the preconditions for 
competition are met (for instance sufficient suppliers and buyers). As described ex ante 
small numbers are recognised within TCE to result in uni or bilateral dependency.
Small numbers is recognised within TCE as a hazard especially in combination with asset 
specificity. Referring to the current reform process of the Dutch hospital care it is plau-
sible to assume that preconditions for competition are not (yet) met and ex ante small 
numbers exist. This can have effect on the efficiency of different modes of governance as 
behavioural uncertainties and hazards arise due to this dependency. Therefore the level of 
competition is explicitly taken into account in this part of the study.
Explicit formulation 2: Institution based trust
An unpredictable and uncertain environment is called by Williamson a weak environment. 
Levy and Spiller (1994), Weingast (1993) and North and Weingast (1989) use “institution 
based trust” when they describe certain elements in the institutional environment, such 
as legal forms, forms of certification and social norms and values (Rousseau et al. 1998). 
Economic actors experience low institution based trust when the predictability of insti-
tutions in the environment is low. Within TCE this results in uncertainty about the shift 
parameters which results in incomplete contracting. This increases the risk of behavioural 
uncertainties or more specific opportunistic behaviour (see also Vosselman and van der 
Meer-Kooistra 2004, Bachmann 2001, Granovetter 1985). Although Williamson does not 
use the word “institution based trust” it is related with his concept of weaknesses in the 
environment.
Institution based trust is relevant for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies. The institutional environment in which hospitals and health insur-
ance companies operate has been highly dynamic in recent years and is expected to be 
changing in the coming years. There is no blueprint for rules and regulations and there 
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are divergent opinions about the future market for hospital care. Politics and the Ministry 
of Health have a major role in this transformation of the institutional environment. Basic 
knowledge of the current situation shows that the individual actors (hospitals and health 
insurance companies) happen to have limited trust in the institutions in the environment 
(like rules and regulations) as they change unpredictably over time. Due to the bounded 
rationality of hospitals and health insurance companies contracts are incomplete which 
results in uncertainties in behaviour.
Institution based trust is therefore made explicit in the three layers model used in this part 
of the study.
Extension: A direct influence of hospitals and health insurance companies on 
the institutional environment.
TCE considers the influence of the individual layer on the institutional environment as 
weak or secondary. This is applicable for transactions in markets with many buyers and 
suppliers and with limited government involvement. The Dutch hospital care market 
knows a limited number of hospitals and health insurance companies and knows a high 
level of government interference, based in many cases on incidents. Basic knowledge 
about the influence of individual hospitals and health insurance companies on politics and 
the Ministry of Health presume a more direct influence of individual hospitals and health 
insurance companies on the institutional environment. For the purpose of this study the 
TCE framework is extended with a primary influence of the individual layer on the institu-
tional environment.
Identification of hazards
With these extensions the “hazard identification framework” as presented in this chapter 
can be made more specific for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a deregulated environment:
The explicit notion that limited competition results in dependency, behavioural 1. 
uncertainties and finally in hazards. 
Institution based trust is explicitly associated with uncertainties in the environment, 2. 
which result in behavioural uncertainties and finally in hazards.
Uncertainties in the environment are increased by the direct influence of individual 3. 
hospitals and health insurance companies on the institutional environment. This 
results in behavioural uncertainties and finally in hazards. 
This results in the next “extended hazard identification framework” which will be used in 
chapter 6 to identify the hazards for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies in a deregulated environment (sub question 2).
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Figure 2.8 Framework: Extended hazard identification framework
2.6 Theoretical model for the design oriented part of this study
The design oriented part of this study (sub question 3) requires a theoretical model 
which can be used to develop recommendations for an efficient governance structure 
for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a more market 
oriented, deregulated environment. An efficiency analysis perspective covers not only the 
transaction costs resulting from the governance structure but also the production costs re-
lated to the governance structure (Williamson 1996, see also Nooteboom 1994). Therefore 
both will be taken into account in the design oriented part of this study.
(1) Transaction costs can be distinguished before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the trans-
action. Ex ante costs occur before the contract is concluded in which the transaction is 
arranged. Examples of ex ante transaction costs are searching and selecting a contract 
partner, drafting, negotiating and safeguarding a contract, organise dispute referrals 
(Klein Woolthuis 1999). Ex post transaction costs occur after the contract is concluded. 
Examples of ex post transaction costs are the costs of adapting the contract to changing 
circumstances, haggling costs to correct misalignments, monitoring the performance of 
the contract partner and information registration or gathering to account for performance 
to the contract partner (see also Klein Woolthuis 1999).
Transaction costs have an important relation with the volume of transactions. As many 
costs are fixed the relative costs or costs per transaction decrease for higher volumes. The 
frequency of transactions is therefore a relevant characteristic of the transaction (see also 
Williamson 1996, Nooteboom 1994).
(2) Production costs are strongly determined by economies of scale. The technology of 
production (and related initial investments in assets) determines the possibilities for 
economies of scale. In general products which require high initial investments know high 
economies of scale as the costs per unit decrease with an increase in production volume. 
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Transactions which require asset specific investments have less economies of scale when 
produced in the market (Noorderhaven 1994). An organisation is better able to realise 
economies of scale as its own requirements become larger compared to the size of the 
market. Williamson (1996) calls economising the production function by realising econo-
mies of scale “scale economy” (Neo Classical Economics, see also figure 2.1 Economics of 
institutions).
Jarillo (1988) presents a formula which can be used to compare the costs of production 
in a market structure with the costs of internal production (hierarchy). In this formula 
not only the transaction costs are taken into account but also the production costs in the 
market and the costs of self-production of the product. Basic assumption of TCE is that 
products made internally instead of in the market are more expensive due to bureaucratic 
costs and lack of market incentives. The formula of Jarillo shows that production in the 
market is not always cheaper as transaction costs necessary to coordinate the transaction 
should be taken into account in the make or buy decision. As soon as the price charged by 
the supplier for the product together with the transaction costs is higher than the internal 
costs (production costs including bureaucratic inefficiencies) of making the product, the 
production should be insourced. This results in a hierarchy.
The formula of Jarillo is presented below.
When 
  EP + TC > IC 
     an activity will be integrated.
EP   the price charged by the supplier for a product
TC   the transaction costs
IC  the internal cost of making rather than buying the product. 
Figure 2.9 Transaction costs and integration of activities (Jarillo 1988)
In this study the formula of Jarillo is used for the design oriented part of this study to 
compare the efficiency of different modes of governance for the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies.
Based on basic knowledge of the hospital care market the importance of economies of 
scale is obvious for certain hospital care (for instance acute care and highly specialised 
care). Therefore economies of scale are made explicit for the design oriented part of this 
study and incorporated in the extended three layers model. Together with the three exten-
sions this results in the next “extended three layers model”
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Figure 2.10 The extended three layers model 
The simple contracting schema (figure 2.5) as presented in this chapter shows that con-
tracting starts with a good understanding of the hazards as they determine the choice for 
a safeguard. A good understanding of the hazards for the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment is given in this study by 
the answer to sub question 2. Based on the identified hazards, the efficiency of different 
modes of governance can be assessed. In this study this is done, on the highest level, by 
comparing the costs of a hierarchy versus the costs of a market structure and hybrid using 
the formula of Jarillo in a for this study developed decision tree.
The contracting schema shows that without hazards a classic contract (market) is sufficient 
to coordinate the transactions. When hazards are identified for the transactions the need 
to reduce the behavioural uncertainties related to the hazard with safeguards arises. As 
described, hazards can be mitigated by introducing vertical coordination on the transac-
tions as a safeguard. A market structure provides no safeguards as price is the only (hori-
zontal) coordination mechanism. Both hybrids and hierarchies have vertical coordination 
mechanisms. There is however a difference between hybrids and hierarchies in production 
costs when economies of scale are high. Hazards in combination with high economies 
of scale of external production result in a hybrid as most efficient governance structure 
(a classic contract with additional institutional arrangements). The advantage in external 
production costs overrules the high transaction costs related to the necessary institutional 
arrangements. High behavioural uncertainties in combination with low economies of 
scale result in a hierarchy as most efficient governance structure. The internal costs of 
making the product are lower compared to the transaction costs and price charged by the 
supplier.
In the next figure the decision tree is described which determines the efficiency of a
governance structure: (1) behavioural uncertainties resulting in hazards requesting safe-
guards and (2) economies of scale.
This decision tree is used in this study to compare the efficiency of different modes of 
governance (market, hybrid and hierarchy) for the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies. The results of this study will show that segmentation of 
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hospital care is necessary. Transactions in different segments of hospital care have differ-
ent characteristics (complexity, frequency and asset specificity) and result therefore in 
different hazards and different economies of scale.
Figure 2.11 Framework: Decision tree for recommendations on the highest governance level.
Recommendations for an efficient governance structure can be given on the highest or 
first level (market, hybrid, hierarchy) but also on a lower or second level (hybrid). In the 
next figure both levels are presented. In a hybrid transactions are coordinated with a clas-
sic contract supplemented with institutional arrangements which differ in their character-
istics and efficiency.
The transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are currently coordi-
nated with a hybrid. Although this can change in the expected deregulated environment it 
is interesting to compare the efficiency of alternative hybrids. Production costs or econo-
mies of scale are not relevant in this analysis as in a hybrid production always is organised 
in the market. The second part of the design oriented study results in recommendations 
for a hybrid to coordinate the transactions between hospitals and health insurance com-
panies with efficient use of institutional arrangements.
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Figure 2.12 Modes of governance on the first and second level.
Institutional arrangements in a hybrid governance structure can cope with hazards result-
ing from elements as presented in the “extended hazard identification framework”:
Incomplete contracting as a result of uncertainties in the environment and/or the • 
complexity of the transaction. Incomplete contracting requests safeguards to reduce 
the chance of opportunistic behaviour.
Dependency between contract partners due to asset specificity and/or a limited • 
number of contract partners. Safeguards are necessary for situations of unilateral 
dependency between contract partners. 
To mitigate incomplete contracting a detailed contract can be used to coordinate the 
transactions. This is a classic contract when there is no room left for uncertainties and 
interpretation.
A detailed contract in which delivery time, product quality agreements or other quality 
assurances are made, is a powerful base for partners to monitor the behaviour of the 
contract partner (Klein Woolthuis 1999, De Jong 1999). Monitoring is supervising and 
judging the realisation of the contract (Nooteboom 1994). It provides a contract partner 
with the possibility to see whether its partner deviates from the (implicit or explicit) 
agreements. Additional punishment or hostages are necessary to make it credible commit-
ments. Complex transactions can result in oversearching when governed with a detailed 
contract and intensive performance measurement (see also Barzel 1982). An example of 
oversearching is given by Kenney and Klein (1983) about the trading of diamonds. Despite 
a classification in more than two thousand categories significant quality variation in the 
stones evidently remains. Measuring the performance in this transactional relationship on 
the unit of a transaction will result in extreme transaction costs. The solution is to establish 
long term relationships in which the average performance is perceived to be relevant and 
not the individual transaction with specified product characteristics. Not in case there is 
an incidental underperformance of a contract partner the contract is ended but when the 
under performance is systematic. Audits should be arranged to monitor the performance 
regularly. Again punishment or hostages have to be included in the contract to result in 
credible commitments. All-in-one (or in-or-out) contracts are institutional arrangements 
which can be used in hybrids and high complexity in transactions. All-in-one contracts are 
contracts in which contract partners arrange all transactions in one contract and it is not 
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possible to contract a subset of the transactions. The average performance for all trans-
actions is monitored with regular audits. The contract ends for all transactions or other 
punishments are used when the delivered average performance is below the average 
performance as agreed in the contract.
Long term contracts9 can be used in hybrids to mitigate hazards resulting from unilateral 
dependency and they are often used in situations of bilateral dependency. Dependency 
occurs when there are small numbers, when asset specificity is high (Williamson 1996) or 
when first mover advantages are high (for instance unique location or learning effects) 
(Williamson 1971). Long term contracts request credible commitments to reduce the risk 
of financial loss when the contract is terminated. Punishments or hostages have to be 
included to make them credible commitments. Shared investments/ownership transforms 
a unilateral dependency into bilateral dependency (reciprocity). The financial participation 
is the hostage and results in a credible commitment. Reciprocity is held to be anticompeti-
tive (Blake 1973, Stocking and Mueller 1957) but can be favourable in some circumstances. 
For instance shared investments equalises the exposure to opportunism by reducing 
the incentive of the buyer to defect from exchange and leaving the supplier to redeploy 
specialised assets at greatly reduced alternative value.
A safeguard for the identifi ed hazards can also be found in reputation-eff ects10 as reputation-
eff ects can be very powerful in hybrids (Williamson 1996, p.116). Reputation-eff ects increase 
the strength of credible threats (see also section 2.3) and decrease the need for additional 
institutional arrangements and related transaction costs. Reputation also has an eff ect in the 
market governance structure as it has impact on the selection of contract partners.
In this study an analysis is made of the efficiency of a hybrid for the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies including a detailed contract, a long term 
contract and reputation effects. This results in recommendations which can support the 
management of hospitals and health insurance companies in their efforts to transform the 
current hybrid governance structure to a hybrid which is appropriate for transactions in a 
deregulated environment. The next table is used in this study as a framework.
Hazard mitigation Transaction costs Recommendations
Detailed contract 1. 
Long term contracts and 2. 
reciprocity
Reputation effects 3. 
Table 2.1 Framework: Analysis of an efficient hybrid governance structure for transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment
9  Short term contracts can be used in a hybrid when the requested autonomous adaptability is high. However in this situation a 
market structure is often more effi  cient.
10  In addition Noorderhaven (1996) sees reputation as a functional equivalent or a substitute for character trust (see also Rowe 
1989). 
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2.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter TCE is described and the relevance of TCE for this study as theoretical 
framework is explained. The three layers model is used for the positive and the design 
oriented part of this study. The model is made more specific for the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment resulting in an 
extended model. The different TCE informed frameworks developed in this chapter are 
used in this study to answer the three sub questions as described in chapter 1.
In chapter 4 the institutional environment in which hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies operate including recent and expected changes in rules and regulations is described. 
Also a description is given of the competition in the hospitals and health insurance 
market. The model to describe and analyse the transactions in a regulated environment is 
applied in this study to answer sub question 1.
 In chapter 5 a description is given of the governance and individual layer for transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment using 
the extended three layers model.
In chapter 6 hazards are identified for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a more market oriented, deregulated environment. The extended 
hazard identification framework is used to identify the hazards. The identified hazards are 
presented in an overview to answer sub question 2 of this study.
Recommendations are given in chapter 6 for an efficient governance structure on the 
highest level with the decision tree on the highest governance level. On the lower level 
the framework for “comparison of institutional arrangements in a hybrid” is used. Sub 
question 3 is answered in this chapter.
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Chapter 3 Research Methods
3.1 Introduction
The research model of this study is presented in chapter 1. In the light of the aim of the 
study and to answer the research question, several research methods were used to collect 
data for this study. These methods are described in this chapter. A justification of the use 
of the method, details about the method used and some quality issues are addressed.
Data collection for this study started with desk research and additional interviews with 
experts. Also two case studies were performed to gain a better understanding of the trans-
actions between hospitals and health insurance companies. The third step in data collec-
tion was a questionnaire and an expert meeting. A questionnaire was sent to all hospitals 
and health insurance companies to gain more insight in the expected changes in rules and 
regulations and in the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies. 
With the expert meeting the results of the questionnaire were verified and amplified.
3.2 Desk research and expert interviews
Desk research was used to gather data about the institutional environment in which hospi-
tals and health insurance companies operate. Desk research is positive research, which 
describes the phenomenon as it is. Most important sources of information for the desk 
research in this study were:
Documents concerning government policy, rules and regulations;
Reports of committees established by the Dutch government.
Expert interviews were used to detect relevant sources for desk research and to gather 
additional information. Interviews were held with stakeholders and experts (policy makers 
at the Ministry of Health, umbrella organisations, hospitals, health insurance companies 
and scientists). In the interviews a checklist was used and a report of the interview was 
submitted to the interviewee.
Checklist used during interview with experts
- Interviewee (role and position, experience with and knowledge of relation between hospital and 
health insurance company)
- Impact of the institutional environment on the transactions, governance structure and individual 
actors (competition, rules and regulations)
- Characteristics of transactions between hospital and health insurance company (asset specificity, 
frequency, complexity)
 - Relevant characteristics of hospital and health insurance company (knowledge/information asym-
metry, opportunistic behaviour)
- Characteristics contractual arrangements (content and duration contract, monitoring, performance 
reports, budget, DBCs)
- Transaction costs
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Desk research resulted in two important findings:
Rules and regulations strongly affected the transactions between hospitals and 1. 
health insurance companies and major changes were expected due to the process 
of deregulation. There was no blueprint available of the planned reform process and 
experts had different opinions about the future environment.
Information concerning the governance structure, the behavioural attributes and 2. 
the characteristics of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies was scarce.
Based on these findings additional research methods were selected for this study. Two 
case studies were done to gain in depth knowledge of the governance structure used for 
the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies and the influence of 
the institutional environment and the individual layer.
The questionnaire was chosen to gain a representative picture of the expected changes in 
the institutional environment and the effect of these changes on the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies and the efficiency of governance structures.
3.3 Case studies
For the aim of this study it is necessary to gain a good understanding of the characteristics 
of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies, its governance 
structure, and the shift parameters and behavioural attributes. Governance is a complex 
phenomenon and case studies are well equipped to study complex phenomenon and 
their background. However they have a more interpretative character than desk research 
(Swanborn 1996, Yin 1994, Hutjes en van Buren 1992). In a case study the transactions and 
governance structure are studied in their real-life context.
The TCE framework is applied using the data gathered with case studies. The TCE frame-
work provides a predicted pattern which covers for instance the influence of the behaviour 
attributes (layer 3), the institutional environment and the characteristics of the environ-
ment on the governance structure.
As described in chapter 2 the expectation is that the institutional environment determines 
the governance structure for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies.
This predicted pattern was also found in the case studies (pattern-matching1, Yin 1994, 
Trochim 1989, Cook & Campbell 1979).
Cooperation of the hospitals and health insurance companies in the case studies was nec-
essary to gather the relevant information. Therefore an introduction meeting was organ-
ised with the CFO of the health insurance company (or a representative) and the CFO of 
the hospital (or a representative) to ensure their cooperation before the case study started. 
It proved to be no problem to organise interviews and obtain the necessary documents for 
desk research.
1  Pattern matching is defi ned by Hutjes and van Buuren (1992) as “the search for a coherent interpretation framework”.
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To ensure no bias entering the readers mind due to the reputation of the participating 
hospitals and health insurance companies the case studies are presented anonymous in 
this study.
Yin mentions six sources of evidence2 used in case studies (Yin 1994, p.80): documenta-
tion, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physi-
cal artefacts. In this study only the first three are used. It was not necessary to use direct 
or participant observations as the gathered information with documentation, archival 
record and interviews was sufficient. Physical artefacts were not relevant for this study. 
The consistency of information collected during the case studies with the three sources of 
evidence was checked (triangulation).
In the case studies documents and archival records of the hospitals and health insurance 
companies, the transactions and the governance structure are gathered like the contract, 
the performance reports and minutes of meetings. In appendix B of this study a list is 
presented of the interviewed persons and the documents and archival records gathered in 
both case studies.
Personal interviews in case studies give a good understanding of the social aspects and 
the perceptions of the different actors and the problems they perceive (Swanborn, 1996). 
Therefore interviews were held with several stakeholders in the hospital and the dominant 
health insurance company in the region. Also the negotiator who represents the other 
health insurance companies in the negotiations (the so called “national representative”) is 
interviewed.
To achieve reliable results and minimise errors and biases all interviews were prepared 
with a checklist which was sent upfront to the interviewee and interviews were reported 
and sent back for review to the interviewee. The checklist covers the elements in the three 
layers model: (1) the influence of the institutional environment on the governance and in-
dividual layer and (2) the characteristics of the transactions and the governance structure 
and (3) the behavioural attributes and their impact on the governance layer.
2  One analysis of case study methods found that those case studies using multiple sources of evidence were rated as higher 
quality than those that relied on single sources of information (Yin 1994, Bateman & Moore 1983)
The next activities were executed in chronological order during the case studies:
General information was sent to the insurance company and hospital1. 
A meeting was organised with a board member of the hospital and the representative of the 2. 
health insurance company to discuss the content, logistics and impact of the case study.
With the two contact persons the checklist for the interviews was discussed and a list with 3. 
names of persons to interview in both organisations was made. 
The checklist was sent to all persons that were planned to be interviewed. 4. 
Interviews were held with the interviewees.5. 
A report was made of each interview and sent back to the interviewee.6. 
If necessary a new version of the report was made.7. 
Reports related to the hospitals and health insurance companies in general and related to 8. 
their transactions were gathered for desk research. 
A case study report was made and was sent to contact persons of the hospital and health 9. 
insurance company.
The case study report was discussed with contact persons and adjustments were made where 10. 
necessary.
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Two case studies were performed in this study. In chapter 2 of this study an extension to 
the TCE model for the level of competition. This extension is made because it is expected 
that not all preconditions for competition are (yet) met for the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies.
Competition is an important precondition for a market structure as it determines the 
possibility for organisations to change their contract partner. To examine the impact of 
competition on the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies and 
their governance structure this criteria was used to select the cases. The two case studies 
performed during this study differ in the number of competing hospitals they have in their 
region.
The next two case studies are performed during this study in 2000 and 2001:
Case study A: a health insurance company and hospital in an urban area which is 1. 
served by many hospitals (four other hospitals in the same city and many in nearby 
cities). Hospital A is a more than medium sized hospital in an urban environment in 
which several hospitals operate. Health insurance company A has 60% market share 
in the region and is part of a big financial conglomerate. Hospital A was founded af-
ter the merger of two hospitals. There were several reasons for the merger: (1) ambi-
tions of the hospital board of directors and staff to realise a major hospital, (2) ability 
to deliver a broad range of complex hospital care3, (3) better staffing of smaller units 
which request specific expertise, (4) knowledge sharing, (5) increase of financial 
flexibility and (6) being a better partner in the negotiations with other partners (in 
particular health insurance companies). In hospital A medical specialists are not on 
the payroll but mainly self-employed.
Case study B: a health insurance company and hospital in a rural area which is served 2. 
by a limited number of hospitals (no other hospital in the same city, three hospitals 
in nearby cities). Hospital B is a medium sized hospital in a rural environment in 
which a limited number of hospitals operate. Hospital B is part of a group which 
includes nursing homes and homes for the elderly. Hospital B started building a 
new hospital with an innovative concept in which IT has a central role. Hospital B 
experiences a medical staff shortage. Medical specialists are not on the payroll but 
self-employed. Health insurance company B is a national player with a high market 
share in specific regions. The market share of health insurance company B in the 
region in which hospital B operates is 70%.
3.4 Questionnaire and expert meeting
With the results of the desk research and case studies it became clear that there was a 
diffuse vision about (1) the future developments in the hospital market in general and (2) 
more specific about the consequences for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies. A larger sample of data had to be gathered to get a representative 
picture. All hospitals and health insurance companies were asked with a questionnaire 
about their expectations of the future situation.
3  These are called “artikel 18 functies”.
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Questionnaire as research technique
A questionnaire was chosen as it is an appropriate technique to gather data in a large 
sample when there is enough information available to develop a questionnaire. The avail-
able information was sufficient for a questionnaire as desk research and case studies were 
completed.
The whole population of hospitals (95 hospitals or hospital groups) public health insur-
ance companies (23) and representatives of the other health insurance companies (18) is 
limited. The decision was made to send the questionnaire to the whole population.
Justification of persons who were asked to fill out the questionnaire
The required data about the expected institutional environment and expected transac-
tions and governance structure have a strategic character. Therefore the questionnaire was 
sent to the board of directors of hospitals and the director responsible for hospital health 
of public health insurance companies. Also the national representatives4 were asked to fill 
out a questionnaire as they are involved in the contract negotiations between hospital and 
health insurance companies.
Surveying hospitals and health insurance companies can give a bias in the results. Both 
hospitals and health insurance companies are actors in the relationship and have there 
own interests. This can have impact on the results as both can fill out the questionnaire 
in their own interest. To investigate the impact of the bias on the findings the answers of 
hospitals and health insurance companies were compared. As the difference proved to be 
not statistically significant the danger of bias in the results is found to be low.
To validate the results of the questionnaire also an invitational conference was organ-
ised. During this meeting the results of the questionnaire were discussed with experts 
and respondents. The results of the invitational conference confirmed the results of the 
questionnaire.
Quality of the questions in the questionnaire
A structured questionnaire was developed for the questionnaire with multiple choice 
answers to increase the possibilities of statistical processing. Some questions gave the 
possibility to give an explanation in open form. In interviews with three hospitals and two 
health insurance companies and some other experts (for instance from the Ministry of 
Finance) the questionnaire was checked on the next topics:
completeness and length of the questionnaire;• 
comprehensibility and meaning of questions and answer categories;• 
significance of questions. • 
Recommendations and suggestions were used to improve the questionnaire.
In the first part of the questionnaire a differentiation was made in the questions for 
hospitals compared to health insurance companies and national representatives. The other 
parts of the questionnaire were the same (with in some questions a reflection).
The questionnaire was sent in Dutch to avoid misinterpretation and to increase the 
response. The questionnaire is included in Appendix C of this study.
4  As described in chapter 3 the national representative represents the public health insurance companies with a minor market 
share and the private insurance companies in the yearly contract negotiations with the hospital.
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Response and missing values 
The next percentage of hospitals, public health insurance companies and national repre-
sentatives filled out the questionnaire and responded:
Hospitals 76%
Public Health services 65%
National representatives 55%
The questionnaire was sent in January 2003. In April the questionnaire was sent again to 
the no respondents. Three actions were taken to increase the response:
In the letter accompanying the questionnaire the respondents were offered to 1. 
receive the results of the questionnaire;
Anonymous processing of the answers was guaranteed;2. 
Non respondents were called 3 weeks after the questionnaire was sent for the 3. 
second time to remind them of filling out the questionnaire.
Reasons for the high reply can also be found in the subject of the questionnaire (in 2003 
“more market mechanisms in hospital care” was on the agenda of the board of directors of 
both hospitals and health insurance companies) and the quality of the questions (checked 
thoroughly with several experts).
In the questionnaire respondents had the possibility to choose the answer category 
“I don’t know”. This has supported probably the low number of missing values in the 
returned questionnaires. Most questions had no missing values; others had one or two 
respondents who did not answer the question.
Analysis and results
In June 2003 the results of the questionnaires were processed and analysed. Analysis of 
the multiple choice answers is done in SPSS. Statistics of small numbers was used as the 
questionnaire was sent to a small population. The multiple choice answers made it pos-
sible to process the number and percentage of answers per category.
Based on the Pearson’s Chi square there was no significant (95%) difference between the 
answers of hospitals and health insurance companies. Striking was the identification of 
a number of respondents who extremely believed in more market mechanisms and a 
number respondents who were very reserved about more market mechanisms. The big-
gest part of population was more moderate in their answers. The “extreme” respondents 
were not treated as outliers as the response to the questionnaire was high and the pattern 
was recognised already in the case studies and interviews. The consequence is that there is 
high variety in answers for most questions.
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Content of Questionnaire
The questionnaire was developed using the results of the case studies, interviews and desk 
research. The questions in the questionnaire were clustered around the next topics:
The situation of the respondent and the organisation he or she is working in;1. 
Feasibility and expected timeframe concerning the introduction of more market 2. 
mechanisms (for instance DBCs) in the hospital market;
Expected developments in the institutional environment, especially the role of 3. 
the government and changes in the number of hospitals and health insurance 
companies;
Expected changes in the position of health insurance companies;4. 
Expected changes in the position of hospitals and medical specialists;5. 
The negotiations between hospitals and health insurance companies.6. 
Topic 1 of the questionnaire is used to check for significant statistical differences between 
the answers of respondents in different situational circumstances. Also the results of 
hospitals, public health insurance companies and national representatives were compared. 
The statistical results showed no differences.
Topic 2 and 3 of the questionnaire had the goal to gather more data about expected 
changes in the institutional environment with questions about (a) the expectations with 
respect to the planned reform process of Dutch hospital care (changes in the institutional 
environment) and (b) competition in the hospital and health insurance market.
Questions with respect to the consequences of these changes for hospitals and health 
insurance companies and their transactions were covered with topic 4 and 5.
Questions in topic 6 are concentrated on the consequences of changes in the institutional 
environment, the position of hospitals and health insurance companies, their transactions 
and the governance structure.
A discussion meeting with experts was organised 9 months after the results of the ques-
tionnaire became available.
The goal of the discussion meeting was to validate and explain in more detail the results 
of the questionnaire. The results were summarised in 12 propositions. These propositions 
were prioritised by the attendants and discussed during the meeting.
A broad range of stakeholders was invited for the discussion meeting:
Board of directors of hospitals and public health insurance companies; • 
Representatives of the umbrella organisations of hospitals and health insurance • 
companies;
Policy workers of the ministry of finance;• 
A member of the Parliament. • 
The outcome of the expert meeting was that the results of questionnaire were sustainable.
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Chapter 4 Institutional Environment and 
Competition
4.1 Introduction
The institutional environment determines the efficiency of the governance structure 
with institutions like rules and regulations. In the three layers model Williamson calls this 
shift parameters. In chapter 2 the three layers model is made specific for the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies in the Netherlands in a regulated en-
vironment (situation before 2005). Rules and regulations are expected to play a dominant 
role in the institutional environment and are marked as relevant shift parameters.
In a deregulated environment the influence of rules and regulations on the governance 
structure changes. In chapter 2 also institution based trust and competition are made spe-
cific in the three layers model for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a deregulated environment.
Data are gathered in this study with desk research, additional interviews, two case studies 
and a questionnaire. The results are used to describe the institutional environment and 
competition (chapter 4) and the governance and individual layer (chapter 5).
This chapter starts in section 4.2 with a description of the informal institutions and basic 
assumptions of the government relevant for the Dutch healthcare. As mentioned in chap-
ter 2 it is relevant for this study to glance at social embeddedness in order to understand 
the institutional environment
In section 4.3 the institutional environment (rules and regulations) in which health insur-
ance companies operated before 2006 is described and analysed. Also a description is 
given of the competition between health insurance companies. In section 4.4 the institu-
tional environment before 2005 and the competition between hospitals is described.
The regulations before 2005 which determine the transactions between health insurance 
companies and the governance structure are described and analysed in section 4.5.
The latest and expected changes in rules and regulations, competition and the role of 
institution based trust are described and analysed in section 4.6.
In section 4.7 sub question 1 is answered and conclusions are given about the competition 
between hospitals and health insurance companies and the role of institution based trust.
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4.2 Embeddedness 
Embeddedness as presented by Williamson (1998) in his Economics of institutions and 
presents informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms and religion. These topics differ 
across borders and have its repercussions on the rules and regulations.
It is an important explanation why healthcare systems in the US and in Europe differ 
significantly1. Basic assumptions in which healthcare in Europe is embedded are: access 
of health and insurance, solidarity and good quality of care. The Dutch Constitution gives 
the government the responsibility to establish a solid healthcare system2. The government 
supervises hospitals and health insurance companies and, if necessary, takes corrective 
actions. The Dutch healthcare system is based on a social insurance (like Germany) and 
not a tax system (like the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, Spain). The government (e.g. the 
Minister of Health) does not have a budget right but uses rules and regulations to guaran-
tee universal access, solidarity and good quality (see also Schrijvers 2001).
Despite the described institutional atmosphere in the Netherlands, the Dutch government 
is preparing a more market oriented system for healthcare in the Netherlands. The aim of 
this reform process is to realise a more efficient healthcare system with good quality for 
patients3. The basic assumptions embedded in Dutch society prevent the Netherlands 
from introducing a commercial system like the US. Universal access, solidarity and good 
quality are high on the political agenda. Changes on this level evolve slowly. These basic 
assumptions will therefore continue to have a substantial influence in the next decennia 
on the healthcare system in the Netherlands.
4.3 Health insurance companies: rules, regulations and competition 
before 2006
Before 2006 there were two types of health insurance companies in the Netherlands: 
(1) social health insurance companies and (2) private health insurance companies. In 
general we can say that, contrary to private health insurance companies, social health 
insurance companies were:
more regulated by the government; • 
available for insurants with lower incomes;• 
compensated by the government for financial risks and losses. • 
The relevant market for both private and social health insurance companies was national. 
However the social health insurance companies had a very dominant position in certain 
regions (due to historical reasons).
The market concentration of health insurance companies in the Netherlands is high and 
still increasing in 2008. Together with the specific Dutch rules and regulations this increas-
es the barriers to entry. In 2002 the 5 largest social health insurance organisations had a 
market share of 67% (Nyfer 2004, Vektis 2003) and were dominant in certain regions with 
1  Van Kemenade (2007) presents in her book `healthcare in Europe 2007` the diff erences between healthcare systems in 11 
European countries.
2  This is described in the Dutch Constitution art. 22.
3  More information is found on the website http://www.minvws.nl/en/ and in the `regeringsverklaring Balkenende 4´. 
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market shares of 70 to 80%. Large financial conglomerates often have health and safety 
services4 (Raad voor de Volksgezondheid & Zorg 1998b) and offered different private and 
social health insurance labels
Decreasing number of health insurance companies 1986 1996 2004
Social health insurance companies 48 29 22
Private health insurance companies (including civil servants) 75 44 38
Table 4.1 Number of health insurance companies in The Netherlands (Brouwer & van den 
Broek 1997, CTG/Zaio 2005).
Health insurance companies in the Netherlands have organised themselves in an umbrella 
organisation called ZN (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland). ZN has a role in supporting health 
insurance companies with new developments in the institutional environment and in the 
negotiation and communication with stakeholders like the government, supervisors and 
the umbrella organisation for hospitals.
The Dutch government discerns three compartments in healthcare which differ in their 
funding5:
Non insurable risks like nursing homes care for disabled people and hospital care 1. 
over one year. Financed6 by the social insurance Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
(AWBZ7). 
Insurable risks for hospital care, medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Until 2006 2. 
financed by the Social Health Insurance Act (Zfw)8 and private insurances9. An ad-
ditional law is the WTZi10, which compensates health insurance companies for high 
risk patients.
Voluntary insurable risks like plastic surgery and the dentist. Financed by additional 3. 
private insurance or patient themselves.
The situation before 2006 for the Social Health insurance Act can be summarised with the 
next bullets:
Social health insurance companies work with a national budget which is set annually 1. 
by the Minister of Health11. This budget is linked to the national budget for health and 
4  Health and safety services are called ARBO-diensten in the Netherlands.
5  For more information about the health insurance system in the Netherlands see Ministry of Health (2004).
6  The contributions in this social insurance are gathered in a central fund named “Bijzondere ziektekosten”. This fund is 
administered by the CVZ (College voor Ziekenhuisvoorzieningen). These funds are used by several private and social health 
insurance companies who are authorised by the central government. These insurance companies have regional offi  ces that 
contract organisations to deliver the healthcare needed.
7  The description of the Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten is found in Staatsblad 1992, 392, last changes in Staatsblad 241.
8  The description of the Ziekenfondswet is found in: Staatsblad 1992, 391, last changes in Staatsblad 2004, 32.
9  Social health insurance companies fund 64% of hospital care, private insurance companies fund 35% , this includes 5% for the 
public servants (Ministerie van VWS, 2004). 
10  Wet op de toegang tot ziektekostenverzekeringen 1998 (Staatsblad 1998, 438, last changes in Staatsblad 2002, 82).
11  This is called macro verstrekkingen budget or MVB.
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funded with wage related premiums. The contributions of employers and employees to 
this compulsory insurance are gathered in a central fund named Algemene kas or AK. 
Also contributions paid by private insurants related to Wet Mooz (in 2004 €120 a year) 
are gathered in the AK (Ministry of Health 2004). This fund is administered by the CVZ 
(College voor Zorgvoorzieningen). The Minister together with CVZ determines how the 
budget (AK) had to be spread over the social health insurance companies. The criteria 
used are: the fixed costs for hospital nursing of the year before; variable costs (hospital 
nursing and medical specialists) and other supplies combined with the risk profile of in-
surants of the health insurance company (with criteria as age, gender, region, diagnose 
related costs).
There are rules concerning the health insurance premiums for Zfw and AWBZ. There is a 2. 
premium related to income that is set by the government and a nominal premium that 
is set by the insurance company. 
Social health insurance companies work under the Zfw and are entitled by a govern-3. 
ment agency CVZ. This entitlement creates an entry barrier for new social health insur-
ance companies. Before 1992 these social health insurance companies had a regional 
focus. Since 1992 they were allowed to work on a national level (see also RVZ 1998). 
The “Ziekenfondswet” knows a system of direct payments to healthcare suppliers. The 4. 
insurants are insured on a natura basis. Private health insurance companies are free to 
use a restitution system. Private insured patients pay the healthcare provider and claim 
restitution from their insurance company.
Social health insurance companies know a budgeting system in which the risk profile 5. 
of insurants is taken into account. They have to accept insurants with high risks for their 
basic healthcare and are not allowed to differentiate their nominal premiums. 
Social health insurance companies are not allowed to supply hospital care or to partici-6. 
pate in hospital care providers. 
Social health insurance companies are allowed to offer a complementary health insur-7. 
ance cover to their insurants of care which is not covered by the social health insurance. 
Almost all social health insurance companies (90%) offer this service. They are free to 
compose this complementary insurance including pricing. 
Social health insurance companies have the duty to assure that their insurants receive 8. 
the healthcare they need. Therefore the “Ziekenfondswet” prescribes that social health 
insurance companies contract healthcare providers, including hospitals (Ministry of 
Health, 2004).
Social health insurance companies also receive a budget to cover their organisational 9. 
costs. This budget is set by the government. Negative or positive results on this budget 
are not balanced but are either a negative or positive result for the insurance company.
In the nineties financial incentives are introduced for social health insurance companies 10. 
like budgeting and partial abolishment of balancing and recalculation (see also RVZ 
1998a). 
The Minister has set a certain minimum on the solvability of social health insurance 11. 
companies. Health insurance companies compensate negative financial results with 
their financial reserves and add positive results to their reserves. There is a maximum 
set for the financial reserves of social health insurance companies (Ministry of Health, 
2004).
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The institutional environment for private health insurance companies can be summarised 
with the next bullets:
Private insurance companies can set their own premium and define their own insurance 1. 
policy. 
Private health insurance companies have full financial risk of their health insurances 2. 
except for those insurants who are mentioned in the WTZi (elderly and patients with 
chronic diseases). The government organisation SUO (Stichting Uitvoering Omslagrege-
ling WTZ) compensates the insurance companies with an extra solidarity premium 
paid by all private health insurants. WTZ is applied to almost 40% of all private health 
expenditures. 
Private insurance companies have their own acceptance policy but are not allowed to 3. 
refuse insurants in the WTZ for the basic health insurance. 
4.4 Hospitals: rules, regulations and competition before 2005
Hospital care has specific characteristics which are important for a good understanding of 
this market. The RVZ (1998b) mentions the next characteristics:
Hospital care is necessary;• 
Patients are fully dependent in critical life threatening situations;• 
Stand by capacity is necessary, regardless the actual demand;• 
An unbalanced situation can occur due to long education time medical specialists and • 
long timeframe for building hospital facilities;
Standardisation of products is low and this makes costs and performance not • 
transparent.
Hospitals in the Netherlands are non governmental foundations (stichtingen) with their 
own profit and loss account. They are not (yet) allowed to make profit but have financial 
reservations.
Hospitals have three functions or general product groups: acute care, planned care (chronic 
and not chronic) and highly specialised care. Acute care has a strong regional focus as 
transportation time should be minimised. A regional focus is also found for certain patient 
groups like elderly and chronically diseased.
Hospital care (together with general practitioners, medical specialists, obstetricians, 
dentists and paramedics) covers almost thirty percent of all healthcare expenditures in the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Health 1999). Total hospital care costs in 2003 were almost € 17 
billion (Centraal Plan Bureau 2003) and total healthcare costs were almost 36 billion (CBS 
Statline).
The NvZ (Nederlandse vereniging voor ziekenhuizen) is the Dutch hospital umbrella 
organisation. There is also an umbrella organisation university hospitals (NFU) and medical 
specialists (OMS). These umbrella organisations have a role in supporting hospitals in 
their negotiation and communication with stakeholders like the government and patient 
associations.
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The last decades have resulted in a wave of mergers in the hospital market (see also Nma 
2003, Centraal Plan Bureau 2003, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2003). In 1990 there 
were 169 hospitals and in 2004 there were 129 hospitals in the Netherlands (CBS Statline). 
The number of hospital beds decreased in the Netherlands from 57.825 in 1998 to 51.300 
in 200512.
The National Health Tariffs Authority or CTG/Zaio (2005) gives the next figures concerning 
the Dutch hospital in 2004: 89 general hospitals, 8 university hospitals13, 8 specialised hos-
pitals (specialised in specific diseases) and 70 Private hospitals or “Zelfstandige Behandel 
Centra” (ZBC). Estimations of the ongoing trend of mergers in the hospital care market 
result in 40 to 70 hospitals left in 2014 due to mergers (RIVM 2006). The Dutch government 
has strict supervision on mergers to guarantee accessibility for patients, which can be 
threatened in certain regions by the shrinking number of hospitals14.
Figure 4.2 Overview of locations hospitals and ZBCs in the Netherlands (RIVM 2004).
A different set of government rules and regulations is developed for small scaled pri-
vate hospitals specialised in specific not clinical hospital treatments called Zelfstandige 
Behandel Centra (ZBC). Although the number of private hospitals has risen they only cover 
a small percentage of the total hospital care budget. Their funding is comparable with the 
funding of hospitals. However capital expenditures are not compensated15 and ZBCs have 
to pay more tax16 (see also College bouw ziekenhuisvoorzieningen 2003). Both increase 
the barriers to entry for new private hospitals.
12  The average number of beds in a general hospital was 234 in 1963 and 200 in 1995 (De Folter 1997, RVZ 1996). 
13  The university hospitals occupy a special place as leading hospitals with advanced clinical functions, education and research 
tasks. 
14  The last years the government has forbidden planned mergers between hospitals due to this reason. 
15  The Ministry of Health has changed this in 2008.
16  VAT exemption is limited.
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Foreign hospitals play a role in Dutch hospital care only in areas next to the border. Hos-
pitals in Belgium en German supply care to Dutch patients living in the areas next to the 
border. Triggered by the waiting lists in recent years patients also went to other countries 
for their surgery, often facilitated by the health insurance company. However numbers are 
still small as patients prefer to receive hospital care in their own region.
A radius of 25 kilometres is widely used for determining the level of competition on a 
regional level. The results of a study done in 1995 and presented by Maarse c.s. (2003) 
show that:
Only 3% of the hospitals did not have another competing hospital in a radius of 25 • 
kilometres;
44% of the hospitals had 1 to 5 competing hospitals in a radius of 25 kilometres.• 
Due to the flood of mergers after 1995 these figures are not representative for 2004. 
Varkevisser et al claims in 2004 that about 20% of all hospitals experience no competition 
of other autonomous hospitals in a radius of 25 kilometres.
Planned care (not for the elderly and chronically diseased) and highly specialised care are 
often received by patients outside the region. This increases the number of hospitals in the 
relevant market and intensity of competition. With around 100 hospitals and 70 private 
hospitals on a national level there is a high potential of competition for the planned care. 
However Porter and Olmsted Teisberg (1996) show that not only the number of hospi-
tals but also the transparency of the quality of the delivered hospital care to patients is 
necessary to activate potential competition. For highly specialised care the potential for 
competition is lower as only a limited number of hospitals offer this care.
The two case studies used in this study show that (1) competition is limited in certain parts 
of the Netherlands and (2) competition has little effect on hospital behaviour in competi-
tive regions due to the waiting lists and the contract obligation between health insurance 
companies and hospitals17.
The last decades several developments have had important effects on the hospital as 
organisation:
Tightening of the capacity of hospital beds has resulted in a strong restitution effect 1. 
to day care and OPD-treatment18. The average number of nursing days dropped from 
twenty days in 1973 to ten days in 1994. The total number of nursing days is decreasing 
since 1975 despite the increase of the Dutch population (Le Grand-van den Bogaard et 
al, 1997, p.55). CBS Statline gives for 2003 eight19 days as average number of nursing 
days.
Since 1985 there are two main trends in organisational development in Dutch hospi-2. 
tals: decentralisation and management participation of medical specialists. One of the 
goals was to realise an integrated hospital with authority and responsibility transferred 
to the operational level to overcome problems of dual hierarchy (medical specialists 
17  The two case studies diff er in the number of competitors they have in a radius of 25 kilometres. In case study B the number 
of competitors in the region is limited. In case study A there are several competitors in the region. However in case study A 
competition was not felt intense due to the waiting lists and the contract obligation of the health insurance company with the 
hospital. Hospital A does not cooperate formally with the other hospitals in the region, except with the academic hospital for 
the referral of patients. However hospital A has informal contacts with competitors in the region about the division of medical 
functions. 
18  This is called “poliklinische behandeling” in the Netherlands.
19  12.757.000 nursing days divided by 1.602.000 admissions.
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versus hospital management) and more flexibility and responsiveness (de Folter 1996, 
p. 96-97). In 1994 the committee Biesheuvel20 recommended the Minister of Health 
to transform hospitals into integrated medical organisations. The medical specialist 
in a Dutch hospital is usually self employed and receives a fee based on production 
(there are some exceptions like university hospitals). The Dutch government stimulated 
employment of medical specialists by hospitals. However due to opposition of medical 
specialists in 2001 about 70 percent of the medical specialists are still self-employed. 
The government changed the contracting process for medical specialists with health 
insurance companies. Medical specialists do not negotiate with the health insurance 
company as they did before. The board of the hospital is responsible for the negotia-
tions with the insurance company about the total hospital budget (including costs for 
medical specialists). Medical specialists have a contract with the hospital in which their 
responsibilities and fees are arranged21.
Since 1992 we see a paradigm shift in hospitals from quality assurance philosophy 3. 
towards a quality improvement philosophy (Brown 1992, p.183). Quality of healthcare 
is on the political agenda and resulted in a rule about the quality in healthcare organi-
sations (kwaliteitswet Zorginstellingen). This rule improves the position of patients 
in quality management and supports the integration of the quality systems of the 
management and professionals in healthcare organisations (Schrijvers 2001, chapter 
13). All actions in healthcare organisations should be guided by the principles of con-
tinuous quality improvement. This requires a well balanced set of quality measures and 
performance indicators. However performance measurement in hospitals is complex 
because measures are difficult to define and to monitor. An important reason is the 
independence of discretionary decision makers as medical specialists, nurses and lab 
technicians (de Folter 1996, p.98). OECD has developed indicators to measure the qual-
ity of healthcare. In the Netherlands CBS and RIVM have studied the development of 
10 indicators (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 2007). The results were promising for 
a number of indicators as they indicated improvement in healthcare quality. However 
hospital care knows a broad variety of products with a low standardisation, which com-
plicates measurement and transparency22. Reputation is found to play a major role in 
the process of patients to choose a hospital and/or medical specialist for treatment. The 
importance of reputation is also found in the case studies and questionnaire (presented 
in chapter 5).
Historical separations of activities among general hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, nurs-4. 
ing homes, medical specialists and other providers are eliminating because of integra-
tion strategies to provide better healthcare (transmural care). There are three factors 
stimulating this integration: 
higher awareness of patient care as a whole;• 
more strategic alliances creating a network of care institutions;• 
technology driven communication and knowledge sharing tools (see also de Folter • 
1996, p. 99 and Braithwaite et al. 1995, p.87).
20  Committee Biesheuvel advises the Minister of Health in 1994 to increase the cooperation and coordination between diff erent 
organisations in the chain of hospital care (GP, hospital, nursing homes). The general practitioner should have a more dominant 
position and work closely with the medical specialist in the hospital. Rules and regulations should be made more fl exible to 
accept diff erent new ways of delivering care to patients requesting hospital care. 
21  This is facilitated with two documents: a MTO (model toelatings overeenkomst) and a DMS (document medische staf ).
22  An important complication in performance measurement is severity. 
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 Schrijvers (2006) presents the developments in the care delivered outside the hospitals 
in his article `The elections and the future of the AWBZ`. These developments will have 
a significant effect on hospital care as a result of the described integration strategies. 
A barrier for further integration is however often the financial compensation of these 
activities. 
The general practitioner has an important role in the Netherlands in directing patients 5. 
to the hospital. The government has given the general practitioner the role of “gate-
keeper”. Patients need (except in case of emergency) a referral from the general practi-
tioner before they get treated in the hospital (Zfw article 4, lid 2). This is requested by 
the health insurance companies to avoid unnecessary rise in healthcare costs.
An important law for hospitals is the planning and construction law (WZV23):
The government sets an annual budget for all healthcare expenditures, in order to 1. 
restrict the healthcare expenditures (macro budget). Maximum prices per medical 
performance and ratios (e.g. number of beds per 100 inhabitants and number of 
medical specialist-performances) are used to calculate this budget. The budget is 
divided over the healthcare insurance companies, who divide it over the hospitals 
with contracts. 
All large construction and expansion initiatives should be approved by the govern-2. 
ment if the hospital wants to obtain government funds.
Hospitals are budgeted on four components (functiegerichte budgettering). These four 
components are (SCP and CP 1997):
The availability component: based on the number of inhabitants in the region 1. 
(adherentie). 
The capacity component: based on the number of beds and medical specialists. A fixed 2. 
price per bed and medical specialist and an additional fee for special facilities. 
The production component: covers the variable costs of the hospitals. The budget is based on 3. 
the agreed production numbers with the health insurance companies (not on the real pro-
duction).These production numbers include number of nursing days, clinical admission, day 
treatment, fi rst outpatient appointments and specifi c treatments (“bijzondere verrichtingen”).
The production numbers multiplied with the maximum prices as set by the National Health 
Tariff s Authority, result in the budget. Diff erences in real production and budget production 
are covered afterwards with an adjustment of the nursing day tariff . The scale of the hospital 
also determines the budget. There are three scales. The bigger the hospital the higher the fee 
for the various production numbers. Diff erences between the small and large scale hospitals 
are 15%. 
The location component: covers costs like energy, maintenance and depreciation.4. 
23  Wet ziekenhuisvoorzieningen (Staatsblad 1971, 268, last changes in Staatblad 220).
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Also rules and regulations concerning the budget system in which hospitals operate are 
important to mention:
The very costly (often low frequent) and highly specialised hospital care is regulated • 
by the government (topreferente zorg, WBMV24). The government gives special 
permits to hospitals for this care to avoid overinvestment and achieve coordination. 
These permits result in high entry barriers for new hospital care suppliers in these 
segments of hospital care.
Pricing of hospital products is regulated with maximum prices set by the govern-• 
ment (WTG25). 
The government has introduced in 2002 a rule to compensate hospitals for additional 
production (so called “boter bij de vis”). The goal of this rule was to reduce waiting lists by 
increasing the production in hospitals with financial incentives.
In 2006 the government has introduced more progressive changes in the financial 
compensation for hospitals with new rules and regulations. The (expected) changes are 
described and analysed in section 4.6.
4.5 The transactions: rules and regulations before 2005
In this section rules and regulations which determine (1) the transactions between hos-
pitals and health insurance companies and (2) the contracting process are described and 
analysed. Recent and expected changes are presented in section 4.6.
1. Transactions
The transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies can be divided in a 
financial (administrative) flow (payments) and a flow of goods/services (the delivery of 
care to the patient). Payment and delivery of services are organised between three actors: 
the hospital, the patient and the health insurance company.
The patient/insurant has an insurance contract with the social or private health insurance 
company and pays insurance premiums to the social health insurance company. In return 
the patient/insurant is assured of the payment of hospital care as agreed upon in the 
insurance contract.
The flow of goods/services is the same for social and private health insurance companies. 
Hospitals ask the health insurance company for approval before providing the care to the 
patient (except for urgent care26). The hospital informs the patient whether the insurance 
company will reimburse the payment. The health insurance company is responsible for the 
administration and handling of insurants with excess for certain hospital care.
The financial flow between social and private health insurance companies differs. Regula-
tions prescribe social health insurance companies to use a system in which they pay the 
24  Wet Bijzondere Medische Verrichtingen (before artikel 18 functies WZV). WBMV is introduced in 1997 and gives the 
government the possibility to stimulate, slow down or stop developments in medical care and the availability of medical 
technology and to concentrate these in certain hospitals (Ministry of Health 1999, p.46). The government decides in which 
hospital the special medical treatments will be located or reallocated.
25  Wet tarieven gezondheidszorg (Staatsblad 1980, 646, last changes Staatsblad 23).
26  Urgent care is hospital care which has to be delivered immediately to complex patients.
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hospital bills for their insurants. Private health insurance companies in general use a resti-
tution system in which the patient pays the hospital bill and sends the bills for restitution 
to his or her health insurance company.
In figure 4.3 and 4.4 the relations between the hospital, patient and health insurance 
companies are summarised.
Figure 4.3 The transactions between hospitals, social health insurance companies and 
patient/insurant.
In the restitution system patients receive a bill for the received hospital care and ask res-
titution from their private health insurance company. There are exceptions where private 
health insurance companies have contracts with hospitals for direct payment. This is an 
extra service for the insurants and it decreases the overall administrative costs for hospital 
and insurance company.
Figure 4.4 The transactions between hospitals, private health insurance companies and 
patient/insurant.
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2. Contracting process
There is an annual contracting process between hospitals and health insurance companies. 
This contracting process is embedded in fi nancial regulations (Zfw, AWBZ and WTG), quality 
regulations (Wet BIG, Kwaliteitswet Zorginstellingen) and the planning of health supply (WZV).
The contract includes agreements about the amount of hospital care provided to the 
insurants of health insurance companies27 and agreements about the financial compensa-
tion for hospitals. With these contracts the macro budget for hospital care as set by the 
government is distributed between the Dutch hospitals.
A special system of representation of health insurance companies has been introduced 
by the government to facilitate the contracting process between the hospitals and health 
insurance companies. The social health insurance companies with the highest market 
share, together with a representative of all the other health insurance companies (national 
representative), negotiate and contract the hospitals.
Negotiations are organised around the next topics:
the number of nursing days; • 
volume of clinical admission; • 
volume of day treatment; • 
volume of first outpatient appointments.• 
The negotiated numbers are included in the contract. The contract has a prescribed format 
(called model contract) but can be supplemented with voluntary basis agreements about 
quality and performance information exchange (called individual contract). The prices are 
limited to a maximum (set by the CTG) but negotiable. However until 2006 in general only 
maximum prices were used in the contracts.
In the next figure the three important contracts which are used in the contracting process 
between hospitals and health insurance companies are presented.
Figure 4.5 Relevant contracts for the coordination of transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies.
27  The government has made insurance companies responsible to contract suffi  cient hospital care for their insurants.
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The contracting process starts with a “result of discussion” (Uitkomsten Van Overleg) 1. 
or “model contract”. Representatives of hospitals and health insurance companies (or 
when they fail the CVZ) construct the model contract. Results of discussion and model 
contracts contain co-ordinated agreements between the hospitals and health insurance 
companies that should be used as a framework for the individual contracts. 
When the result of discussion or the model contract is authorised by the CVZ individual 2. 
contracts can be finalised. These contracts are the result of the negotiating process 
between hospitals and (a representative28 of ) the health insurance companies. 
A health insurance company which does not negotiate with the hospital has the 3. 
possibility to link up with an individual contract. Regulation prescribes social health 
insurance companies to link up with every contract finalised with a hospital in the 
Netherlands. The national representative represents their interests in the negotiations. 
Private insurance companies are free to join.
The individual contracts between hospitals and health insurance companies must include at 
least the following information (prescribed by the government, see article 44 number 3 Zfw and 
article 42 number 4 AWBZ):
Start and duration contract• 
Rights and duties of the contract actors • 
The care to be delivered• 
Quality and efficiency parameters about the care to be delivered• 
Administrative procedures• 
Control procedures• 
Rules regarding termination of the contract• 
The possibility to install a committee when disputes arise between parties.• 
The next performance or management reports are prescribed by the government (Zfw and 
AWBZ):
Quarterly report (6 weeks after quarter has ended) with production figures (number 1. 
of products delivered, number of OPD-day treatment, number of clinical admissions) 
and financial figures; 
Financial annual report;2. 
Quality annual report.3. 
4.6 Deregulation of the Dutch healthcare: 2005 and later
The healthcare expenditures in the Netherlands were over € 38 billion in 2002. This is 
roughly 12% of GDP. The expenditures were 28 billion euros in 1999 (Ministry of Health 
2003). The challenge for the Dutch government is to reform the healthcare market to 
establish an affordable healthcare for the future (Ministry of Health 2001a, 2001b, 2002).
28  Usually social health insurance companies with the largest market share in the region and a private insurance company.
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The government has announced in their strategic plans of 2002 and 200329 a basic health 
insurance for all citizens. This has resulted in the introduction of the “Zorgverzekeringswet”30 
in 2006. The distinction between private and social health insurance companies has disap-
peared resulting in only private health insurance companies. Health insurance companies 
can choose whether they want to use restitution system or contract hospitals and pay 
hospital bills directly.
In the new law a difference is made between a basic insurance and a complementary 
insurance. The basic insurance includes all necessary healthcare (including care already in-
sured within the Zfw, see section 4.5). For this basic insurance health insurance companies 
have to accept all insurants. As before health insurance companies are compensated for 
costs of high risk insurants to avoid that insurants are not accepted by insurance compa-
nies due to their high health risk. Health insurance companies are allowed to select and 
refuse insurants for the complementary health insurances.
To increase the competition between health insurance companies the patients are allowed 
to change their health insurance company at the beginning of every year. Health insur-
ance companies offer reductions to insurant groups who join as a group. This has resulted 
in an enormous increase of employers who contract health insurance companies for their 
employees. The employer negotiates with the health insurance companies about the 
conditions of the insurance for the employees.
The “Zorgverzekeringswet” started with a no-claim component31 to restrain the consump-
tion of healthcare. Due to the limited effect health insurance companies replaced it in 
2008 with (limited) excess risk for insurants. The Netherlands knew an almost hundred 
percent health insurance rate. This percentage has dropped since 2006 which will prob-
ably result in new regulation of the government to stop this trend.
The law WTG has been changed dramatically in 2005 with the WTG Express. The goal of 
this new law is liberalisation of the price setting for hospital care based on the product 
system DBC (see also WTG32 2000 and Ministry of Health 2001a). DBCs include all costs 
of treatments between diagnoses and discharge of the patient. Clinical, inpatient and 
outpatient treatments are covered in the DBC system, including the workload of medical 
specialists. It is an important instrument for the Ministry of Health in the process of further 
deregulation. The main goal of DBCs is competition between hospitals with transparency 
in the costs and performance of hospitals. This transparency supports health insurance 
companies (and patients) in selecting the best performing hospitals and increases the 
incentives for hospitals to improve their performance. Since 2008 the compensation of 
medical specialists is based on a general hourly rate (set by the government) and the time 
necessary for the treatment as set in the DBC system.
The DBC system has, like the DRG system, also another goal: offer hospital management 
the means for understanding and controlling resource usage within hospitals (Lehtonen 
2007, Fetter and Freeman 1986, Fetter 1987).
The Dutch government operates with a step by step approach and uses segmentation in 
hospital care to introduce more market mechanisms. This segmentation resulted in seg-
29  Strategisch Akkoord kabinet Balkenende I 2002 and Hoofl ijnen akkoord kabinet Balkenende II 16 mei 2003.
30  Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 2004/05, 29 689, nr. 12
31  A no-claim component gives insurants the opportunity to receive part of their paid insurance fees back when they have not 
submitted a claim during a year.
32  WTG is the law Wet Tarieven Gezondheidszorg.
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ment A and B of hospital care. In 2005 segment B contained 10% of all, non acute hospital 
care (budget of € 900 million). For this segment free price negotiation (contract obligation 
is lifted and prices are no longer set by the government) between hospital and health 
insurance companies is possible. Examples of care in segment B are hip replacement and 
cataract operations. Segment A contains all other insured hospital care (CTG/Zaio 2005). 
There is a standard pricelist for DBCs which is maintained by a governmental body33. The 
questionnaire shows that more than one in three respondents expects that the contract 
obligation for hospitals and health insurance companies will not be lifted completely 
before 2008 (table 4.2). These expectations are confirmed by the situation in 2008. In 2007 
the government has announced to increase the segment B from 10% to 20% of all, non 
acute hospital care in 2008. For the other non acute hospital care the plan was to intro-
duce a “benchmark competition price system”. However the Dutch parliament has post-
poned this plan and is investigating other possibilities to introduce controlled competition 
in the hospital market.
At the start of the DBC system the capital expenditures were left out due to complicated 
financial valuations of hospital buildings. The government is planning to incorporate the 
capital expenditures in the DBC price. In 2008 a start is made in the negotiations between 
hospitals and health insurance companies for the prices including capital expenditures for 
segments of (not complex) planned care.
Changes in rules and regulations have also had direct effect on the contracting process 
between hospitals and health insurance companies and the way hospitals are financed. 
The law “Herziening Overeenkomstenstelsel Zorg (HOZ)34” is adopted as of 1st of February 
2005 and has resulted in:
Repeal of contract obligation in “Ziekenfondswet” for segment B of hospital care.• 
Repeal of ‘uitkomsten van overleg’ en modelovereenkomsten “ziekenfondswet”.• 
Health insurance companies and hospitals are free to contract for the B segment and 
model contracts are not longer used.
The government has ordered hospitals in 2005 to present product price lists for segment B. 
The price on this list is used for not contracted hospital care. The insurance company 
compensates all or a reasonable part (at least 70 percent) of this price to the patient35.
To give healthcare suppliers more flexibility in organising the hospital care in their region 
the WZV is replaced in 2006 with the WTZi36. It is the first step in deregulation of the plan-
ning and construction laws37. Key in WTZi is permission to supply care which is related to 
the “Zorgverzekeringswet” or AWBZ. This permission guarantees that healthcare suppliers 
meet certain criteria as accessibility, transparency, governance structure and operational 
management. This permission has been dropped and new entrants to the hospital market 
are not restricted any longer in their product range and are allowed to supply all hospital 
care (segment A and B, including clinical treatments). These new entrants are called Zelf-
standige Behandel Centra or ZBCs (see also section 4.4).
33  Beleidsregel standaardprijslijst (I-710) CTG/Zaio, taking eff ect on october 1st 2004.
34  Tweede Kamer, 2003-2004, 28 994.
35  Insurants which are treated in a hospital at the time the contract with his or her insurance company ends is assured of 
prolongation of his care without extra costs (amendment Van der Vlies, Kamerstuk 2003-2004, 2\d.\d.\d. nr 18 Tweede Kamer).
36  Wet toelating Zorginstellingen. The WTZi has passed on october 18th 2005. 
37  See also kamerstukken II, 2003/04, 29379 and 2000/01, 27659).
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Also the WTZi does no longer restrict health insurance companies from offering hospital 
care or participate financially in hospitals. This has resulted in new initiatives like a new 
operation unit in a hospital in the South of the Netherlands which is financed partly by the 
health insurance company.
4.7 Expectations for the future
The plans of the government to change rules and regulations are not undisputed. The 
expectations of hospitals and health insurance companies about the future changes are 
investigated in this study with a questionnaire. The answers to questions related to the 
institutional environment (role of the government, supervising agencies, rules and regula-
tions) and competition are presented below. The research methodology of the question-
naire is described in detail in chapter 3.
In the questionnaire hospitals and health insurance companies were asked about their 
expectations concerning the timeline in which the preconditions for a free hospital market 
will be met. The results in the next table show quite a variety in answers. Many respond-
ents expect all preconditions will be met in the long run. However a substantial part of the 
respondents expects that certain preconditions will never be met. For instance 33 percent 
expects that complete funding of hospitals on DBC output will never happen.
When will the next market precondi-
tions be met for hospital care? (% an-
swers based on 103 questionnaires)
2004 2005-2006 2006-2008 >2008 Will not happen No idea
DBCs for all hospital products 2% 23% 38% 15% 21% 0%
DBCs for a part of the hospital 
products 32% 43% 18% 1% 4% 1%
Funding of hospital based on 
DBC-output 1% 12% 29% 22% 33% 2%
Partly funding of hospital based on 
DBC-output 21% 40% 28% 5% 4% 0%
Health insurance companies have suf-
ficient understanding of the efficiency 
of hospitals
2% 23% 33% 26% 15% 0%
Health insurance companies have 
sufficient understanding of the quality 
of delivered hospital care 
1% 17% 38% 28% 16% 0%
Contract obligation for health 
insurance companies to contract all 
hospitals is lifted
5% 22% 32% 21% 14% 5%
Contract obligation for hospitals to 
contract all health insurance compa-
nies is lifted
6% 17% 30% 19% 26% 2%
Sufficient hospital care supply 8% 22% 20% 24% 18% 8%
Table 4.2 Results Survey 2003: question 2.2 
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In a more market oriented system not only price but also transparency of quality is 
important (see also Porter and Olmsted Teisberg 2006). Transparency of quality and of 
the performance of hospitals and medical specialists is important for health insurance 
companies and patients to select a hospital. In recent years more and more information 
has become available about the performance of hospitals (e.g. annually benchmarking by 
Elsevier, Algemeen Dagblad and several internet sites).
In the Netherlands a system called peer review is used in the associations of medical 
specialists (organised for each discipline). In addition the umbrella organisation for 
hospitals in the Netherlands has introduced a quality stamp for hospitals. An organisation 
called “Nederlands Instituut voor Accreditatie Ziekenhuizen (NIAZ)” is launched to review 
hospitals on a set of performance indicators resulting in a star-rating. Also the IGZ 38, the 
State Inspectorate of Health, has an important role in monitoring the quality of delivered 
hospital care.
As described in this chapter supervising agencies like CTG, CTZ and IGZ play an important 
role in the Dutch hospital market to guarantee universal access, solidarity and good qual-
ity. In 2006 the law Marktordening Gezondheidszorg (WMG) has replaced the WTG. The 
WMG covers rules about the market structure, the efficiency and controlled cost develop-
ments in the healthcare. The WMG assigns the supervision of the hospital market to differ-
ent organisations like Nma, NZa and IGZ. NZa or Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit is a result of 
a merger between CTZ and CTG on October 1st 2006. The mission of this new supervising 
agency is (NZa, 2006):
 “The NZa creates and monitors a market of the Dutch healthcare market which works well. 
The interests of the patient are of central concern. Efficiency on the short and long run, 
transparency of the market, freedom of choice, accessibility of healthcare and quality are 
guaranteed by the NZa”.
The results of the questionnaire show that most respondents expect that supervisors will 
be as important in 2008 as they are in 2003 especially on the topics: quality, access and 
competition. Over 35% of the respondents also expect that health insurance companies 
have to certify themselves in the future and over 50% thinks this maybe will be the case. 
Certification is an instrument which can be used by supervising agencies to monitor the 
quality of organisations.
More important As important as in 2003 Less important
What is your opinion about the role 
of supervising organisations in the 
hospital market in 2008
26% 57% 17%
Table 4.3a Results Survey 2003: question 6g 
38  Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg.
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Which topics will be monitored by supervising agencies? The next topics were mentioned by 
more than 50% of the respondents:
The quality of the delivered hospital care (78%)
Accessibility of hospital care (65%)
Competition in the health insurance market (64%)
Competition in the hospital market (64%)
Accessibility of health insurances (52%)
Table 4.3b Results Survey 2003: question 6
Do you agree with the next propositions? Certainly Maybe Definitely not No idea
Health insurance companies must certify themselves 1. 
for being a good health insurance company. 37% 51% 6% 6%
Table 4.4 Results Survey 2003: question 3 
Several rules and regulations have changed in recent years in the reform process of Dutch 
healthcare. The questionnaire shows however that most respondents are not sure whether 
deregulation will result in less infl uence of the government in the institutional environment. 
The results in the table below show that around 40 percent of the respondents expect this 
will defi nitely not happen (question 3.1, 3.2, 3.3). Question 3.3 shows that hospitals and 
health insurance companies experience elusiveness of rules and regulation. Only 6% of the 
respondents are certain that the predictability of rules and regulations will increase
.
Do you agree with the next propositions? Certainly Maybe Definitely not No idea
The government will withdraw itself from the hospi-2. 
tal market the next 5 years (2003-2008). 7% 54% 38% 1%
The macro budget for hospital healthcare will disap-3. 
pear after successful implementation of DBCs. 7% 44% 41% 8%
The predictability of rules and regulations concern-4. 
ing hospital care will increase the next 5 years. 6% 41% 44% 9%
Competition between hospitals will increase 5. 
because of the introduction of DBCs. 41% 51% 8% 1%
Private hospital care suppliers (including ZBCs) will 6. 
play in 2008 a substantial role in the hospital market 
(with a market share part of more than 20%).
10% 46% 44% 1%
Insurants/patients will receive in 2008 a substantial 7. 
part of their hospital care outside their own region. 6% 34% 56% 4%
New entrants in the health insurance market will 8. 
play an important role. 16% 61% 16% 8%
The influence of umbrella organisations will de-9. 
crease in the next years. 27% 56% 14% 3%
Organisations representing the interests of patients 10. 
will gain more influence in the relationship between 
hospital and health insurance companies.
23% 54% 18% 5%
Table 4.5a Results Survey 2003: question 3 
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Respondents are not sure what will happen with the level of competition (table 4.5a and b):
Only 8 percent thinks competition in the hospital sector will not increase, 41 percent 
thinks it will definitely increase (question 3.4);
10 Percent is certain that private hospitals will play an important role in 2008 and • 
44% thinks this will definitely not happen (question 3.5);
Only 6% percent of the respondents is certain that patients will receive a substantial • 
part of their hospital care outside their region, 56% thinks this will definitely not be 
the case (question 3.6); 
Only 16 percent expects new entrants to play an important role in the health insur-• 
ance market and 16 percent think this will definitely not happen (question 3.7). 
Around a quarter of the respondents expects an increase in the influence of umbrel-• 
la organisations (question 3.8) and patient organisations (question 3.9) and around 
15 percent think this definitely will not happen39. 
Only 4 percent of the respondents do not expect that health insurance companies • 
will invest in procurement of hospital care from abroad.
What investments will be done by health 
insurance companies to maximise their 
profit of the introduction of more market 
mechanisms? 
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Procurement of hospital care abroad 26% 64% 4% 6%
Table 4.5b Results Survey 2003: question 6.2 
Most respondents expect that collaboration between hospitals will either increase or 
change after the introduction of more market mechanisms. This is in line with the trend 
in the institutional environment of mergers between hospitals. Burgess et al. (2005) argue 
that hospital network activity itself does not affect price. However when they are working 
in the same market tis will raise the price. Overall conclusion of Burgess is that hospital 
networks are as likely to use arrangements in pro-competitive as in anti- competitive ways. 
Further research is recommended to gain more insights in the effects of network arrange-
ments on hospital pricing behaviour.
Collaboration hospitals after the introduction of more market mechanisms (question 3k):
39% thinks hospitals will increase collaboration
9% thinks hospitals will decrease collaboration
15% thinks hospitals will not change their level of collaboration
39% thinks hospitals will change the way they collaborate
Table 4.6 Results Survey 2003: question 3k
39 With the concentration in the health insurance market the role of ZN as umbrella organisation for the health insurance 
companies has diminished in 2008. The role of the umbrella organisation of the hospitals has increased in 2008 with a focus on 
the communication with stakeholders like the Ministry of Health. 
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Competition with the threat of losing clients to competitors and the ultimate consequence 
of bankruptcy triggers organisations to be competitive and deliver a good performance 
on costs and/or quality. The threat of bankruptcy is an important precondition. Only  1 in 3 
respondents expect bankruptcy for hospitals with bad performance in 2008 and 1 in 2 
respondents expects this for health insurance companies. In 2006 the first Dutch hospital 
became bankrupt and had start up with a new owner and new management. Despite a 
very bad financial position of some Dutch hospitals there were no other cases until June 
2008.
Will hospitals and/or health insurance companies with bad performance will be bankrupt in 2008?
29% expects both hospitals and health insurance companies with bad performance will be bankrupt 
5% expects only hospitals with bad performance will be bankrupt
22% expects only health insurance companies with bad performance will be bankrupt
43% expects neither hospitals nor health insurance companies with bad performance will be bankrupt.
Table 4.7 Results Survey 2003 question 6f
4.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter a description is given of the (expected) institutional environment of trans-
actions between hospitals and health insurance companies and the level of competition 
based on the data gathered with desk research and additional interviews, case studies and 
a questionnaire.
This chapter confirms the dominant influence of rules and regulations on hospitals, health 
insurance companies and their transactions. Before 2006 rules and regulations determine 
the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies and the way they are 
coordinated. In the three layers model the shift parameters between the institutional envi-
ronment and the governance layer determine the way the transactions are coordinated.
In chapter 5 the results of the case studies confirm the dominant rules of rules and regula-
tions before 2005.
Figure 4.6 Framework to describe and analyse the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies and its governance structure in a regulated environment.
Institutional 
environment 
Governance 
 
Shift 
parameters 
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With this conclusion sub question 1 is answered in this chapter:
How can we describe the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies and its governance structure in a regulated environment?
The expected deregulation in the institutional environment will result in less influence 
of the shift parameters on the governance structure. The results of the questionnaire 
show the doubts about complete deregulation. The expected situation is rather a semi-
regulated environment. The informal institutions, customs, traditions and religion in which 
the Dutch hospital care is embedded support these expectations. The basic assumptions 
in Dutch health care (access of health and insurance, solidarity and good quality of care) 
request a certain regulation. Changes in these assumptions will take decennia.
Limited competition in the hospital market (1) and the role of institution based trust (2) 
are two other important conclusions of this chapter.
(1) The market concentration in the health insurance market is high:
Mergers and acquisitions resulted in a limited number large financial organisations with 
different health insurance brands;
There are very dominant health insurance companies in many regions; • 
The entry barriers for new entrants are high.• 
The relevant market for health insurance companies is national. Despite the very dominant 
position of health insurance companies in many regions the number of health insurance 
companies is (still) sufficient to realise competition.
There are sufficient hospitals on a national level to realise competition. Most hospital care 
is however supplied within a region. The number of hospitals in many regions is limited 
which complicates the introduction of a market with competition between hospitals. 
Segmentation on the characteristics of hospital care and/or patient groups is necessary 
to determine the (potential) competition between hospitals. Urgent care and care for 
chronically diseased people and elderly people is delivered in general within a region. 
Highly specialised care and certain planned care have a bigger relevant market as this 
care is often provided to patients outside the region. However the complication of highly 
specialised care is that special permission of the government is needed to receive financial 
compensation. The result is that only a very limited number of hospitals deliver this care 
on a national level.
Competition is included, in chapter 2, in the extended three layers model for the design 
oriented part of this study as complication with competition was expected. This chapter 
confirms that a limited number of hospitals can complicate the realisation of competition 
in certain segments of hospital care or for certain patient groups.
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(2) The basic assumptions in Dutch hospital care do not correspond with complete 
deregulation and the effects of a free market. The management of hospitals and health 
insurance companies have a variety of ideas about the future institutional environment 
and the role of the government. Expected changes in rules and regulations are not clear. 
This elusiveness of rules and regulations is presented in chapter 2 in the extended three 
layers model as institution based trust. Low institution based trust effects the behaviour of 
economic actors and will be taken into account in the design part of this study.
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Chapter 5 Governance and Individual Layer
5.1 Introduction
The extended three layer model is applied in this chapter to describe and analyse the 
transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies and the way they are coordi-
nated. Data gathered with the case studies and with the questionnaire are used to increase 
our understanding of the governance structure and the variables which determine the 
efficiency of this governance structure. As described in chapter 2 the characteristics of 
the transactions have a dominant impact on the coordination of transactions. Additional 
variables which have a direct or indirect effect on the way transactions are coordinated are 
presented in the extended three layer model. The shift parameters, behavioural attributes, 
economies and scale and competition have a direct effect on the governance structure. 
Institution based trust and the direct influence of individual actors on politics and govern-
ment have an indirect effect. The shift parameters resulting from the institutional envi-
ronment, competition and institution based trust are presented in chapter 4. The other 
variables are described in this chapter.
In section 5.2 the results of the case studies and in section 5.3 the results of the question-
naire are presented. This chapter ends with a conclusion about expected changes in the 
way transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated 
environment will be coordinated in an economic way.
In the next chapter the results of chapter 4 and 5 are used to identify the hazards for 
the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated 
environment.
The “extended three layers model” as presented in chapter 2 is presented in the next 
figure.
Figure 5.1 The extended three layers model.
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Governance 
Individual 
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5.2 Results of the case studies
In this section the results of the two case studies performed in 2000-2002 (before deregu-
lation) are presented to describe and analyse the governance and individual layer. First 
the governance structure as found in the two case studies is described (5.2.1.). Next the 
characteristics of the transactions (5.2.2.), economies of scale (5.2.3.) and the behavioural 
attributes resulting from the individual layer (5.2.4.) are described. This increases our un-
derstanding of how these variables determine the efficiency of the governance structure.
5.2.1 The governance structure
A contract, meetings and performance reports were found as instruments in the govern-
ance structure of the two case studies. However there role in coordinating the transactions 
was found to be limited due to the dominant role of rules and regulations and the limited 
financial risk for contract partners. In a regulated environment the added value of institu-
tional arrangements other than the ones prescribed by rules and regulation are limited. 
Both hospitals and health insurance companies in the case studies confirmed the limited 
impact but saw their efforts as a first step towards the governance structure necessary in 
the expected deregulated environment.
The contract 
The gathered documents (archival records) in both case studies showed that the pre-
scribed individual contracts based on the standardised form of CTG are concluded on 
a yearly basis. The contract between hospital and health insurance company contained 
standardised parts (start and duration of the contract, rights and duties and so on) and 
three main topics which were filled out every year:
1. Budget
In chapter 4 the budget system as prescribed by rules and regulations is described. The 
negotiators in the two case studies complained that the budget was set for 95% by rules 
and regulations. Their negotiations were focused on only the last 5% of the budget.
2. Production figures
The production figures in a hospital are related to historical production (e.g. number of 
beds) and to the budget. Until 2002 hospitals did not receive financial compensation for 
an increase in production. The case studies showed this resulted in a conflict of interests 
as health insurance companies had to reduce waiting lists for their insurants. With the 
introduction of a new rule in 2002 (“boter bij de vis”), which compensated hospitals for 
extra production, this conflict of interest disappeared. Case study B showed also another 
conflict of interest. Health insurance company B wanted priority for their insurants in hos-
pital B as they had waiting lists for insurants in other regions. Hospital B gave patients in 
the own region priority1 and is not bothered about the insurance company of the patient. 
This resulted in conflicts.
1  An important reason for this is that studies have shown that patients prefer to be treated in a nearby hospital.
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3. Number of specialists
The number of specialists and medical functions were the third topic in the contract. The 
two case studies showed that hospitals prefer to increase the number of medical func-
tions in their hospital. An increase in medical functions increases production, budget, 
reputation and the possibility to attract good physicians. Health insurance companies are 
consulted by the Ministry of Health before a hospital is awarded for the request of a new 
medical function. Hospitals and health insurance companies have a conflict of interest as 
health insurance companies want optimisation of medical functions in a region.
Hospital A and B discussed additional medical functions with the health insurance com-
panies. To increase their negotiation power hospital A discussed the division of medical 
functions with other hospitals in the region before discussing it with the health insurance 
company.
The case studies showed that contract partners did not feel the need to use additional 
arrangements to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Health insurance company B 
mentioned that they can ask support of one of the supervising agencies when they have 
lost faith in the hospital. In practice this instrument was hardly used as problems were 
discussed and solved between the contract partners. This is illustrated with the next quote 
of a physician in hospital B:
“Punishments for breaching the contract are not necessary. Health insurance 
companies and hospitals will not start a fight. They are sentenced to each 
other for the regional demand and supply of hospital care.”
Hospital B and health insurance company B did not share their willingness to create a part-
nership. Hospital B liked to share financial risks and involved health insurance company 
where possible. An example of an initiative of hospital B was the membership of a board 
member of health insurance company B in the new building “think tank” of hospital B.
Health insurance company wants to operate independently and does not want to increase 
dependency with for instance long term contracts or co-financing activities.
There was a conflict when health insurance company B breached the long-term contract 
with hospital B as soon as financial disadvantages appeared for them due to changes in 
government rules and regulations. There were no punishments recorded in the contract. 
This opportunistic behaviour of health insurance company B had a negative impact on the 
relationship with hospital B.
Hospital A and health insurance company A did not like the idea of a partnership. Health 
insurance company A did not want to be involved but liked to be informed about major 
investments in hospitals. The next quote of the negotiator of health insurance company A 
illustrated this: “Hospital A is not very keen on discussing the hospital policy with the health 
insurance company”. Hospital A informed health insurance company A only when they 
need additional budget.
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In both cases additional contracts were concluded for financing innovation/improve-
ment projects in the hospitals. This is illustrated with the next quote Hospital B physician: 
Coordination between hospital and health insurance company is necessary to realise innova-
tion and major improvements in hospital care. Both health insurance companies used a form 
that had to be filled out to apply for financial compensation for hospital innovation/im-
provement projects2. Compared to the budget of the hospital there were no considerable 
amounts of money involved in these additional contracts.
Meetings
In both case studies meetings were organised between hospitals and health insurance 
companies. In both case studies four types of meetings were determined:
Two to four times a year the hospital policy was discussed. In spring the long-term 1. 
policy plan of the hospital was discussed in one or more meetings with the health in-
surance company. In autumn the results and problems in the realisation of the hospital 
plan were discussed in the same setting.
Several technical meetings were held to prepare the content of the contract and the 2. 
negotiating process. In the technical meetings representatives of the health insurance 
company, the national representative3, the finance manager and the representative of 
the medical staff of the hospital attend. Production figures and rules and regulations 
are the main discussion topics. 
The contract negotiation meetings were joined by representatives of the health insur-3. 
ance company, the national representative, the board member, finance manager and 
the representative of the medical staff of the hospital.
Several meetings were organised to discuss the hospital performance during the year. 4. 
In the case studies 4 problems were found with respect to the meetings which did not 
have major impact in a regulated environment but could result in hazards in a deregulated 
environment.
In general the meetings were not well structured and archived.1. 
Discussions and agreements about qualitative aspects were not archived at all. A quote 
of the health insurance company A negotiator illustrates that this caused problems: 
“Arrangements between hospital and health insurance company are not always documented 
well within health insurance company A. This gives the hospital the possibility to behave 
opportunistically.”
The policy meetings were focused on financials and not on policy concerning delivered 2. 
hospital care.
Both hospitals4 were very negative about the added value health insurance companies 
had in discussions about hospital care. The only advantage hospital B found in the 
policy meetings was the referral of health insurance company B to examples of innova-
2  In case study A there were three projects running in 2001 (started in 2000) with a fi nancial horizon of 3 years. One project 
was 50% fi nanced by the hospital. The form provided by health insurance company A contained information about project 
defi nition, project goal, fi nancials and number of patients. In some projects the medical adviser of the health insurance 
company was involved in the project team, in others there was only periodic reporting.
3  The national representative and health insurance company try to reach consensus before discussing issues with the hospital. 
Although their interest is often confl icting they have a good relationship in which they act as a team. 
4  In 2002 the archiving system for hospitals in health insurance company B is not yet computerised. A project team is concerned 
with future improvements in the information system. 
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tions in other hospitals (best practices).5. A quote of hospital B financial manager il-
lustrated the situation: “Current policy meetings are a ritual. The real decisions are made in 
informal meetings between the directors of both hospital and health insurance company.” 
The dominant role of rules and regulations was perceived as main cause of the limited 
added value of the policy meetings. A physician of hospital B illustrates this with the 
next quote: “Realisation of agreements made in policy meetings is difficult due to rules and 
regulations”.
Unbalanced negotiation partners.3. 
The hospitals in both case studies found it problematic that the representatives of the 
health insurance companies had no decision power in the negotiations. They often had 
to go back to their manager to discuss the issue. This slowed down the negotiation 
process and frustrated the board of directors of the hospitals. The health insurance 
companies admitted the problem but also that this was the negotiation strategy of the 
health insurance company.
Delay in negotiations.4. 
In both cases studies the budget was not set and negotiations were not finished before 
the start of a new budget year. In case study B the budget for 2002 is discussed for the 
last time in spring 2002 before it is set. Both hospital and health insurance company 
claim this is not a desirable situation, however in practice, given the framework of rules 
and regulations, there is believed to be no real alternative.
Performance reports
The health insurance companies used the provided financial reports of the hospitals to 
analyse their pattern of spending and to signal financial misbehaviour (e.g. under invest-
ments). The gathered performance reports in both case studies show that both hospital 
A and B deliver the legally required management information to the contracted health 
insurance companies:
production figures;1. 
number of fulltime equivalents;2. 
number of specialists;3. 
waiting lists and extra production (compared to agreed production);4. 
entry time (Treeknormen5. 6and OPD);
number of performances (verrichtingen).6. 
There were several issues were found in the two case studies related to the management 
reports. Again these issues had no severe consequences in a deregulated environment but 
should be addressed properly in a regulated environment to avoid opportunistic behav-
iour of one of the contract partners.
In both case studies the management reports were delivered often too late without 1. 
any consequences. The process of management reporting from hospital A to health 
insurance company A had a long history of problems. Reports were delivered too late 
and incomplete. For example the first quarterly report of 2001 was delivered in July 
5  There is a regular report with benchmark data of the hospitals performance. Health insurance company B has started a study 
to defi ne performance measures for the quality of hospital care (not highly specialised). This is done with 8 or 9 hospitals 
(including Hospital B). The study is fi nanced by health insurance company B and the hospitals. Benchmark information health 
insurance companies can generate in the nearby future can be of help for health insurance companies and hospitals to 
improve effi  ciency and quality.
6  Treeknormen are the permitted maximum number of people on waiting lists.
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2001. An important cause was the problems hospital A experienced with its information 
system. Hospital A was also sometimes reluctant to provide health insurance company 
specific information. Hospital B also had delays in reporting internal and external 
management information. This was mainly due to the new information system. The 
expectations were that in the future hospital B would be able to generate sophisticated 
management reports. 
In both case studies the monitoring of health insurance companies on the performance 2. 
of hospitals and more in particular the quality of the delivered hospital care was per-
ceived as weak. For instance in case study A quality of hospital care was only monitored 
by the health insurance company with the registration of complaints of insurants. There 
were two reasons for the weak monitoring: (1) The information system of both health 
insurance companies was inadequate. Both health insurance companies were investing 
in their information systems. Health insurance company B mentioned that they also had 
the intention to benchmark hospitals on performance. (2) The role of the medical advi-
sor in monitoring the performance of hospitals was relevant but limited. Their capacity 
was limited and they did not acquire the necessary information from the hospitals. This 
is illustrated with a quote of the health insurance company A medical advisor: “Profes-
sional medical groups have a peering review to check the performance of physicians in 
hospital A. These visitation reports are not given to health insurance company A”. In both 
case studies reputation was recognised as an important safeguard which prevents the 
delivery of poor hospital care. A good reputation attracts patients which is important 
for both hospital management and physicians. 
As mentioned hospital B wanted to establish a partnership with health insurance com-3. 
pany B and provided health insurance company B with additional performance reports. 
Long term investment plans, the results of the Balanced Scorecard, the quality annual 
report and health innovation initiatives were provided. However these reports were 
never discussed between the contract partners and were only used by the health insur-
ance company to check whether the initiatives were in line with rules and regulations. 
The differences between the two case studies concerning the governance structure and 
used instruments were found to be limited to the perceived dependency and the willing-
ness to realise a partnership.
5.2.2 Characteristics of the transactions 
As described in chapter 2 TCE discerns 3 characteristics of a transaction: asset specificity, 
frequency and complexity. These characteristics can give rise to hazards and have there-
fore impact on the governance structure. The results of the case studies are used in this 
section to describe and analyse the characteristics of the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies. The results of chapter 4 show that the characteristics 
of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are found to be 
irrelevant for the governance structure in a regulated environment. The results of the 
case studies confirm these results. However the extended three layers model shows that 
the characteristics of transactions will become relevant in a deregulated environment as 
the governance structure is no longer prescribed by rules and regulations. The charac-
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teristics found in the case studies are relevant for the next chapter of this study in which 
the hazards of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
deregulated environment are identified.
Asset specificity
The results of the case studies showed several categories of asset specificity. TCE perceives 
asset specificity as an issue as it bears financial risks for contract partners when one of 
the partners breaches the contract and switches to a competitor. The results of chapter 4 
showed that the rules and regulations prevent switching. Contract obligation makes the 
financial risk related with asset specificity irrelevant for hospitals and health insurance 
companies. Further deregulation will change this situation.
1. Site specificity
In both case studies hospitals and health insurance companies claimed that most patients 
(especially certain patient groups) prefer to go to the hospital in their region and some-
times even town. The distance between a hospital and supply chain partners (e.g. nursing 
homes) was also identified as a site specific asset as this had impact on transportation 
costs. Site specificity was seen as especially crucial for urgent care as patients are brought 
in general to the nearest hospital. For a hospital with a limited number of competitors in 
the region (like case study B) site specificity was most relevant.
2. Physical asset specificity
During the case studies the physical assets of hospitals were distinguished in the next 
categories:
Buildings and equipment related to capacity (number of beds, OPD treatments)• 
Equipment, innovative techniques and educated people related to certain specialised • 
care.
Equipment to support the hospital organisation in general (e.g. ICT).• 
Assets in the first category are related to volume but not related to certain products/ treat-
ments delivered by the hospital (DBCs). Especially urgent care has a high capacity related 
financial component. Also hospital care which requests an operation and/or admission 
has a capacity related component. Hospital buildings are big investments often related 
to the number of beds (volume). These investments include new hospital development, 
expansions, renovations and improvements of the buildings. Redeploying the assets 
for contracts with other health insurance companies is possible. However possibilities 
are limited as (1) most patients go to nearby hospitals and (2) in many regions there is a 
dominant health insurance company with a market share of 50 tot 90 percent. This may 
cause problems for hospitals to redeploy these assets as other health insurance compa-
nies. Redeploying the assets for other purposes is also possible as an example illustrates. 
The first bankrupt hospital in the Netherlands “Slotervaart hospital” had several bidders in 
2006. One of them wanted to create apartments in the hospital building.
Hospital A did not view asset specificity as a threat as (1) the budget system compensated 
investments (2) the contract obligation and (3) the shortage of hospital care supply.
Hospital B experienced high financial risks for the innovative building concept with invest-
ments in IT and a new hospital building which did not fit into the rules and regulations. 
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Health insurance company B supported hospital B in the discussions with the Ministry of 
Health about the budget. However health insurance company B did not like to share risks 
and co-finance the innovative building concept.
Investments in physical assets diff er among hospital products. For instance most highly spe-
cialised hospital care needs high investments in medical equipment. Physical asset specifi ci-
ty occurs when investments in these assets are not redeployable when the contract partner 
ends the contract. In both case studies physical assets of the second category were found. In 
some cases the health insurance company fi nanced part of the assets with innovation funds. 
These funds were however limited compared to the hospitals budget. Both hospital A and B 
did not experience the risk of physical asset specifi city for the transactions with health insur-
ance company A respectively B due to the contract obligation and budget system.
Physical assets in the third category (equipment to support the hospital organisation in 
general) are not related to a hospital product but related to the organisation as a whole. 
There are possibilities for redeployment.
3. Human asset specificity
The case studies showed that the quality, qualifications and reputation of physicians are in 
many cases leading for the patient to choose a hospital. Both hospitals and health insur-
ance companies recognised that having the best physicians in a hospital is an important 
asset. This attracts patients especially for specialised and complex care. Health insurance 
companies would prefer to contract hospital care for their insurants given by the best 
physicians. This is however only possible with further deregulation.
Not only rules and regulations but also asset specific investments to realise transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies can result in barriers to entry for new 
hospital care suppliers. This is applicable for the next hospital care: (1) hospital treatments 
which require the availability of an intensive care, (2) hospital treatments requiring high 
investments in building or equipment and (3) hospital treatments which know a shortage 
of physicians.
Frequency
Frequency is related to the number of transactions between two contract partners. As 
described in chapter 2 the frequency of transactions has an impact on the efficiency 
of the governance structure. The results of the desk research showed that social health 
insurance companies had in general high market shares in certain regions. A high market 
share in a region implied many patients consulting the hospitals in the region. This results 
in many transactions between hospital and health insurance company and therefore 
a high frequency. Private health insurance companies have lower market shares and 
therefore a lower frequency. The case studies confirm these findings. In both case studies 
the social health insurance companies have high market shares and the private health 
insurance companies represented by the national representative have low market shares. 
As described in chapter 4 the difference between public and private health insurance 
companies has been lifted in 2006. However the dominant market shares of certain health 
insurance companies have not changed.
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It is not only interesting to analyse frequency related to the market share of the health in-
surance company but also for hospital products. Some hospital treatments or DBCs occur 
frequently others are very rare. This is mainly a result of the occurrence of the disease. This 
frequency is not related to the commonly used segments of hospital care as all segments 
(urgent, highly specialised and planned care) know frequent and rare treatments (DBCs).
Complexity
Within TCE a transaction is called complex when the price and/or quality of a product or 
service is not transparent7. The more information is not captured in the market price, the 
more complex the transaction (see also chapter 2).
The results in chapter 4 show that the government has introduced the DBC system to han-
dle the complexity of hospital care and increase the transparency of costs and perform-
ance of hospital care. The interviewees in the two case studies confirmed that hospital 
care is complex. The complexity is caused especially by the variety in products and the 
difficulty to measure and benchmark quality of delivered hospital care. The next three 
important aspects of information are mentioned in the interviews held and documents 
consulted in the case studies:
Volume: the production figures are registered by the hospital and reported to the 1. 
health insurance companies on a periodic basis. 
Quality: the variety in products (diagnoses and treatments) and the specialised 2. 
knowledge of the physicians indicates how difficult it is to measure quality of hos-
pital care with performance indicators. The risk profile of patients complicates this 
process. An example was given in the case studies: a patient with heart problems 
having an operation related to another diagnosis (e.g. a fracture) has a higher risk of 
experiencing complications than a patient without these heart problems. This makes 
benchmarking complicated. As the medical advisors of health insurance company A 
illustrates the government (IGZ) plays an important role: “The medical performance 
of a hospital is not transparent for a health insurance company; however the health 
insurance company can alert the IGZ8 when signals of medical performance problems 
are detected by the health insurance company”. Reputation was mentioned by both 
hospital and health insurance company in both case studies as important incentive 
for hospitals to deliver high quality hospital care. 
Costs: in the budget system costs of hospitals were not linked to output/products 3. 
which make benchmarking and managing costs difficult. One of the goals of the 
introduction of the DBC system was to change this. A physician in the case studies 
confirmed this: “DBCs will increase the transparency of costs”.
7  TCE calls problems with performance measurement of complex transactions a measurement hazard which can result in high 
transaction costs due to oversearching (Williamson 1996). A measurement hazard can cause instability in the transactions 
between two organisations when not handled properly with an adequate governance structure. 
8  Inspectie voor de GezondheidsZorg: this organisation has the task to check the quality of care delivered by hospitals in the 
Netherlands. 
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5.2.3 Economies of scale
In the extended three layers model economies of scale are presented as a variable having 
impact on the governance structure for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment.
Economies of scale are related to the costs per product for different production volumes. 
For instance 200 hip replacement operations a year will result in other investments in 
physical assets and another price compared to 2000 hip replacement operations a year. 
Production in the market has the advantage that volumes necessary for several health 
insurance companies can be joined. Insourcing by a health insurance company reduces 
the volume to the necessary production for its own insurants. It is relevant to determine 
for hospital products whether they are provided to patients on a regional or a national 
level as competition differs. On a national level the market shares of health insurance 
companies are not dominant. The case studies confirmed that on a regional level market 
shares can be very dominant (70 to 80% of all insurants). Economies of scale are no issue 
to insource hospital care with a regional focus for health insurance companies with a 
dominant market share in the region. The interviewed persons in the case studies expect 
an exception for the hospital products which occur very rarely and hospital products 
which request very high initial investments which can be shared in the market (like urgent 
care). Economies of scale of production in the market can be relevant for health insurance 
companies with minor market shares in the region and for hospital care with a national 
market. Economies of scale of the market can also be relevant for highly specialised care 
which requests high initial investments in physical assets and human assets. The results 
of the case studies show the complexity of economies of scale for hospital products due 
to variety in market share of health insurance companies and the variety in frequency and 
initial costs of hospital care.
5.2.4 Behavioural attributes: the individual layer
TCE distinguishes bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour as behavioural at-
tributes of the individual actors. The results of the case studies show the limited impact of 
bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour on the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies in a regulated environment. This confirms the results 
of chapter 4 in which the governance structure is determined rules and regulations. The 
case studies show however a potential threat of bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviour for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
deregulated environment when not coordinated properly.
Bounded rationality and information asymmetry
As described in chapter 2 actors have a limited ability to process information. This implies 
that they act with limited rational behaviour or with “bounded rationality”. The results of 
the case studies show that both hospital and health insurance company are focused in 
their negotiations on the legally required budget parameters related to production. Qual-
ity and efficiency are not taken into account.
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Within TCE especially information asymmetry is identified as a point of attention for 
transactions between two organisations. Information asymmetry in combination with 
opportunistic behaviour is seen by Williamson (1996) as one of the main problems for 
transactions between two organisations as it creates instability (see also chapter 2). The in-
terviewees in the case studies identify information asymmetry as an issue for the transac-
tions between hospital and health insurance company. Both health insurance company A 
and B experience a considerable lack of knowledge about the performance of the hospi-
tals. In a regulated environment the problems arising from this information asymmetry in 
the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are however limited. 
This situation will change with further deregulation as opportunism will result in negative 
financial consequences for the other contract partner. The results of the case studies show 
that the expectation of hospitals and health insurance companies is that both want to 
reduce this information asymmetry with investments in for instance information systems 
and benchmarking. The expectation is however that the both actors have cognitive limita-
tions in processing information and hospitals and health insurance companies will not be 
able to completely avoid information asymmetry.
The case studies show three causes of the information asymmetry between hospitals and 
health insurance companies:
Knowledge of hospital care, which is complex, is limited within health insurance com-1. 
pany A and B. Employees are in general not medically educated but business oriented. 
Only the medical advisor of the insurance company has a medical background. Both 
health insurance companies in the case studies have medical advisors. The medical 
advisor has mainly added value in innovative/improvement activities in the hospital. 
Health insurance company A never visits the hospital to view production units and gain 
understanding of the operation and performance of hospital A. Quote of physician in 
hospital A: “The knowledge of the health insurance company about what happens in a hos-
pital has shortcomings”. A quote of the health insurance company B negotiator: “Health 
insurance company B does not have an exhaustive picture of the performance of hospital B”.
Both health insurance company A and B have a high turnover rate in contact persons 2. 
for the hospital which increases lack of knowledge and experience. Health insurance 
company A had three different persons in the last year. Health insurance company B has 
replaced its contact person four times in six years. 
As mentioned hospital A and B have problems with their information system and are 3. 
not able to process and report performance information. 
Opportunism
The assumption of TCE is that organisations can behave opportunistically. When the eco-
nomic actor gets the opportunity from an economic point of view9 he will act in his own 
favour (see also chapter 2).
Interviewees in both case studies (hospitals and health insurance companies) confirm 
the existence of opportunistic behaviour. Quote Health insurance company A negotia-
tor: “Lack of transparency makes both partners suspicious”. The hospitals are most likely 
to behave opportunistically due to the information asymmetry experienced by health 
insurance companies. Quote Health insurance company A negotiator: “Hospital A is behav-
9  For example TCE claims that an actor will breach the contract when the punishment of breaching the contract is less than the 
gain.
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ing opportunistically whenever they have the possibility”. An illustration with a quote of the 
board member hospital B: “Hospital B behaves opportunistically with the goal to gain more 
budgets.”
An example of opportunistic behaviour of health insurance company B is the contract 
concluded with a hospital abroad to solve their waiting list problems without informing 
hospital B. Hospital B was not amused as they were not involved.
In the two case studies the consequences of opportunistic behaviour on the transactions 
were experienced as limited due to the regulated environment. The financial consequenc-
es of opportunistic behaviour for both hospitals and health insurance companies will rise 
with further deregulation.
5.2.5 Direct influence of individual actors on the institutional 
environment 
The extended three layer model shows that individual actors not only determine the 
efficiency of a governance structure with their behavioural attributes but also indirectly 
by influencing the institutional environment. In both case studies hospitals and health 
insurance companies illustrate this indirect influence with the use of lobbying and press 
and media to influence directly the policy makers at the Ministry of Health and politics.
An example found in case study B is hospital B using the media to express their dissatisfac-
tion with the negative impact of rules and regulations on hospital care10. Health insur-
ance company B was not informed and not pleased with this article as it damaged their 
reputation.
Also lobbying is used in both case studies and the board of directors of both hospitals 
and health insurance companies have positions in committees which are related to the 
government.
The direct influence hospitals and health insurance companies have on the institutional 
environment is perceived as negative as it is used often opportunistically. The next quote 
of a physician of hospital A illustrates this: “Lobbying within the government occurs without 
informing health insurance company A”.
5.3 Results of the questionnaire
The case studies have resulted in an increased understanding of the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies and the governance structure. The information with 
respect to the expected future situation found in the case studies was however limited. As de-
scribed in chapter 3 a questionnaire was used in this study additional to the case studies. In this 
questionnaire all hospitals and health insurance companies were questioned about the transac-
tions between hospitals and health insurance companies, the governance structure and the 
expected changes. The expected institutional environment is described and analysed in chapter 
4 using the results of the questionnaire. In this section the results of the questionnaire are used 
10  Hospital B experienced frustration of the rules and regulations and the fact that health insurance company B did not want to 
share any of the fi nancial risks of the new building. 
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to increase our understanding of the expected governance structure and the variables which 
determine this governance structure11.
5.3.1 The governance structure
The questionnaire included questions about the current governance structure and the 
expected future governance structure. The next table shows that reliable DBC information, 
trust between negotiators and a good relationship between the board of directors and 
the physicians in a hospital are perceived as most important by 80 to 90% of the respond-
ents. A good contract and good knowledge of the need for hospital care are perceived as 
important by 60 to 70 percent of the respondents.
How important are the next characteristics of 
the negotiations between hospital and health 
insurance company?
Not important Somewhat important Important No idea
A good contract1. 4% 31% 65% 0
Reliable DBC information2. 5% 20% 75% 0
Long-term relationship between negotiators3. 13% 57% 28% 2%
Trust between negotiators4. 3% 20% 77% 0
Good relationship between board of direc-5. 
tors and physicians in the hospital 0% 21% 79% 0
An health insurance company having a good 6. 
knowledge of the hospital 5% 45% 50% 0
Negotiators having a good knowledge of the 7. 
need for hospital care. 1% 33% 65% 1%
Table 5.1a Results Survey 2003: question 6k
In chapter 2 reputation is mentioned as a credible threat which can be used in governance 
structures to mitigate hazards and opportunistic behaviour. The results of the question-
naire show that the respondents think that reputation is important for the transactions be-
tween hospitals and health insurance companies. Voicing about reputation can therefore 
be used in the governance structure as a credible threat.
Do you agree with the next proposition? Certainly Maybe Definitely not No idea
Reputation will retain an important variable for 1. 
hospitals to monitor the quality of the delivered 
care and to monitor the satisfaction of patients.
88% 9% 2% 1%
Table 5.1b Results Survey 2003: question 3 
11  In the presentation of the fi ndings of the questionnaire no diff erentiation is made between the answers of hospitals and health 
insurance companies. As described in chapter 3 there are no signifi cant diff erences found in the answers of both respondent 
groups.
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Respondents expect a slight, although not significant, shift in the characteristics of the 
relationship between hospitals and health insurance companies (table 5.2). A bit more 
tight lipped, content oriented, hostile and long term focused.
How would you characterise the relationship between hospital 
and health insurance company? 
In 2003
Average score
In 2008
Average score
1 = very open, 5 = very tight lipped 2,4 2,8
1 = very content oriented, 5 = very process oriented 3,2 2,8
1 = very cooperative, 5 = very hostile 2,6 2,8
1 = short term focused5 = long term focused 2,5 2,7
Table 5.2 Results Survey 2003: question 6m and 6n
The questionnaire was filled out by the respondents in 2003. Table 5.3 shows that respond-
ents expect various scenario’s for the governance structure which will be used in 2008 for 
the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies. Shared investments, 
preferred supplier contracts, contracting with several health insurance companies and the 
use of benchmark information, DBC information and protocols are mentioned by respond-
ents as possibilities. The recommendations in this study will show whether these govern-
ance structures are appropriate for the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies in a deregulated environment in the light of TCE.
Which scenario is most likely in 2008? 
Hospital and Health Insurance Compa-1. 
ny cooperate to improve hospital care 
with shared investments. Investment 
risks are shared for certain projects.
36% Only the hospital is responsible for deliv-ering hospital care 64%
Hospitals and health insurance com-2. 
panies have a yearly contract includ-
ing price and capacity of a complete 
package of DBCs. The hospital can be 
certain of payments for this package. 
18%
Hospital and health insurance company 
have a preferred provider contract, includ-
ing DBCs and prices. The health insurance 
company pays only the DBCs used taken 
by the insurants. The hospital is responsi-
ble for setting the capacity.
82%
The hospital negotiates with different 3. 
health insurance companies (for in-
stance in favour of spreading the risks) 
39%
Hospital negotiates only with health 
insurance companies with a high market 
share in the region.
61%
Hospital and Health Insurance 4. 
Company will present themselves with 
quality certificates, which will be used 
in the negotiations.
22%
Hospital and health insurance company 
use benchmark information in their 
negotiations. 
78%
Health insurance companies use 5. 
protocols to guarantee the quality 
and efficiency of the hospital and 
physician
28%
Health insurance companies will use the 
DBC information delivered by the hospital 
to guarantee the quality and efficiency of 
the purchased hospital care.
72%
Table 5.3 Results Survey 2003: question 6a-6e
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Respondents expect several alternatives for contracting health insurance companies with a minor 
market share which indicates the expectation of more variety in future governance structures. 
Linking up with the market leader, a product catalogue and shared procurement organisations 
are marked by the respondents as alternatives. Only 1 in 5 respondents expects that a product 
catalogue will be used by health insurance companies.
How will health insurance companies with a minor market share contract hospital 
care in 2008? (more answers possible) % respondents
With a contract concluded with a health insurance company with a high market 1. 
share 42%
Using a product catalogue which includes the hospital products and prices2. 21%
Using procurement organisations in which more health insurance companies 3. 
with minor market shares participate 58%
Other4. 5%
Table 5.4 Results Survey 2003: question 6l 
The results in the table below show that health insurance companies are expected to 
invest more in information systems, benchmarking and contracts and negotiations with 
hospitals. Respondents are positive but less unanimous about investments in hospital 
care knowledge and private hospital care suppliers12. These investments will reduce the 
information asymmetry between hospitals and health insurance companies as found in 
the case studies.
What investments will be done by health insur-
ance companies to maximise their profit of the 
introduction of more market mechanisms? 
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Hospital care knowledge and medical 1. 
advisors 32% 53% 10% 5%
Information systems2. 74% 23% 2% 1%
Benchmarking of hospital performance 3. 
(including the performance of physicians) 81% 17% 0% 2%
Contracts and negotiations with hospitals 4. 
(procurement) 72% 26% 1% 1%
Knowledge of hospital care issues 5. 27% 55% 15% 3%
Private hospital care suppliers6. 33% 61% 4% 2%
Table 5.5 Results Survey 2003: question 6.2 
The results of the case studies show that information about the performance of the hospi-
tal is a problem. The table below shows that respondents of the questionnaire expect that 
12  Investments in private hospital care suppliers would suggest ownership of the health insurance company of a hospital care 
supplier which transforms the current hybrid governance structure into in a hierarchy.
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the implementation of DBCs will result in an improvement of the internal management 
information but also a rise in administration costs. Also a changing relationship between 
physicians and the board of directors of a hospital is expected.
What are the consequences for hospitals of the 
implementation of DBCs? Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Improvement of internal management 1. 
information 71% 27% 1% 1%
Higher costs of administration 2. 56% 32% 7% 5%
Changing relationship between physician 3. 
and board of directors due to higher trans-
parency of the performance of physicians
47% 44% 7% 2%
Table 5.6 Results Survey 2003: question 5.1 
The table below shows the expectation that negotiation and contract costs will also rise. 
Most respondents also expect that differentiation and marketing become more important 
for hospitals. This suggests that marketing costs will rise for hospitals.
What are the consequences for hospitals of lift-
ing the contract obligation between hospitals 
and health insurance companies? 
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Higher negotiation and contract costs (sales)1. 53% 38% 4% 5%
Differentiation and marketing become more 2. 
important 69% 30% 1% 0%
Table 5.7 Results Survey 2003: question 5.2 
In addition many respondents expect a rise in higher administrative costs for buying 
hospital care.
The expected position of health insurance 
companies in 2008 when DBCs are implemented 
successfully.
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Health insurance companies will experience 1. 
higher (administrative) costs for buying 
hospital care.
49% 26% 13%
Table 5.8 Results Survey 2003: question 6.1 
This expected rise in transaction costs will be taken into account in the next chapter. The 
recommendations for the most appropriate governance structure incorporate the expected 
rise in transaction costs when the current hybrid governance structure for the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies is used in a deregulated environment.
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5.3.2 Characteristics transactions
The results of the case study show that asset specificity was not perceived as an issue for 
the hospitals as health insurance companies are obliged to contract every hospital. The 
results of the questionnaire show that after lifting the contract obligation hospitals will be 
more vulnerable when high investments are made.
What are the consequences for hospitals of lift-
ing the contract obligation between hospitals 
and health insurance companies? 
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
Vulnerability when high investments are 1. 
made in care with sufficient supply 41% 47% 8% 4%
Table 5.9 Results Survey 2003: question 5.2 
With the results of the case studies it was possible to generate a segmentation of hospital 
care based on the characteristics of the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies. For this study segments of hospital care are made using the characteris-
tics of the transactions: frequency/volume and complexity (based on the level of risk and 
the complexity of performance measurement).
Also traditionally used segments for hospital care (highly specialised, planned and urgent 
care) are used in the questionnaire. As described these traditionally used segments know 
different kinds of asset specificity and level of competition (regional versus national).
With the questionnaire the expectations of hospitals and health insurance companies 
about the possibility of a market structure for the different segments were investigated.
The results, presented in the next table, show a significant difference between the widely 
used segments and even a greater difference in expectations in the segments based on 
volume and complexity. Planned care and care with high volume, low risks and measura-
ble results are expected by most respondents to be segments for which a market structure 
is perceived to be possible. The recommendations in the next chapter will show that this 
TCE study confirms the expectations of the respondents on most aspects.
For which segments of hospital care is a market 
structure possible? Certainly Maybe Certainly not No idea
Highly specialised care1. 5% 38% 51% 6%
Planned care2. 68% 27% 4% 1%
Urgent care3. 5% 20% 71% 4%
Care with high volume, low risk and measurable 4. 
results 78% 18% 4% 0%
Care with low volume, high risks and complex 5. 
performance measurement 2% 25% 70% 3%
Table 5.10 Results Survey 2003: question 2.1 
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5.3.3  Individual layer
Information asymmetry between hospital and health insurance company was found in the 
two case studies. The results of the questionnaire show that most respondents expect that 
the performance of hospitals will become more transparent in the future and health insur-
ance companies will negotiate more on price and quality. However information asymmetry 
is expected to remain for the performance of physicians. This can be a deliberate choice 
of the health insurance companies not to invest more in this knowledge or it can be due 
to bounded rationality of health insurance companies. Respondents do not expect that 
health insurance companies will be better capable in reducing waiting lists, direct patients 
to a hospital, or employ more influence on hospital policy or –investments.
The expected position of health insurance 
companies in 2008 when DBCs are implemented 
successfully.
Fully agree Partly agree Do not agree No idea
The performance of hospitals is more trans-1. 
parent to health insurance companies 38% 50% 9% 3%
The performance of physicians is more trans-2. 
parent to the health insurance company. 3% 13% 59% 25%
Health insurance companies will negoti-3. 
ate lower prices in their negotiations with 
hospitals (assuming hospital care supply is 
sufficient)
42% 47% 9% 2%
The insurance company will call hospitals 4. 
more often to account for the quality of 
delivered care.
43% 41% 14% 2%
Health insurance companies will employ 5. 
more influence on the policy and invest-
ments of individual hospitals.
8% 44% 44% 4%
Health insurance companies are better 6. 
capable in reducing waiting lists 15% 58% 23% 4%
The insurance company will decide in which 7. 
hospital the insurant receives its hospital 
care13
13% 62% 20% 5%
Table 5.11 Results Survey 2003: question 6.113
5.3.4  Direct influence on the institutional environment
The case studies showed the use of press and media by hospitals and health insurance 
companies to influence politics and policy makers directly. The results of the questionnaire 
show that press and media will continue to be important in the future for the transactions 
13 These contracts between insurant and insurance companies are called “stuurpolis”. With a “stuurpolis” an insurance companies 
sends patients to certain hospitals which are contracted. Patients can choose to go to another hospital but there is the 
possibility that the insurance company will not restitute all the costs (in case the prices are higher compared to the contracted 
hospital care).
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between hospitals and health insurance companies. About lobbying many respondents 
are not sure.
Fifty percent of the respondents expect personal networking between hospitals and health 
insurance companies is by to increase, however 43% is not sure whether this will happen.
Do you agree with the next propositions? Certainly Maybe Definitely not No idea
After the introduction of more market 1. 
mechanisms political involvement will still be 
triggered by reports in press and media. 
68% 28% 4% 0%
Lobbying (with politicians) will have less 2. 
meaning after the realisation of more market 
mechanisms.
18% 51% 25% 6%
Personal networking between hospitals and 3. 
health insurance companies will increase after 
the realisation of more market mechanisms.
50% 43% 6% 1%
Table 5.12 Results Survey 2003: question 3 
5.4  Conclusions 
The case studies were performed in a situation where the institutional environment had a 
dominant influence on the governance structure used for the transactions between hos-
pitals and health insurance companies. Rules and regulations prescribed the governance 
structure in detail. The governance structure found in the two case studies were similar in 
most aspects and match the governance structure as prescribed by rules and regulations 
(see chapter 4). Interesting conclusions of this chapter with respect to the way transac-
tions between hospitals and health insurance companies are coordinated in a deregulated 
environment are listed below.
The results of the questionnaire show that hospitals and health insurance companies 1. 
expect changes in the way transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies will be coordinated when rules and regulations with respect to the 
transactions and governance structure are lifted. They expect different governance 
structures across segments of hospital care.
The results of the case studies show that the complexity of the transactions between 2. 
hospitals and health insurance companies causes information asymmetry due to the 
bounded rationality of health insurance companies. Hospitals and health insurance 
companies expect that this information asymmetry will decrease in the future due 
to the DBC-system and investments of health insurance companies in, for example, 
information systems and benchmarking. However this is not expected to lift the 
information asymmetry about the performance of physicians.
The expected changes in the governance structure can be explained by the findings 3. 
concerning the characteristics of the transactions. Asset specificity, frequency and 
complexity differ significantly across segments of hospital care. As these characteris-
tics determine the efficiency of the governance structure this will result in different 
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governance structures for different segments of care. The governance structure used 
in the regulated environment is not efficient for most of the hospital care. Planned 
care and care with high volume, low risks and measurable results are segments for 
which a market (with a classic contract) is expected to be an efficient governance 
structure. Complexity of this hospital care is low. Performance measurement is 
supported by standardisation and the use of protocols. High volumes result in low 
transaction costs per unit as many transaction costs are fixed. For urgent care and 
care with low volumes, high risks and complex performance measurement a market 
structure is less efficient due to the high transaction costs. For highly specialised 
care a market structure is probably not efficient. Most highly specialised care, urgent 
care and part of the planned care know a high variety in procedures and less predict-
able outcomes. Performance measurement is difficult and requests highly special-
ised medical knowledge. Using the TCE characteristics “frequency and complexity” it 
is possible to create other segments of hospital care than the traditional segments. 
Based on the characteristics of TCE the next segmentation can be made: (1) care 
with high frequency and low complexity (low risk and measurable results) and (2) 
care with low frequency and high complexity (high risks and complex performance 
measurement).
In addition a differentiation in governance structures can be expected based on 4. 
economies of scale as they also determine the efficiency of the governance struc-
ture. Economies of scale are related to the market share of the health insurance 
company in the relevant market of the hospital product and related to the requested 
initial investments necessary to deliver the hospital product. Therefore differentia-
tion in governance structures across health insurance companies and segments 
of hospital care is expected. Economies of scale are relevant for hospital care with 
a national market which require high investments (highly specialised and certain 
planned care), health insurance companies with small market shares on a regional 
level and hospital care with a regional market requesting very high investments 
(urgent care).
 The direct influence of hospitals and health insurance companies on the institution-5. 
al environment complicates the coordination of transactions with a classic contract 
as it raises the chance of opportunistic behaviour. The case studies and question-
naire show that both hospitals and health insurance companies are found to behave 
opportunistically. Hospitals and health insurance companies use lobbying and press/
media to influence their environment in their own favour.
Reputation is an important variable in the institutional environment as it has an 6. 
important role for hospitals to attract patients and for health insurance companies 
to attract insurants. Reputation is therefore a potential credible threat which has 
influence on the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies 
and the way they are coordinated.
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In the questionnaire respondents were asked about their expectations of the introduc-
tion of more market mechanisms and the effect on the efficiency of hospital care and the 
satisfaction of patients (who are interested mainly in quality and service/friendliness). The 
respondents expect a positive contribution to efficiency, despite the expected invest-
ments which raise the transaction costs. They expect however a limited contribution to the 
satisfaction of patients. The results of the questionnaire are presented in the next table.
What is your opinion about the contribution of the 
introduction of more market mechanisms to: Average score (1=very little, 10=very high)
A more efficient hospital care 7
A higher satisfaction of patients about the delivered 
hospital care 6
Table 5.13 Results Survey 2003: question 6i and 6j
Certain findings (relevance of a long term relationship, trust, and good relationship) in 
the case studies and the questionnaire are not found in TCE or more specific the extended 
three layers model. These findings are considered to be outside the scope of this study. In 
chapter 7 the relevance of these additional findings are addressed together with certain 
critics of TCE. These critics found in literature confirm the relevance of the found variables 
for the study of governance.
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Chapter 6 Hazards and Recommendations for 
the Governance Structure 
6.1 Introduction
Williamson (1996, p.14) states that transaction cost economics is concerned with the 
identification, explication, and mitigation of hazards through governance. In this chapter 
the hazards for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a 
deregulated environment are identified and recommendations are given for an efficient 
governance structure to mitigate these hazards.
In section 6.2 the description of the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies as presented in chapter 4 and 5 is used to fill out the “extended hazard 
identification framework”. This framework is based on the extended three layers model 
and is described in detail in chapter 2 of this study. The framework is filled out for the 
different segments of hospital care as the expectation is that this will result in different 
hazards in a deregulated environment. With this overview of hazards for the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies an answer is given to sub question 2 
of this study.
Sub question 2: Which hazards can be identified for the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment using 
an extended three layers model?
In section 6.3 recommendations are given to mitigate the identified hazards with an 
efficient governance structure. The “decision tree for recommendations on the highest 
level”, as presented in chapter 2, is filled out with the hazards and the economies of scale 
for different segments of hospital care as presented in chapter 5. It results in recommenda-
tions for the most efficient governance structure on the highest level: market, hybrid or 
hierarchy.
As a hybrid can have many forms an analysis will be made in section 6.3 to compare the 
efficiency of different institutional arrangements in coordinating transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment. The framework 
“Analysis of an efficient hybrid governance structure for transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment” as presented in chapter 2 
is used. This results in recommendations for different segments of hospital care.
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Sub question 3 of this study is answered.
Which governance structure is most suitable from an efficiency analysis1 
perspective for the transactions between Dutch hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a deregulated environment?
6.2 The identification of hazards 
Hazards occur due to behavioural uncertainties of contract partners about transactions. 
These behavioural uncertainties are the result of (A) incomplete contracting or (B) depend-
ency between contract partners.
Figure 6.1 Framework: Extended hazard identification framework
1  Williamson (1996, p. 307) gives the next defi nition of effi  ciency analysis: “effi  ciency analysis properly encompasses governance 
costs as well as production costs”. Also costs due to excesses of waste, bureaucracy, slack, and the like are addressed as they are 
related to the alignment problem.
Uncertainty 
Environment 
(institution 
based trust) 
Hazards Behavioural 
uncerta inties 
Asset 
specificity 
Incomplete 
contracting 
Complexity 
transaction 
Influence individual 
on environment 
Limited 
competition 
Dependency 
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A. Incomplete contracting due to (1) uncertainties in the environment and (2) complex 
transactions.
(1) Recently many rules and regulations have changed in the institutional environment 
of hospitals and health insurance companies and their transactions. In chapter 4 low 
institution based trust is found for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies due to elusiveness and limited predictability of rules and regulations. This 
elusiveness is reinforced by the conflict between the norms and values in Dutch society 
and a free market for healthcare. The influence individual hospitals and health insurance 
companies have on politics and the Ministry of Health limits the predictability of rules and 
regulations. Both are weaknesses in the institutional environment which nourish oppor-
tunistic behaviour based on information asymmetry.
The results of this study show low institution based trust and opportunistic behaviour of 
both hospitals and health insurance companies. In a regulated environment this oppor-
tunistic behaviour has had limited effect on the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies. The transactions and the governance structure were completely reg-
ulated with limited financial risks. In a deregulated environment this will result in hazards 
and instability in transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies when 
not governed properly. The hazard identified is called “weaknesses in the environment”.
Petterson (2004) claims that the degree of trust or distrust in state agencies as regulative 
bodies determines the strategy of the government (see also Hood 2002). When there is 
high trust in state agencies a delegation strategy is used and when trust is low a directive 
strategy is used. This statement is supported by the directive strategy of the Dutch govern-
ment in this market with low trust in the government.
(2) The results of this study show that the transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies are diverse and the complexity differs across segments of hospital 
care. Complexity of transactions is low when there are possibilities to use standardisation 
(protocols) and the outcome is predictable. Variety in transactions, high risk treatments 
and specific knowledge to review the performance of a hospital increases complexity. The 
traditionally used segments of hospital care are: highly specialised care, planned care and 
urgent care2. Complex transactions are found in the three segments but are overrepresent-
ed in urgent and highly specialised care. A complex transaction can result in information 
asymmetry and incomplete contracts. The chance of opportunistic behaviour rises and this 
creates instability for transactions when not governed properly. These hazards are called 
“measurement hazards”.
B. Dependency: Maladaptation hazards due to (1) limited competition and (2) asset 
specificity.
Bilateral dependency can result in maladaptation hazards and requests an appropriate 
governance structure. Adaptation is seen as a central economic problem for organisations 
(Barnard 1938 and Hayek 1945). In perfect markets autonomous adaptation of organisa-
tions is realised through the price system. In imperfect markets coordinated adaptation 
is required which is more complex as it requires coordination between two organisations 
(Williamson 1996).
The results of this study show that individual hospitals and health insurance companies 
know maladaptation hazards due to limited competition and asset specificity.
2  Urgent care is care which is provided immediately to complex patients.
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(1) Competition requests sufficient supply and sufficient contract partners in the market. 
In recent years sufficient hospital care supply has been achieved by the reduction of wait-
ing lists for most hospital care. Sufficient contract partners are a problem for most hospital 
care despite the entrance of many small scaled private hospitals (or ZBC’s) in recent years. 
The results of this study show that on a regional level there are often a limited number 
of hospitals and one dominant health insurance company. On a national or international 
level there are sufficient contract partners available for hospitals and health insurance 
companies. The results show that only a limited part of the hospital care is supplied to pa-
tients outside region and the expectation is that this will not rise dramatically. Urgent care 
and hospital care for certain patient groups like chronically diseased and elderly people 
will always be provided within the region. The problems with competition and insufficient 
contract partners increases dependency between hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies for certain hospital care.
(2) Asset specificity represents the assets which bind one contract partner to another since 
these assets lose their value when the contract is terminated. In chapter 5 of this study 
an analysis is made of asset specific transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies. Asset specific investments are identified for different segments of hospital 
care. The results of the questionnaire indicate that asset specificity will become a hazard 
for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies as soon as the 
contract obligation is lifted by the government. Hospitals become more vulnerable when 
investing in assets to provide certain hospital care which cannot be redeployed by the 
hospital. In general, highly specialised, certain planned care and urgent care request high 
investments. Highly specialised care knows also human asset specificity which makes 
health insurance companies dependent of hospitals. Human asset specificity occurs when 
there are a limited number of qualified physicians to deliver certain hospital care. Urgent 
care knows also site specificity as the distance from the patient to the hospital is crucial. 
Asset specificity especially in combination with a limited number of contract partners 
(small numbers) causes maladaptation hazards. The result can be suboptimal investments 
of hospitals in, for instance, redeployable but more expensive assets, delay in replacing 
equipment or the decision of the hospital to stop offering the hospital care. Asset specifici-
ty can be reduced by leasing assets. Although this is in general somewhat more expensive 
compared to buying the asset, it is an effective instrument to mitigate the hazards related 
to asset specificity.
The conclusion is that maladaptation hazards occur in a deregulated environment 
especially for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies which 
require asset specific investments and which are provided on a regional level with limited 
competition.
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Overview of hazards
In the next table an overview is given of the identified hazards for hospital care in general 
and for the different segments of hospital care.
Hospital care segment Weaknesses in the environment Measurement hazards Maladaptation hazards
Hospital care in general
All segments which 
are deregulated know 
weaknesses.
Measurement hazards 
arise when complexity 
of transactions is high. 
Performance measure-
ment is difficult due to 
lack of standardisation 
and unpredictable 
outcome of treatment.
Maladaptation hazards 
occur when there is as-
set specificity especially 
in combination with 
small numbers. 
Planned care
 Planned care is very 
diverse in complex-
ity. There is planned 
care which is easy to 
standardise and there is 
planned care for which 
this is not the case.
Small numbers occur in 
regions with a limited 
number of contract 
partners for planned 
care delivered to cer-
tain patient groups like 
chronically diseased 
and elderly people. 
Some planned care also 
requests asset specific 
investments.
Urgent care
Urgent care is in general 
complex as possibilities 
for standardisation and 
delivering a predictable 
outcome are limited. 
Urgent care knows 
asset specificity, site 
specificity and competi-
tion on regional level.
Highly specialised care
Highly specialised care 
is diverse in complexity. 
Complexity is on aver-
age higher compared 
to planned care. Human 
asset specificity (quality 
of physician) has an 
important role in highly 
specialised care.
Highly specialised care 
knows very high asset 
specificity. Highly spe-
cialised care knows in 
general competition on 
a national level which 
results in fewer prob-
lems with the number 
of contract partners.
Table 6.1 Hazards identified for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies in a deregulated environment.
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A new segmentation of hospital care can be made using the identified hazards for hospital 
care in a deregulated environment.
Figure 6.2 Segmentation of hospital care on identified hazards (TCE segmentation).
1. Hospita l care with 
weaknesses in the 
environment. 
4. Hospita l care with 
weaknesses in the 
environment, measurement 
hazards and 
maladaptation hazards. 
2. Hospita l care with 
weaknesses in the 
environment and 
measurement hazards. 
3. Hospita l care with 
weaknesses in the 
environment and 
maladaptation hazards. 
Dutch Hospital Care   114 02-07-2008   13:48:34
Process Black
115
A TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS OF DUTCH HOSPITAL CARE
6.3 Recommendations for an efficient governance structure
6.3.1  The basic governance structure
Coase (1937: 336) presents as a general rule that a hierarchy will be chosen as soon as 
the costs of using a market exceed those of using internal governance. The efficiency of a 
market, hybrid or hierarchy for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies is determined in this section using the decision tree for recommendations 
on the highest governance level and the identified hazards in section 6.2 of this chapter. 
The formula of Jarillo (1988) is used to compare the costs of the alternative governance 
structures.
Figure 6.3 Framework: Decision tree for recommendations on the highest governance level.
In the decision tree hazards and economies of scale determine the efficiency of the basic 
governance structure:
(1) Hazards
Several hazards have been identifi ed for the transactions between hospitals and health insur-
ance companies. A safeguard to mitigate hazards is creating a hierarchy. Another safeguard is 
to mitigate these hazards with institutional arrangements. This results in a hybrid governance 
structure. There are several institutional arrangements which can be used in a hybrid. The 
cost eff ectiveness of these arrangements depends on the identifi ed hazards. The frequency of 
transactions is important as it determines the transaction costs per transaction. Many transac-
tion costs are fi xed and not related to the number of transactions. Frequency diff ers per hospi-
tal product (DBC) and is not related to the traditionally used segments of hospital care.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EP   the price charged by the supplier for a product 
TC   the transaction costs 
IC  the internal cost of making rather than buying the product.  
Hazards 
Economies of 
scale 
Market  
Hybrid 
IC<EP+TC  
 
EP+TC<IC 
High TC due to 
hazard mitigation 
however EP far 
less than IC due to 
economies of scale 
EP+TC<IC 
Low TC as no 
hazard mitigation 
is necessary. 
low 
h igh 
yes 
no 
Hierarchy 
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(2) Economies of scale
Economies of scale can be achieved for certain products when production is organised in the 
market. A hierarchy can have major fi nancial disadvantages in production costs for these 
products. In terms of Jarillo the EP is very low compared to the IC. There are two important 
variables in measuring economies of scale: initial investments in technology3 (not related to 
production volume) and market share. Economies of scale diff er across the traditionally used seg-
ments of hospital care (highly specialised care, planned care and urgent care). A health insurance 
company with a high market share has more opportunities to insource hospital care activities 
effi  ciently compared to health insurance companies with low market shares. The market share in 
the region is relevant for hospital care which is provided to patients in a region and the national 
market share is relevant for hospital care which is provided also to patients outside the region.
In the next table recommendations are given for the most suitable governance structure (market, 
hybrid or hierarchy4):
Segment Hazards (TC) Economies of scale (EP) Recommended governance structure
Planned 
care
Hazards are present but 
vary across planned care. 
Transaction costs are high 
for planned care with 
measurement and malad-
aptation hazards, when not 
using a hierarchy.
Maladaptation hazards 
can be reduced by leasing 
assets.
Economies of scale are 
high for planned care 
which request high invest-
ments in physical assets/
buildings. The advantage 
of production in the mar-
ket is highest for health 
insurance companies with 
a limited market share.
A hierarchy is recommended 
for planned care with high 
asset specificity and/or high 
complexity delivered to a 
health insurance company 
with a dominant market 
share.
A hybrid is recommended 
for all other planned care. 
Urgent care 
Urgent care knows meas-
urement and maladapta-
tion hazards which request 
safeguards. Transaction 
costs are high, when not 
using a hierarchy. Malad-
aptation hazards can be 
reduced by leasing assets.
Economies of scale for ur-
gent care are high due to 
the high investment costs 
in buildings, equipment 
and the necessary standby 
capacity.
A hybrid is recommended 
for all urgent care as the 
economies of scale outdo 
the transaction costs neces-
sary to mitigate the identi-
fied hazards.
Highly 
specialised 
care
Highly specialised care 
knows measurement and 
maladaptation hazards. 
Transaction costs are high 
when not using a hierarchy. 
Maladaptation hazards 
can be reduced by leasing 
assets.
Economies of scale for 
highly specialised care are 
high due to the necessary 
investments in physical 
and human assets. 
A hybrid is recommended 
for highly specialised care. 
The economies of scale 
outdo the transaction costs. 
It is possible for a health 
insurance company with 
a dominant market share 
to organise highly special-
ised care efficiently in a 
hierarchy.
Table 6.2 Recommended basic governance structure for the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment.
3  Technology requests certain equipment and machines, buildings and human skills and knowledge.
4  To realise a hierarchy forward or backward integration is necessary. The most sustainable scenario is that health insurance 
companies buy hospitals or start hospitals themselves due to their dominant market position and the fi nancial resources they 
have available. In recent years some health insurance companies in the Netherlands have already developed some initiatives to 
off er certain health care for their insurants themselves. 
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Based on the traditionally used segmentation of hospital care and the segmentation based 
on the TCE characteristics of transactions the following recommendations can be given:
A market governance structure is not suitable for transactions between hospitals 1. 
and health insurance companies as hazards are identified for all hospital care. In case 
the current weaknesses in the institutional environment dissolve in the future it is 
recommended to use a market governance structure for hospital care which has no 
measurement and maladaptation hazards. This is mainly planned care which is easy 
to standardise in a region with several contract partners and/or limited asset specific 
investments. The hospital care in the current B-segment meets these requirements. 
More hospital care can be coordinated in a market governance structure when the 
necessary assets are leased instead of bought by the hospital. Another possibility is 
that the health insurance company buys the assets which are used in the hospital. 
Voicing with reputation effects can be used by health insurance companies as a 
credible threat. This increases however the chance of conflicts and rivalry.
A hierarchy is the recommended governance structure for transactions between 2. 
hospitals and health insurance companies which know (1) low economies of scale 
when organised in the market, (2) maladaptation and/or measurement hazards. A 
hierarchy is in general recommended for health insurance companies with a domi-
nant market share as they can create economies of scale with internal production. A 
hierarchy is also recommended for hospital care with maladaptation and measure-
ment hazards where transaction costs are higher compared to the lower production 
costs when produced in the market.
A hybrid is the recommended governance structure for transactions between hospi-3. 
tals and health insurance companies when economies of scale of production in the 
market are high. Economies of scale are high for health insurance companies with 
low market shares and hospital care with very high initial investments. In general 
a hybrid is an efficient governance structure for highly specialised and urgent care 
and for planned care with high economies of scale. An exception concerns very large 
health insurance companies who can efficiently insource highly specialised care with 
high frequencies. Examples of institutional arrangements which can be used in the 
hybrid governance structure efficiently can be found in the next section.
Segmentation hospital care on identified 
hazards
Economies of scale of produc-
tion in the market for individual 
health insurance company.
Basic governance 
structure
Hospital care with weaknesses in the 
environment Hybrid with limited TC
Hospital care with weaknesses in the 
environment and measurement hazards
High (IC>EP)
Low (IC<EP)
Hybrid with high TC
Hierarchy
Hospital care with weaknesses in the 
environment and maladaptation hazards
High (IC>EP)
Low (IC<EP)
Hybrid with high TC
Hierarchy
Hospital care with weaknesses in the 
environment, measurement and malad-
aptation hazards
High (IC>EP)
Low (IC<EP)
Hybrid with very high 
TC
Hierarchy
Table 6.3 Recommended basic governance structure for the TCE segments of hospital 
care for transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated 
environment.
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6.3.2 Recommendations for the hybrid
In chapter 2 the following definition is given of a hybrid: “a hybrid is a governance struc-
ture in which both horizontal and vertical coordination is used to coordinate the transac-
tions between two separate organisations”.
A hybrid can have many forms as different institutional arrangements and credible com-
mitments can be used additional to the classic contract. In chapter 2 the detailed contract 
and long term contract (including credible commitments) are mentioned as commonly 
used arrangements in a hybrid. Also the use of credible threats resulting in reputation-
effects is analysed.
In this section an analysis is made of the use of detailed contracts, long term contracts and 
reputation-effects to mitigate the identified hazards for the transactions between hospi-
tals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment. Recommendations are 
given for the hybrid governance structure in the framework “Analysis of an efficient hybrid 
governance structure for transactions between hospitals”.
First the effectiveness of detailed contracts, long term contracts and reputation-effects in 
mitigating the identified hazards is analysed:
Weaknesses in the environment result in incomplete contracts as there is uncer-1. 
tainty and possible information asymmetry between hospitals and health insurance 
companies about (future) rules and regulations and interventions of politics in the 
hospital care market. Discussions and agreements related to (a) possible future sce-
narios of the institutional environment and (b) the use of individual influence on the 
environment diminishes the information asymmetry between contract partners. The 
(financial) interests of both the hospital and the health insurance company should 
be taken into account in these agreements. Credible commitments are necessary 
to reduce the chance of opportunistic behaviour. This results in detailed contracts. 
Weaknesses in the environment can also be mitigated with the creation of shared 
interests. Shared interests are created by shared ownership and shared investments. 
Both are long term agreements. Shared interests dissolve after the asset is depreci-
ated and reinvestments are necessary. Long term contracts with credible commit-
ments can create shared interests for a longer period.
Measurement hazards are identified for transactions between hospitals and health 2. 
insurance companies which are complex. Complex hospital care is difficult to stand-
ardise (with protocols), risks are high and performance measurement is complex. 
This results in incomplete contracting. The results of this study show that health in-
surance companies are investing in their knowledge of hospital care (investments in 
benchmarking and information systems) to mitigate this hazard. The highly detailed 
product prices system which is prescribed by the Dutch government (DBC) can result 
in oversearching (Barzel 1982, Kenney and Klein 1983). Performance measurement 
with this system is very costly. An appropriate institutional arrangement to avoid 
oversearching is block booking. Block-booking economises on measurement costs5. 
Williamson (1986, p.77) describes an interesting case of the market for gem quality 
5  This is a reinterpretation of the Loew’s case (United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 1962) in which block-booking is seen as an 
eff ort to eff ect price discrimination.
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uncut diamonds. The comparison with hospital products is striking. For diamonds a 
classifi cation in more than two thousand categories exists. However signifi cant quality 
variation in the stones remains. For hospital products in the Netherlands thousands of 
DBC-classifications are used, still medical specialists complain that their treatments 
do not fit into the classification system. To avoid oversearching in the diamond trade 
all-or-none and in-or-out trading rules were introduced. A combined regime of 
all-or-none and in-or-out trading rules supports legitimate expectations. With block 
booking a long term relationship is established in which the average performance 
is perceived to be relevant and not the performance of every individual transaction. 
Only with systematic underperformance the contract is ended. Higher integrity is 
achieved when using this institutional agreement in trade. The risk of oversearching 
for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies with high 
complexity and/or low frequency can be mitigated with all-or none and in-or-out 
trading rules. Reputation effects are recognised as a credible threat and an impor-
tant safeguard for bad performance of hospitals and health insurance companies 
towards the patient/insurant. The strong reputation effects for hospitals and health 
insurance companies provide the possibility to use alternative instruments to 
support the coordination of transactions. These alternative instruments are quality 
certificates and/or benchmarking by supervising agencies. Supervising agencies can 
increase the transparency of the quality of hospital care. The results of the question-
naire used in this study, show that almost 80% of the respondents expect that the 
quality of the delivered hospital care is an important topic for supervising agencies 
in 2008. Two examples of appropriate instruments which mitigate the measurement 
hazards by using the strength of reputation effects are:
Benchmarking done by supervising agencies. These benchmark data can be used by • 
hospitals and health insurance companies in their negotiations. However Llewellyn 
and Northcott (2005) claim that in the UK the problem with this “metrics approach” is 
that hospitals are highly differentiated places which make comparisons not possible. 
The effect of using cost categories for hospital care is standardisation resulting in the 
“average hospital”. This implies that poorly performing hospitals improve perform-
ance but also that well performing hospitals worsen performance. Van Helden and 
Tillema (2005) argue that the impact of benchmarking in public sector may be 
similar to the effects of market forces in the private sector. This makes benchmarking 
a substitute for the market and not an instrument which can be used with a market.
Quality certificates can be given to hospital care suppliers. This can mitigate the • 
measurement problem. Quality certificates can be organised and published by a 
national organisation, for instance a supervising agency. Additional regular audits 
are necessary.
Asset specific investments in physical assets are identified for certain hospital care 3. 
and in combination with small numbers this results in maladaptation hazards. This 
hazard can be mitigated with institutional arrangements such as long term agree-
ments and shared investments/ownership. Another possibility to mitigate the hazard 
is to lease assets. Health insurance companies also experience hazards as a result of 
site specificity (limited number of hospitals in the region), human asset specificity 
(limited number of good physicians for a treatment) and brand name of the hospital. 
Health insurance companies can mitigate this hazard with long term agreements 
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including credible commitments. Another possibility to mitigate these hazards is by 
encouraging insurants with (financial) incentives to receive their treatment outside 
their region or even abroad. Health insurance companies can also start hospitals 
themselves to mitigate this hazard. This results in a hierarchy instead of a hybrid.
In chapter 2 a framework is given for the hybrid in which detailed contracts, long term 
contracts and reputation-effects are included. This framework is used here to formulate 
recommendations for the use of these instruments for the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies coordinated with a hybrid.
Hazard mitigation Transaction costs Recommendations
Detailed 1. 
contract 
Weaknesses in the envi-
ronment and measure-
ment hazards can be 
mitigated with a detailed 
contract. However it is dif-
ficult to realise a complete 
contract and therefore 
credible commitments 
like financial punishments 
or hostages should be 
included. In the contract 
credible commitments 
should be made about 
the renewal and ending 
of the contract.
A detailed contract 
including credible 
commitments is in 
general expensive. 
Monitoring of a 
detailed contract 
and enforcement 
of the agreements 
with the financial 
punishments and 
hostages increases 
the transaction costs. 
All-in-one contracts are very 
effective in mitigating the 
measurement hazard and 
reduce transaction costs as it 
avoids monitoring on the level 
of the transaction. Additional 
audits are necessary to check 
the average performance 
regularly.
For weaknesses in the environ-
ment a detailed contract is 
an expensive arrangement. 
Alternatives described below 
are recommended.
Long term 2. 
contract 
Hazards due to weak-
nesses in the environ-
ment and maladaptation 
hazards can be mitigated 
effectively with long term 
contracts as long as they 
are combined with cred-
ible commitments. 
Long term contracts 
can be costly when 
they are detailed or 
request intensive 
monitoring and 
enforcement of 
agreements in the 
contract.
Shared investments/ ownership 
are an effective alternative and 
can be more efficient com-
pared to a detailed long term 
contract. Shared investments/ 
ownership create shared 
interests which mitigates the 
maladaptation hazards and the 
hazards due to weaknesses in 
the environment. Leasing is 
a good alternative to reduce 
maladaptation hazards.
Reputation 3. 
effects 
Reputation effects can 
mitigate the identified 
measurement hazards.
Reputation threat can 
be used by hospitals 
and especially health 
insurance companies. 
Reputation-effects can be 
supported by independ-
ent supervising agen-
cies which monitor the 
performance of hospitals 
using quality certificates 
or benchmarking.
Reputation ef-
fects involve high 
transaction costs 
when benchmarking 
or quality certifi-
cates are used. The 
transaction costs 
for supervising 
agencies are high 
as hospitals have to 
record data and the 
agency needs staff 
to audit and report 
the performance of 
hospitals. 
Reputation threat is effective 
but is normally not used in a 
situation where cooperation 
is necessary between contract 
partners (due to dependency).
Benchmark systems are 
costly and controversial. Qual-
ity certificates are effective but 
costly. Credible threats using 
the results of benchmarking 
or quality certificates are in 
general used in conflicts and 
rivalry and are less appropriate 
for a hybrid with dependency 
between contract partners.
Table 6.4 Framework: Analysis of an efficient hybrid governance structure for transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment
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The results of this study show that the costs related to the coordination of transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies with a hybrid is higher in a deregulated 
environment. Many of these costs know initial investments (fixed). The more transactions 
between a hospital and a health insurance company (frequency) the lower the transaction 
costs per transaction. Health insurance companies with a limited number of transactions 
are recommended, from an economic point of view, to use a lean governance structure or 
even market governance (restitution system). However market governance has the disad-
vantage that instability in transactions is expected due to the identified hazards.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Limitations 
of the Study
7.1 Conclusion
Transaction Costs Economics is used as theoretical framework in this study to reach the 
next aim:
Formulate recommendations for the management of hospitals and the management 
of health insurance companies and policy makers, in order to (re) align the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies with an efficient governance structure 
in a more market oriented, deregulated, environment.
With the three layers model as presented by Williamson (1996) the transactions between 
hospitals and health insurance companies are described and hazards are identified. Data 
gathered with desk research, case studies and a questionnaire were used to describe and 
analyse the layers and the parameters and variables in the three layers model. The model 
was appropriate to describe and analyse the transactions in a regulated environment. The 
model was made more specific to describe and analyse the transactions between hospi-
tals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment. This resulted in an 
extended model which is based on TCE principles.
The transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are complex as many 
different types of hospital care are delivered by the hospital to the patient and billed to 
the insurance company. The hospitals and health insurance companies coordinate these 
transactions with a governance structure. In the regulated institutional environment 
this governance structure is prescribed by the government. This study showed that this 
prescribed governance structure is not efficient and will change during the process of 
deregulation into more efficient governance structures.
An important conclusion of this study is that the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies have different characteristics. The transactions differ in com-
plexity, asset specificity and frequency and request different governance structures. Also 
the market share of the health insurance company and the number of possible contract 
partners differs across regions and requests different governance structures. Economies 
of scale in production are important as they diminish the production costs. Economies of 
scale are determined by the investments in hospital care (technology) and by the market 
share of health insurance companies (in the relevant market).
The extended three layer model was used in this study to describe and analyse the 
transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies and the way they are 
coordinated. This increased our understanding of the transactions and other variables 
which determine the efficiency of the governance structure. With this knowledge three 
categories of hazards could be identified for the transactions between hospitals and 
health insurance companies which differ across segments of hospital care: (1) weaknesses 
in the environment, (2) measurement hazards and (3) maladaptation hazards.
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Another important conclusion is that in a deregulated environment the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies can be organised effi  ciently only when 
diff erent governance structures are used across segments of hospital care and by diff erent 
health insurance companies.
A market governance structure was found to be inappropriate for all segments due to the 
weaknesses in the environment. However when weaknesses in the environment dissolve 
in the next years and alternatives are used for high investments in hospital care there are 
possibilities for the coordination of transactions with a classic contract. Certain hospital 
care which knows problematic measurement and maladaptation hazards is most effi  ciently 
organised in a hierarchy when the health insurance company is able to achieve the neces-
sary economies of scale. A hybrid is an alternative governance structure for this hospital care 
when the health insurance companies are not able to achieve the necessary economies of 
scale.
This study concludes also that the commonly used detailed (long term) contract will result in 
high transaction costs. Alternatives like all-in-one contracts and shared investments/owner-
ship are recommended. All-in-one contracts with regular audits and agreements about aver-
age performance and contract ending or renewal with fi nancial punishments or hostages 
is the most cost eff ective instrument for complex hospital care. The eff ectiveness of bench-
marking is controversial. Quality certifi cates can be helpful for complex care but increase 
transaction costs. Voicing on reputation eff ects can be used as credible threats but are less 
suitable for contract partners with dependency issues as they results in confl icts and rivalry. 
Shared investments/ownership and leasing are effi  cient safeguards for hazards caused by 
asset specifi city. Weaknesses in the environment can be mitigated with a contract including 
possible future scenarios in rules and regulations taking into account the fi nancial conse-
quences for hospitals and health insurance companies. These contracts should include cred-
ible commitments like punishments or hostages. Also agreements should be made about 
the use of individual infl uence on politics. The creation of shared interest with for instance 
shared investments also mitigates the hazards due to weaknesses in the environment.
The final conclusion of this study is that ultimately the classic hospital with 
a full range of services and products which contracts health insurance 
companies for all hospital products will disappear. Economic behaviour of 
hospitals and health insurance companies in a deregulated environment will 
result in segmentation, specialisation and selective contracting.
The research aim of this study is to formulate recommendations for the management of 
hospitals and the management of health insurance companies and policy makers, in order 
to (re) align the transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies with an 
efficient governance structure in a more market oriented, deregulated, environment. This 
study shows that an analysis of the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies with an extended TCE model meets the aim of this study. The recommenda-
tions provide sufficient clues to improve the current hybrid governance structure during 
the process of further deregulation and to coordinate the transactions between hospitals 
and health insurance companies with an efficient governance structure in the future.
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7.2 Methodological issues
In this study two case studies were used to gather information about the transactions be-
tween hospitals and health insurance companies. The case studies were used to increase 
the understanding of transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies, the 
governance structure and the contract partners. The results of the case studies showed 
no effect of the level of competition between hospitals on the transactions and govern-
ance structure. An explanation was found in the fact that the case studies were performed 
before important changes in the institutional environment. Analysis of the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies in the regulated environment showed 
the dominant influence of rules and regulations on the transactions and governance 
structure. Competition is expected to have an important effect in a deregulated environ-
ment. The extended three layers model explicitly presents competition as a variable which 
has effect on the transactions and the way they are coordinated. This effect is however not 
investigated in this study with additional case studies in a deregulated environment.
A questionnaire was used in this study to gather information about the future develop-
ments in the hospital market and the future transactions between hospitals and health 
insurance companies. This research method has certain limitations as there is the risk that 
respondents fill out the questionnaire with insufficient knowledge or based on wishful 
thinking instead of realistic expectations. In this study triangulation is used to address 
these risks. In chapter 3 more details are given about the research methods.
7.3 The relevance of the conclusions for current theory
The relevance of this study for current theory is that it demonstrates that a generic theory 
can be used for an industry like hospital care with a specific and changing institutional 
environment. The TCE model is made more specific for this study as this was necessary to 
describe and analyse the transactions properly and to identify and understand the hazards 
related to these transactions. The principles of TCE are the basis of the theoretical model 
and determine the recommendations for an efficient governance structure.
Transaction Costs Economics has proven its practical relevance in this study. However the 
data gathered with the two case studies and a questionnaire show that trust and especial-
ly process based trust is perceived to be relevant for the coordination of the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies. These concepts can have added value 
for the management of individual hospitals and individual health insurance companies. 
Hospitals and health insurance companies have long lasting transactional relationships 
and combined business experience. They also have to act within the current institutional 
environment with an unpredictable process of deregulation and limited possibilities to 
use other governance structures than a hybrid. Especially in situations with high uncer-
tainty and complexity a process based approach starting with a lean governance structure 
and improving it “along the way” is more efficient compared to the design of a complete 
governance structure in which all risks and uncertainties are covered (see also Vosselman 
2006 and Vosselman and van der Meer 2004).
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In this section the concepts of trust and the process based approach are described and 
illustrated with findings in the case studies and questionnaire. In the next section recom-
mendations are given for future research on these subjects.
Trust
TCE has many critics1 who are concerned with the absence of the domain of trust in trans-
action costs economics2. They conclude that the social-context variable of trust interacts 
with the behavioural assumptions of the TCE model and therefore must be addressed in 
future treatments (Klein Woolthuis 1999, Klein Woolthuis Hillebrand & Nooteboom 2005). 
There are several definitions of trust3. Zucker (1986) identifies process based trust, charac-
ter based trust and trust based on institutional mechanisms4. Trust based on institutional 
mechanisms is related in this study to uncertainties in the institutional environment. This 
institution based trust is part of the extended three layers model. It supports the identifi-
cation of the hazard for the transactions between hospitals and health insurance compa-
nies related to the “weaknesses in the environment”. Character based trust was not taken 
into account in this study as it does not fit into the aim of this study to formulate general 
economic recommendations, which are not are related to the character of individual 
persons.
Process based trust is related to the exchange between partners in the past and to the 
expected future exchanges. Granovetter (1985) indicates that long-lasting exchange rela-
tionships get a social content with strong expectations regarding trust and forbearance 
of opportunism. The result of the case studies and questionnaire show that process based 
trust was found to be relevant by hospitals and health insurance companies for their trans-
actions and the way they are coordinated. Frequent changes in contract partners were 
perceived to be disturbing for the coordination of the transactions. A good relationship 
between the negotiators was perceived to be important for the contract negotiations.
1  Gambetta (1988) refers to it as “the elusive notion of trust” and claims that trust is necessary due to bounded rationality. Chiles 
and McMackin (1996) claim that many of the perceived shortcomings of the TCE paradigm are in part attributable to the 
inadequate treatment of risk and trust.
2  Williamson (1993a and b) calls trust an endogenous preference and is not taking it into account in his studies.
3  Luhman (1979) states that trust starts where knowledge stops. Bromiley and Cummings write in 1992 that the infl uence of the 
layer of trust on the basic structural implications of TCE is not altogether clear. The defi nition of trust used by Gambetta (1988, 
see also Dasgupta 1988 and Luhmann 1988) is: “trust is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses that another agent will perform a particular action, before he can monitor such action and in a context in which it 
aff ects his own action.
Two other defi nitions of the concept of trust are:
“The expectations concerning standards and values related to competencies and responsibilities” (Barber 1983)
“The social and statutory expectations which are shared by all partners involved in an exchange” (Zucker 1986)
Nue (1991) recognises some similarities in the several defi nitions for trust. Trust seems to be based on common expectations. 
Also trust seems to be part of the system and of the individuals in the system. Finally pressure seems to be absent in the 
concept of trust (Kahnemann et al. 1986). 
The conceptual association between risk and trust is pervasive in literature (see e.g. Coleman 1990, Deutsch 1973, Koller 
1988, and Zand 1972). Zand (1972, p. 230) and Noorderhaven (1996, p. 109) distinguish interpersonal trust as the willingness 
to increase one’s vulnerability to another whose behaviour is not under one’s control In the context of a transaction 
Noorderhaven (1995) calls this “the willingness to engage in a transaction in absence of adequate safeguards”.
4 Character based trust also has an important role in the trust partners have in each other. Partners with common characteristics 
as nationality, social environment, age, sex and so on get expectations (correct or incorrect) regarding the behaviour of 
partners and this is the starting point for behaviour in a relationship.
Trust based on the character is more robust and therefore a more reliable basis for transactional relations (Noorderhaven 1995, 
Nooteboom 1993, Ring 1993).
The institution based trust Zucker describes can be divided in individual and organisational specifi c actions, intermediary and 
rules and regulations.
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Process based approach and relational signalling
Critics like Vosselman and Van der Meer (2004) challenge the farsighted approach as it 
is presented in TCE. They introduce the process based approach which is related to a 
“transactional relationship” between contract partners. The process based approach knows 
a step by step approach for realigning transactions with an efficient governance structure 
and incorporates the concept of (process based) trust.
Vosselman and van der Meer Kooistra (2005) argue that accounting controls such as cred-
ible commitments can be used in relationships in order to prevent strategic opportunism 
from occurring. Vosselman and van der Meer Kooistra call this “thin trust” as it does not 
suffice in attenuating all potential opportunistic behaviour. In order to prevent myopic 
opportunism from occurring parties experience the need for a vehicle of relational signal-
ling. This vehicle of relational signalling reflects commitment and helps building “thick” 
trust, which contributes to the stability and durability of the relationship between contract 
partners. The concept of process based trust fits well to the concept of “thick trust” which 
is build up with relational signalling. Relational signalling presumes a process based ap-
proach. It implies that the indirect effect or endogenous preferences of the governance 
layer on the economic actors becomes direct and the there is a continuous feedback loop 
between the individual and the governance layer. Speklé (1998, 2001) describes frequent 
personal contact as an arrangement which can be used in a hybrid to coordinate transac-
tions. The effect of frequent personal contact can be found in the concept of relational 
signalling as described by Vosselman and van der Meer Kooistra.
The results of the case studies support the importance of relational signalling and process 
based trust. In both case studies the hospital and health insurance company have a con-
tractual relationship for several years. Negative experiences in the past were perceived to 
affect the relationship and the level of trust. This revealed itself by not or partly informing 
the contract partner about certain topics and weakening of certain combined initiatives. 
In both case studies interviewees complain that the turnover rate of contact persons of 
the health insurance company is high. This is perceived to have a negative influence on 
the transactional relationship as there is no shared history (this is reinforced by the bad 
archiving and documentation within the health insurance companies). There are several 
meetings and other contact moments between hospitals and health insurance companies 
in both case studies. This reduces the risk of myopic opportunism of one of the contract 
partners which increases the stability of the relationship by building thick trust.
7.4 Limitations and research recommendations
This study knows certain limitations which challenges further research. In this section 
these limitations and recommendations for further research are described.
The recommendations given in chapter 6 of this study are purely theoretical. Based on this 
study more controlled quantitative studies on this subject can be conducted in the future 
(see also Burns and Grove 1987) to investigate the transaction costs of different govern-
ance structures. Variables used in this study can be (1) the economies of scale and asset 
specific investments for different segments of hospital care and health insurance compa-
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nies with different market shares and their effect on hospital pricing and (2) the transac-
tion costs related to segments of hospital care which differ in complexity and frequency.
The impact of competition on the transactions between hospitals and health insurance 
companies, the governance structure and the transaction costs under the new regulation 
is not investigated with field research in this study. Recommendation for future research 
is to perform case studies to investigate the effect of competition on the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies and the way they are coordinated in 
a deregulated environment (output pricing and free contracting). In 2006 we see already, 
for certain segments of hospital care, the effect competition can have on the transactions 
between hospitals and health insurance companies. In chapter 4 a more detailed descrip-
tion is given of these effects. The ultimate goal of policy makers is to create a healthcare 
system which is affordable. Deregulation and the DBC-system are instruments used by the 
Dutch government in this effort to increase efficiency.
Interestingly is that Pizzini (2006) claims that the ability to significantly reduce healthcare 
expenditures lies in containment of the direct costs of patient care. Previous research 
shows that cost systems (like the DBC system) result in improvements in administrative 
efficiency and not in direct costs of patient care. Until the cost system functionality is in-
troduced in the management of clinical expenditures the usefulness of cost-system design 
in containing hospital costs is limited.
Lehtonen (2007) has similar conclusion as he sees that in general DRG-based prospec-
tive pricing and case-mix accounting systems have in general more potential for control 
purposes at the profit centre and speciality levels but less on the departmental level. 
Lehtonen argues that the key to successful implementation of cost accounting systems is 
an ability to persuade clinicians to become centrally involved in the management and the 
development of the control systems. Groot (1999) argues that involvement of clinicians 
is achieved with control systems including incentives which are aligned with the profes-
sional opinions and attitudes. Latent professional attitudes which contribute to the goals 
of the organisation are reinforced with these incentives in the control system.
Leister and Stausberg (2005) have studied the eff ect of cost accounting methods on health 
care quality. They conclude that every single DRG systems cost accounting method has an 
impact on providers´ behaviour and the quality of services provided. They caution govern-
ments that an unsolicited and inadequate method of calculation could impact provider 
behaviour badly and result in economic losses. This stresses the need for more research to 
determine the eff ects of the DBC system on the effi  ciency and quality of Dutch hospital care.
In this study the Dutch hospital care is investigated within its specific institutional environ-
ment. The transactions between hospitals and health insurance companies are embedded 
in institutions, customs, traditions, norms and religions which are typically for the Netherlands. 
However, cases from abroad about how hospital care can be organised efficiently can 
give useful insights. The HMOs in the United States, the role of the regional government 
in countries like the Czech Republic and Norway and the effect of competition on hos-
pital care in England due to private hospitals can provide the Dutch government, health 
insurance companies and hospitals with information about the transaction costs of 
different governance structures. A study of Aidemark and Lindkvist (2004) illustrates that 
performance of hospitals improved with the introduction of contracts including regu-
lated prices according to performance between hospitals and procurement authorities. 
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These contracts resulted in more commercially minded leadership, rapid decision mak-
ing procedures, increased administrative control and goal congruence between medical 
professionals and the hospital leaderships. Increased competition could not be seen as 
an explanation as the number of hospital care suppliers did not change. This is a relevant 
finding as lack of competition is often considered to be a problem for the introduction of 
more market mechanisms in the hospital care market.
Also lessons learned from other industries, despite the differences in institutional envi-
ronment, can have added value in finding the most suitable governance structure. The 
example used in this study about the diamond industry with all-in-one contracts illustrates 
this argument.
Further research in an international and industry wide context will create new insights 
which can be helpful in the current reformation process of the Dutch hospital care market.
The role of trust is only superficially investigated in this study. More research is necessary 
on the process of building “thick” trust to determine the role of trust and relational signal-
ling in transactional relationships between hospitals and health insurance companies. This 
also the case for the effects of reputation for hospitals and health insurance companies 
and the way their transactions are coordinated.
In this study the health insurance companies in the Netherlands using the restitution 
system resulting in classical contracting, are not investigated separately. It is interesting to 
perform more research on the effect of the identified hazards in this study, on the transac-
tions between hospitals and health insurance companies using the restitution system and 
the effect on contracted prices.
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Appendix A Institutional Environment
The next table gives an overview of all possible forms of the health insurances in The 
Netherlands with their characteristics before the new law “Zorgverzekeringswet” was 
introduced (2006). 
Public private
AWBZ1 Ziekenfonds civil servants2 private other WTZ3 
Character-
istics in justice in justice legal status under private law
mixed (duty 
to accept 
insurants)
Insurants
every per-
son paying 
Dutch 
income 
tax
Employees 
with wages 
under “Zie-
kenfondswet” 
limit, benefit 
holders 
Civil servants 
local author-
ity, province, 
police
Civil servants central 
government, em-
ployees with wages 
above “Ziekenfonds-
wet” limit, self 
employed
all other
number of 
insurants 14,5 mln 8,9 mln 0,9 mln 4,0 mln 0,7 mln
premium
percent-
age of 
wages
Part 1: percent-
age of wages 
Part 2: nominal 
percentage of 
wages nominal nominal
compensa-
tion in kind/
restitution
in kind in kind restitution restitution restitution
Contribution 
and franchise
com-
pulsory 
contribu-
tion
compulsory 
contribution
compulsory 
contribution voluntary franchise
compulsory 
contribution 
and franchise
Execution
various 
organisa-
tions
social health 
insurance 
companies
public 
civil servant 
insurance 
organisations
private insurance 
companies
private insur-
ance companies
Supervision CTZ CTZ Ministry of home affairs Insurance chamber
Insurance 
chamber
Table A1 Overview health care insurance in the Netherlands (Brouwer & van den Broek 1997)
123
1 Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten. For instance hospital care that takes more than one year is covered by the AWBZ. Costs 
for hospital care up till one year are covered by the other insurances.
2 Het Instituut Ziektkostenvoorziening Ambtenaren of de Interprovinciale ZiektekostenRegeling and DGVP.
3 The WTZ (de Wet op de Toegang tot de Ziektekostenverzekering) is an insurance for people with high health risks and manages 
the duty of private health insurance companies to accept people who are named in this legislation (for instance aged people). 
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In the next table the hospital products are presented which present the DBCs in segment B 
which know since 2005 free contracting and price negotiations between hospitals and 
health insurance companies.
DBC-categorieën met vrije prijsvorming 
Specialisme DBC categorie 
Chirurgie Liesbreuk (hernia inguinalis) 
Chirurgie Spataderen (varices) 
Interne geneeskunde Diabetes mellitus 
KNO Keel- en neus amandelen (adenoïd en tonsillen) 
Plastische chirurgie Borstverkleining 
Dermatologie Spataderen (varices) 
Gynaecologie Baarmoederhals-afwijkingen (cervixafwijkingen) 
Gynaecologie Incontinentie bij vrouw 
Kindergeneeskunde Diabetes bij kinderen 
Oogheelkunde Staaroperatie (cataract) 
Neurochirurgie Hernia nek en hernia long/tot de lende behorend (HNP) 
Reumatologie Jicht 
Orthopaedie Verstijving van de wervelkolom als gevolg van reuma (spondylitis ankylopoetica) 
Orthopaedie Totale heup/overige operaties 
Orthopaedie Totale knie/overige operaties 
Orthopaedie Hernia (H.N.P) 
Gastro-enterologie Gastro-oesofageale refluxziekte/oesofagitis 
Gastro-enterologie Chronische bovenbuikklachten (dyspepsie functioneel) 
Urologie Blaasoperaties 
Urologie Niersteen-behandeling 
Urologie Uretersteen-behandeling 
Neurologie Hernia (radiculair syndroom / HNP lumbaal) 
Longgeneeskunde Interstitiële aandoeningen 
Table A2 DBC’s in segment B (CTG/Zaio 2005)
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Appendix B Case studies
In this appendix the sources of information used in this study for the case studies are 
presented. First the list of interviewed persons in both case studies is presented in two 
separate frames. Subsequently the documents and archival records gathered in both case 
studies are presented in two separate frames.
List of interviewed persons in case study A:
Hospital
Manager finance and information
Member board of directors• 
Nurse and clustermanager “klinisch ambulante zorg” and participant innovation project • 
Medical specialist “stafvertegenwoordiger, Nefroloog”• 
Participant innovation project (shared project with health insurance company)• 
Medical specialist/neuroloog• 
Health insurance company
Manager “Zorg Beleid & contractering”, manager Health region, before working in • 
hospital for several years.
Account manager hospitals • 
Account manager Hospitals/country representative other region.• 
Account manager Hospitals/country representative other region. • 
Director Health • 
Medical advisor • 
Account manager hospitals country representative health insurance companies • 
List of interviewed persons in case study B: 
Hospital
Member board of directors• 
Member board of directors• 
Medical specialist, chairman medical specialists• 
Hospital manager, finance portfolio• 
Medical specialist, new chairman medical specialists• 
Health insurance company
CEO, chairman board of directors, portfolio finance and new building activities• 
CEO health• 
Head of department hospitals and account manager• 
Account manager• 
Country representative in negotiations• 
Head of department hospitals • 
Medical advisor• 
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Rapport “zorgvernieuwingsprojecten 2001 ziekenhuis”, 23 maart 2001.1. 
Rapport “zorgvernieuwingsprojecten fase 2 consequenties in beeld, ziekenhuis, juni 2000.2. 
Rapport “evaluatie zorgvernieuwingsprojecten 2000, ziekenhuis”, november 2000.3. 
Convenant tussen NVZ, orde van medisch specialisten, VAZ en ZN, 6-12-2000.4. 
Budget aanpassingen per 1 januari 2001 op grond van herallocatie FB, Bijlage 7 ij JM/5. 
th/l/2001/14c, gecorr. 13 maart 2001.
Addendum bij modelovereenkomst 2000 ziekenhuis-zorgverzekeraar.6. 
Artikel interview directeur zorgverzekeraar over rol zorgverzekeraar in Nederland.7. 
Jaarverslag 2000, zorgverzekeraar.8. 
Brochure ziekenfondsverzekering zorgverzekeraar.9. 
Verzekerings reglement en vergoedingen ziekenfonds wet en aanvullende verzekeringen 10. 
zorgverzekeraar, ingangsdatum 1 januari 2001.
Folder “Bruggen bouwen in de gezondheidszorg ( tussen vraag en aanbod in de regio)” 11. 
zorgverzekeraar.
Jaarrekening 1999, 2000, ziekenhuis.12. 
Kwartaal rapportage 2000, ziekenhuis.13. 
Bijlage 8 bij J</th/l/2001/14c, gecorr. 14 maart 2001, Budget aanpassingen per 1 januari 14. 
2001 op grond van productieafspraken (inclusief afspraken m.b.t. wachtlijstproductie).
Brief productie afspraken 2001 (inclusief ontdooiing) tussen zorgverzekeraar, ZN en zieken-15. 
huis, 4 mei 2001.
Brief aan NVZ aan de directies/Raad van Bestuur van de instellingen aangesloten bij de 16. 
NVZ (Nederlandse Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen), 7 december 2000, onderwerp: convenant 
bekostiging 2001.
Model overeenkomst ziekenfonds-ziekenhuis (geïntegreerde verstrekking). 17. 
Kwaliteits jaarverslag 1999, ziekenhuis.18. 
Fusie document ziekenhuis, 8 september 1999.19. 
Regiovisie Ziekenhuiszorg 2000-2003, kader voor curatieve zorg, opgesteld door de hold-20. 
ing”, 28 maart 2001 en een update dd 5 juli 2001.
List of documents and archival records gathered in case study A:
List of documents and archival records gathered in case study B:
Jaarverslag 2000, ziekenhuis1. 
Kwaliteits jaarverslag, ziekenhuis, 20002. 
Lange termijn plan ziekenhuis 2002-2005, versie september 20013. 
Kwartaal rapportage productie cijfers ziekenhuis, oktober 20014. 
Balanced Score Card ziekenhuis, derde kwartaal 20015. 
Notulen bijeenkomst tussen ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar.6. 
Notulen bijeenkomst ziekenhuis, zorgverzekeraar en landelijke vertegenwoordiger.7. 
Notulen interim bijeenkomst accountmanagers ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar.8. 
Rapporten over nieuwbouw activiteiten ziekenhuis.9. 
Maandelijkse nieuwskrant ziekenhuis.10. 
Nieuwskrant ziekenhuis over nieuwbouw activiteiten ziekenhuis.11. 
Publicaties van ziekenhuis in professionele literatuur over verschillen van mening met het 12. 
beleid van zorgverzekeraars en zorgverzekering wetgeving.
Jaarverslag ziekenhuizen 2001, zorgverzekeraar.13. 
Patiënt tevredenheids onderzoek, format vragenlijst, zorgverzekeraar.14. 
Patiënten informatie zorgverzekeraar, december 200215. 
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Appendix C Questionnaire
In this appendix the format of the questionnaire used in this study is presented. The ques-
tionnaire for hospitals and health insurance companies differ for certain questions and are 
therefore both presented.
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1 
Vragenlijst ziekenhuis  
 
Naam 
ziekenhuis:______________________________________________________________________________ 
Plaats 
ziekenhuis:______________________________________________________________________________ 
Verzekeraar(s) waarmee wordt onderhandeld: 
_______________________________________________________ 
Regiovertegenwoordiger verzekeraars:  
Naam respondent: 
Functie respondent: 
U kunt het ingevulde vragenformulier terugsturen in de bijgevoegde antwoordenveloppe of naar UMC Utrecht, Julius 
Centrum D01-335, tav prof dr A.J.P. Schrijvers, antwoordnummer 8419, 3500 VW UTRECHT 
 
deel 1 Situationele vragen 
a. Hoe lang werkt u reeds bij dit ziekenhuis?  
O minder dan 2 jaar  
O tussen de 2 en 5 jaar,  
O meer dan 5 jaar 
 
b. Welke achtergrond heeft u?  
O zorginhoudelijk 
O bedrijfseconomisch 
O anders namelijk _____________________________ 
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2 
 
c. Hoeveel jaren onderhandelt u in uw huidige functie met verzekeraars?  
O minder dan 1 jaar  
O 2 tot 5 jaar 
O meer dan 5 jaar 
 
d. Hoe groot is het marktaandeel van uw ziekenhuis in uw WZV regio? 
O minder dan 25% 
O tussen de 25 en de 50%,  
O tussen de 50 en de 75%,  
O meer dan 75% 
 
e. Hoe groot is het marktaandeel in de provincie waarin uw ziekenhuis is gehuisvest? 
O minder dan 10% 
O tussen de 10 en de 20%,  
O tussen de 20 en de 30%,  
O meer dan 30% 
 
f. Heeft uw ziekenhuis een landelijke functie? Nee/ja namelijk voor: _______________ ______ 
 
g. Op welke gebieden onderscheidt uw ziekenhuis zich? (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk) 
O regio gerichtheid en kennis,  
O topklinische zorg,  
O klantvriendelijkheid,  
O innovativiteit,  
O transmurale projecten,  
O wachtlijstbehandeling,  
O anders namelijk………. 
O weet niet 
 
h. Met hoeveel ziekenhuizen concurreert u?  regionaal___________ziekenhuizen 
             landelijk____________ziekenhuizen 
 
i. Met hoeveel ziekenhuizen werkt u samen in een formeel verband?_______________ 
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3 
 
deel 2 Vragen over marktwerking 
1.   Voor welke segmenten van ziekenhuiszorg denkt u dat marktwerking1 in Nederland realiseerbaar is? 
a. Topklinische zorg 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. Zorg met hoge volumes/prevalentie (vaak voorkomend) , lage risico’s en meetbare resultaten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. Zorg met laag volume/prevalentie (nauwelijks voorkomend), hoge risico’s en minder duidelijke uitkomsten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
d. Planbare zorg 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
e. Spoedeisende hulp 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
f. Andere segmenten namelijk:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.   Wanneer denkt u dat aan onderstaande voorwaarden, die gerelateerd zijn aan marktwerking, is voldaan? 
 
a. integrale invoering dbc’s 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
b. gedeeltelijke invoering dbc’s (bijvoorbeeld voor planbare zorg) 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
c. volledige financiering ziekenhuizen op basis van onderhandelde dbc’s 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
                                                
1 Onder marktwerking wordt verstaan vrije onderhandeling over volume, prijs en kwaliteit van in te kopen ziekenhuisproducten met door de 
verzekeraar geselecteerde ziekenhuiszorg aanbieders. 
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d. gedeeltelijke financiering ziekenhuizen op basis van onderhandelde dbc’s (bijvoorbeeld planbare zorg) 
  1 jaar   2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
e. voldoende inzicht verzekeraars in doelmatigheid prestaties ziekenhuis en medisch specialisten in het kader van onderhandelingen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
f. voldoende inzicht verzekeraars in kwaliteit prestaties ziekenhuis en medisch specialisten in het kader van onderhandelingen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
g. contracteervrijheid voor zorgverzekeraars t.a.v. ziekenhuizen en specialisten 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
h. contracteervrijheid voor ziekenhuizen t.a.v. zorgverzekeraars 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
i. Voldoende ziekenhuis personeel en -voorzieningen om aan de vraag te voldoen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deel 3 Vragen over de institutionele omgeving  
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5 
 
Kunt u aangeven wat uw verwachting is ten aanzien van onderstaande stellingen? 
a. De overheid zal de komende 5 jaar geleidelijk terugtreden uit de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
b. Het BKZ zal na een succesvolle invoering van DBC’s worden afgeschaft. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
c. De voorspelbaarheid van de wet- en regelgeving waaraan ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars zich dienen te houden zal de 
komende 5 jaar toenemen. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
d. Berichten in de media zullen een belangrijke rol blijven spelen voor politieke bemoeienis in de ziekenhuismarkt na realisatie van 
een bepaalde mate van marktwerking2 in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
e. Persoonlijk netwerken in de politiek (lobbyen) zal minder betekenis krijgen voor ziekenhuizen na realisatie van een bepaalde mate 
van marktwerking in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
f. Persoonlijk netwerken tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars zal toenemen na realisatie van een bepaalde mate van 
marktwerking in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
g. De concurrentie tussen ziekenhuizen zal toenemen door de komst van DBC’s. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
Toelichting:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
h. Priveklinieken (inclusief ZBC’s) zullen over 5 jaar een aanzienlijk deel (meer dan 20%) van de ziekenhuiszorg leveren. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
i. Verzekerden zullen over 5 jaar een aanzienlijk deel (meer dan 20%) van de ziekenhuiszorg buiten hun eigen regio (ander deel van 
Nederland of buitenland) ontvangen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
                                                
2 Onder een bepaalde mate van marktwerking wordt verstaan vrije onderhandeling over volume prijs en kwaliteit met door de verzekeraar 
geselecteerde ziekenhuiszorg aanbieders voor een bepaald assortiment ziekenhuisproducten (bijvoorbeeld alle planbare ziekenhuiszorg) 
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6 
j. Nieuwe toetreders in de zorgverzekeringenmarkt zullen een belangrijke rol gaan spelen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
k. Ziekenhuizen zullen over 5 jaar na de invoering van gedeeltelijke of gehele marktwerking:  
O meer gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O minder gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O evenveel samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O anders gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen, namelijk ____________________________ 
O weet niet 
 
l. Reputatie blijft voor ziekenhuizen een belangrijke factor om de kwaliteit van de zorg en/of klanttevredenheid hoog te houden. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
m. De invloed van de koepelorganisaties (ZN,NvZ, Orde MS) zal de komende jaren afnemen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
Indien u denkt dat de invloed anders wordt kunt u dit omschrijven? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
n. Patienten (behartigings) organisaties (voor chronisch zieken) zullen een grote rol gaan spelen als intermediair tussen verzekeraar 
en ziekenhuis bij de inkoop van zorg voor hun patienten  
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
o. Verzekeraars zullen zich wettelijk moeten gaan certificeren voor goed “zorgverzekeraarschap” 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
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7 
Deel 4 Vragen over positie van verzekeraars 
1. Verwachte positie verzekeraar over 5 jaar bij een succesvolle invoering van DBC’s. 
 
a. De prestaties van het ziekenhuis zijn transparanter voor de verzekeraar 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
b. De prestaties van de medisch specialisten zijn transparanter voor de verzekeraar 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
c. De verzekeraar zal scherpere prijzen onderhandelen met ziekenhuizen (bij voldoende capaciteit) 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
d. De verzekeraar zal ziekenhuizen vaker op de kwaliteit van geleverde diensten aanspreken 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
e. De verzekeraar zal meer directe invloed uitoefenen op het individuele ziekenhuisbeleid en -investeringen 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
f. De verzekeraar zal hogere (administratieve) kosten voor de inkoop van ziekenhuiszorg maken. 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
g. De verzekeraar zal in staat zijn effectiever wachtlijsten terugdringen 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
h. De verzekeraar zal met stuurpolissen sterk bepalen naar welk ziekenhuis de verzekerden zullen gaan 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
2. Waarin zullen verzekeraars meer gaan investeren om beter gebruik te kunnen maken van de invoering van marktwerking 
(inclusief DBC’s)?  
 
a. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in zorginhoudelijke kennis en mensen,  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in informatiesystemen 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
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c. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in benchmarking van prestaties ziekenhuizen en specialisten  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
d. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in contacten en onderhandeling met ziekenhuis (de inkoopfunctie) 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
e. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in kennis van ziekenhuisproblematiek  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
f. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in priveklinieken 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
g. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in buitenlandse inkoop 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
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Deel 5. Vragen over de positie van ziekenhuizen en specialisten 
 
1. Welke gevolgen heeft de invoering van DBC’s voor ziekenhuizen?  
a. betere interne managementinformatie 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. hogere administratiekosten door genereren DBC informatie 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. verandering relatie RvB-specialist door verhoogde transparantie prestaties specialisten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
2. Welke gevolgen heeft het afschaffen van de contracteerplicht voor ziekenhuizen? 
a. Kwetsbaarheid bij grote investeringen voor zorg waarvoor voldoende capaciteit bestaat3 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
Toelichting:______________________________________________________________________ 
 
b.Hogere onderhandelings- en contractkosten (de verkoopfunctie naar verzekeraars)  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. Differentiatie en marketing worden belangrijker voor ziekenhuis (differentiatie in de zin van goedkoper, innovatiever, 
klantvriendelijker dan andere ziekenhuizen) 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 De kwetsbaarheid is afhankelijk van de verwachte contractduur en de mogelijkheid/wens van verzekeraar om te wisselen van ziekenhuis 
bij de inkoop van zorg.  
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Deel 6 Vragen over onderhandelingsrelatie zorgverzekeraars en ziekenhuizen 
a. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar werken samen aan het verbeteren van de ziekenhuiszorg door gezamenlijke investeringen. 
Investeringsrisico’s worden voor bepaalde projecten gedeeld.  
O Ziekenhuis is alleen verantwoordelijk voor het leveren van de ziekenhuiszorg  
 
b. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar hebben een jaarcontract afgesloten met prijs en capaciteit van een compleet pakket DBC’s. Het 
ziekenhuis is verzekerd van betaling van dit pakket ziekenhuisproducten. 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar hebben een preferred supplier contract afgesloten. De zorgverzekeraar betaalt alleen de 
daadwerkelijk afgenomen DBC’s tegen de afgesproken prijs. Het ziekenhuis is verantwoordelijk voor het bepalen van de 
benodigde capaciteit. 
 
c. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis onderhandelt met verschillende verzekeraars (bijvoorbeeld t.b.v. van risicospreiding)  
O Ziekenhuis onderhandelt alleen met verzekeraars die een hoog marktaandeel hebben in de regio.  
 
d. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en verzekeraar zullen zich gaan profileren met kwaliteitscertificaten en hiervan in hun onderhandelingen gebruik 
maken. 
O Ziekenhuis en verzekeraar zullen op basis van benchmark informatie onderhandelen. 
 
e. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Verzekeraars zullen het instrument van protocollering gebruiken om de kwaliteit en efficientie van ziekenhuis en specialist te 
waarborgen.  
O Verzekeraars zullen gebruik maken van de door het ziekenhuis en specialist opgeleverde DBC informatie om de kwaliteit en 
efficientie van de door hun ingekochte ziekenhuiszorg te waarborgen. 
 
f. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
 O ziekenhuizen die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn 
 O verzekeraars die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn (cq. uit de zorgmarkt zijn gestapt) 
 O ziekenhuizen en verzekeraars die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn 
 O geen enkel ziekenhuis/verzekeraar zal failliet zijn  
 
g. Wat is uw mening over de rol van toezichthoudende instanties in de ziekenhuismarkt over 5 jaar? 
O belangrijker dan nu   O even belangrijk als in de huidige situatie   O minder belangrijk 
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h. Welk rol zullen toezichthoudende instanties spelen over 5 jaar? (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk) 
O bewaking kwaliteit geleverde ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking wachtlijsten 
O bewaking inkoopbeleid zorgverzekeraars 
O bewaking transparantie ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking transparantie ziektekosten verzekeringen 
O bewaking concurrentieverhoudingen in ziekenhuiszorg markt 
O bewaking concurrentieverhoudingen in zorgverzekeringen markt 
O bewaking toegankelijkheid ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking toegankelijkheid zorgverzekeringen 
O bewaking klanttevredenheid patienten 
O bewaking klanttevredenheid verzekerden 
O ___________________________________ 
 
i. In hoeverre denkt u dat de invoering van marktwerking zal bijdragen aan een efficientere4 ziekenhuiszorg? (omcirkel svp de 
bijdrage waarbij 1 is zeer weinig, 10 is zeer veel)) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Toelichting________________________________________________________________ 
 
j. Denkt u dat de invoering van marktwerking zal bijdragen aan een hogere tevredenheid van patienten over de geleverde 
ziekenhuiszorg? (omcirkel svp de bijdrage, 1 is zeer weinig, 10 is zeer veel) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Toelichting________________________________________________________________ 
                                                
4 Efficienter betekent met dezelfde middelen meer doen. 
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k. Hoe belangrijk zijn de volgende variabelen in de onderhandelingen tussen ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar?  S.v.p. aankruisen in 
hokje. 
 niet belangrijk enigszins belangrijk zeer belangrijk weet niet 
Een goed contract     
Betrouwbare DBC informatie     
Langdurige relatie personen aan 
de onderhandelingstafel 
    
Vertrouwen tussen personen aan 
de onderhandelingstafel 
    
Goede relatie RvB en specialisten 
ziekenhuis 
    
Goede kennis bij verzekeraar van 
ziekenhuis 
    
Goede kennis vraag naar 
ziekenhuiszorg bij de personen 
aan de onderhandelingstafel 
    
 
l. Hoe zullen verzekeraars met een laag marktaandeel in een regio de ziekenhuiszorg gaan inkopen over 5 jaar? meerdere 
antwoorden mogelijk 
O met een contract met een verzekeraar met een hoog marktaandeel 
O met een productenboek waarin het ziekenhuis verrichtingen en prijzen aanbiedt 
O met een inkoopcombinaties gevormd door verzekeraars die ook een laag marktaandeel hebben 
O anders namelijk ______________________________________________________________ 
 
m. Hoe typeert u op dit moment uw relatie met de zorgverzekeraar? svp per regel een cijfer omcirkelen 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer open, 5 = zeer gesloten) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer inhoudelijk, 5 = zeer procedureel) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer cooperatief, 5 = zeer vijandig) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = korte termijn gericht, 5 = lange termijn gericht) 
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n. Hoe denkt u dat de relatie met de zorgverzekeraar eruit ziet over 5 jaar na de invoering van gehele of gedeeltelijke marktwerking? 
svp per regel een cijfer omcirkelen 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer open, 5 = zeer gesloten) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer inhoudelijk, 5 = zeer procedureel) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer cooperatief, 5 = zeer vijandig) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = korte termijn gericht, 5 = lange termijn gericht) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EINDE VRAGENLIJST 
HARTELIJK DANK VOOR UW MEDEWERKING 
\ 
U kunt het ingevulde vragenformulier terugsturen in de bijgevoegde antwoord enveloppe of naar UMC Utrecht, Julius 
Centrum D01-335, tav prof dr A.J.P. Schrijvers, antwoordnummer 8419, 3500 VW UTRECHT 
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Vragenlijst zorgverzekeraar  
 
Naam verzekeraar 
:_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Ziekenhuizen waarmee wordt onderhandeld: _______________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Naam respondent: 
Adres respondent: 
email: 
Functie respondent: 
U kunt het ingevulde vragenformulier terugsturen in de bijgevoegde antwoordenveloppe of naar UMC Utrecht, Julius Centrum 
D01-335, tav prof dr A.J.P. Schrijvers, antwoordnummer 8419, 3500 VW UTRECHT 
 
deel 1 Situationele vragen 
a. Welke achtergrond heeft u?  
O bedrijfseconomisch 
O zorginhoudelijk 
O anders namelijk _____________________________ 
 
b. Hoeveel jaren werkt u in uw huidige functie?  
O minder dan 1 jaar  
O 2 tot 5 jaar 
O meer dan 5 jaar 
 
c. Bent u een regionale of landelijke verzekeraar?  landelijk / regionaal 
 
d. Hoe groot is uw marktaandeel in Nederland in de zorgverzekeringen? 
O minder dan 5% 
O tussen de 5 en de 10%,  
O tussen de 10 en de 15%,  
O meer dan 15% 
O weet niet 
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e. Voor hoeveel ziekenhuizen bent u marktleider (meer dan 50% van de patienten is bij u verzekerd)? 
 O 0 tot 5 
 O 5 tot 10 
 O 10 tot 15 
 O 15 tot 20 
 O meer dan 20 
 O weet niet 
 
f. Wat zijn de belangrijkste gebieden waarop u zich onderscheidt als verzekeraar? 
O aanpak van wachtlijsten,  
O klantvriendelijkheid,  
O prijs 
O innovativiteit,  
O zorginhoudelijke kennis  
O anders namelijk………. 
O weet niet 
 
g. Met welke verzekeraars concurreert u? _______________ 
h. Met welke verzekeraars werkt u samen?_______________ 
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deel 2 Vragen over marktwerking 
1.   Voor welke segmenten van ziekenhuiszorg denkt u dat marktwerking5 in Nederland realiseerbaar is? 
a. Topklinische zorg 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. Zorg met hoge volumes/prevalentie (vaak voorkomend) , lage risico’s en meetbare resultaten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. Zorg met laag volume/prevalentie (nauwelijks voorkomend), hoge risico’s en minder duidelijke uitkomsten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
d. Planbare zorg 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
e. Spoedeisende hulp 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
f. Andere segmenten namelijk:_____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.   Wanneer denkt u dat aan onderstaande voorwaarden, die gerelateerd zijn aan marktwerking, is voldaan? 
 
a. integrale invoering dbc’s 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
b. gedeeltelijke invoering dbc’s (bijvoorbeeld voor planbare zorg) 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
c. volledige financiering ziekenhuizen op basis van onderhandelde dbc’s 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
                                                
5 Onder marktwerking wordt verstaan vrije onderhandeling over volume, prijs en kwaliteit van in te kopen ziekenhuisproducten met door de 
verzekeraar geselecteerde ziekenhuiszorg aanbieders. 
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d. gedeeltelijke financiering ziekenhuizen op basis van onderhandelde dbc’s (bijvoorbeeld planbare zorg) 
  1 jaar   2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
e. voldoende inzicht verzekeraars in doelmatigheid prestaties ziekenhuis en medisch specialisten in het kader van onderhandelingen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
f. voldoende inzicht verzekeraars in kwaliteit prestaties ziekenhuis en medisch specialisten in het kader van onderhandelingen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
g. contracteervrijheid voor zorgverzekeraars t.a.v. ziekenhuizen en specialisten 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
h. contracteervrijheid voor ziekenhuizen t.a.v. zorgverzekeraars 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
 
i. Voldoende ziekenhuis personeel en -voorzieningen om aan de vraag te voldoen 
 1 jaar  2-3 jaar   3-5 jaar  langer dan 5 jaar    zal niet gebeuren   weet niet 
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Deel 3 Vragen over de institutionele omgeving  
 
Kunt u aangeven wat uw verwachting is ten aanzien van onderstaande stellingen? 
a. De overheid zal de komende 5 jaar geleidelijk terugtreden uit de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
b. Het BKZ zal na een succesvolle invoering van DBC’s worden afgeschaft. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
c. De voorspelbaarheid van de wet- en regelgeving waaraan ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars zich dienen te houden zal de 
komende 5 jaar toenemen. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
d. Berichten in de media zullen een belangrijke rol blijven spelen voor politieke bemoeienis in de ziekenhuismarkt na realisatie van 
een bepaalde mate van marktwerking6 in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
e. Persoonlijk netwerken in de politiek (lobbyen) zal minder betekenis krijgen voor ziekenhuizen na realisatie van een bepaalde mate 
van marktwerking in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
f. Persoonlijk netwerken tussen ziekenhuizen en zorgverzekeraars zal toenemen na realisatie van een bepaalde mate van 
marktwerking in de ziekenhuis zorgmarkt. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
g. De concurrentie tussen ziekenhuizen zal toenemen door de komst van DBC’s. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
Toelichting:____________________________________________________________________ 
 
h. Priveklinieken (inclusief ZBC’s) zullen over 5 jaar een aanzienlijk deel (meer dan 20%) van de ziekenhuiszorg leveren. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
i. Verzekerden zullen over 5 jaar een aanzienlijk deel (meer dan 20%) van de ziekenhuiszorg buiten hun eigen regio (ander deel van 
Nederland of buitenland) ontvangen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
                                                
6 Onder een bepaalde mate van marktwerking wordt verstaan vrije onderhandeling over volume prijs en kwaliteit met door de verzekeraar 
geselecteerde ziekenhuiszorg aanbieders voor een bepaald assortiment ziekenhuisproducten (bijvoorbeeld alle planbare ziekenhuiszorg) 
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j. Nieuwe toetreders in de zorgverzekeringenmarkt zullen een belangrijke rol gaan spelen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
k. Ziekenhuizen zullen over 5 jaar na de invoering van gedeeltelijke of gehele marktwerking:  
O meer gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O minder gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O evenveel samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen 
O anders gaan samenwerken met collega ziekenhuizen, namelijk ____________________________ 
O weet niet 
 
l. Reputatie blijft voor ziekenhuizen een belangrijke factor om de kwaliteit van de zorg en/of klanttevredenheid hoog te houden. 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
m. De invloed van de koepelorganisaties (ZN,NvZ, Orde MS) zal de komende jaren afnemen 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
Indien u denkt dat de invloed anders wordt kunt u dit omschrijven? 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
n. Patienten (behartigings) organisaties (voor chronisch zieken) zullen een grote rol gaan spelen als intermediair tussen verzekeraar 
en ziekenhuis bij de inkoop van zorg voor hun patienten  
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
 
o. Verzekeraars zullen zich wettelijk moeten gaan certificeren voor goed “zorgverzekeraarschap” 
O zeer zeker    O mogelijk    O zeker niet    O weet niet 
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Deel 4 Vragen over positie van verzekeraars 
1. Verwachte positie verzekeraar over 5 jaar bij een succesvolle invoering van DBC’s. 
 
a. De prestaties van het ziekenhuis zijn transparanter voor de verzekeraar 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
b. De prestaties van de medisch specialisten zijn transparanter voor de verzekeraar 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
c. De verzekeraar zal scherpere prijzen onderhandelen met ziekenhuizen (bij voldoende capaciteit) 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
d. De verzekeraar zal ziekenhuizen vaker op de kwaliteit van geleverde diensten aanspreken 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
e. De verzekeraar zal meer directe invloed uitoefenen op het individuele ziekenhuisbeleid en -investeringen 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
f. De verzekeraar zal hogere (administratieve) kosten voor de inkoop van ziekenhuiszorg maken. 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
g. De verzekeraar zal in staat zijn effectiever wachtlijsten terugdringen 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
h. De verzekeraar zal met stuurpolissen sterk bepalen naar welk ziekenhuis de verzekerden zullen gaan 
O geheel mee eens  O deels mee eens  O geheel mee oneens  O weet niet 
 
2. Waarin zullen verzekeraars meer gaan investeren om beter gebruik te kunnen maken van de invoering van marktwerking 
(inclusief DBC’s)?  
 
a. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in zorginhoudelijke kennis en mensen,  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in informatiesystemen 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
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c. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in benchmarking van prestaties ziekenhuizen en specialisten  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
d. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in contacten en onderhandeling met ziekenhuis (de inkoopfunctie) 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
e. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in kennis van ziekenhuisproblematiek  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
f. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in priveklinieken 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
g. Verzekeraars zullen investeren in buitenlandse inkoop 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
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Deel 5. Vragen over de positie van ziekenhuizen en specialisten 
1. Welke gevolgen heeft de invoering van DBC’s voor ziekenhuizen?  
a. betere interne managementinformatie 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
b. hogere administratiekosten door genereren DBC informatie 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. verandering relatie RvB-specialist door verhoogde transparantie prestaties specialisten 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
2. Welke gevolgen heeft het afschaffen van de contracteerplicht voor ziekenhuizen? 
a. Kwetsbaarheid bij grote investeringen voor zorg waarvoor voldoende capaciteit bestaat7 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
Toelichting:______________________________________________________________________ 
 
b.Hogere onderhandelings- en contractkosten (de verkoopfunctie naar verzekeraars)  
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
c. Differentiatie en marketing worden belangrijker voor ziekenhuis (differentiatie in de zin van goedkoper, innovatiever, 
klantvriendelijker dan andere ziekenhuizen) 
O zeker     O mogelijk     O zeker niet     O weet niet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 De kwetsbaarheid is afhankelijk van de verwachte contractduur en de mogelijkheid/wens van verzekeraar om te wisselen van ziekenhuis 
bij de inkoop van zorg.  
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Deel 6 Vragen over onderhandelingsrelatie zorgverzekeraars en ziekenhuizen 
a. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar werken samen aan het verbeteren van de ziekenhuiszorg door gezamenlijke investeringen. 
Investeringsrisico’s worden voor bepaalde projecten gedeeld.  
O Ziekenhuis is alleen verantwoordelijk voor het leveren van de ziekenhuiszorg  
 
b. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar hebben een jaarcontract afgesloten met prijs en capaciteit van een compleet pakket DBC’s. Het 
ziekenhuis is verzekerd van betaling van dit pakket ziekenhuisproducten. 
O Ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar hebben een preferred supplier contract afgesloten. De zorgverzekeraar betaalt alleen de 
daadwerkelijk afgenomen DBC’s tegen de afgesproken prijs. Het ziekenhuis is verantwoordelijk voor het bepalen van de 
benodigde capaciteit. 
 
c. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis onderhandelt met verschillende verzekeraars (bijvoorbeeld t.b.v. van risicospreiding)  
O Ziekenhuis onderhandelt alleen met verzekeraars die een hoog marktaandeel hebben in de regio.  
 
d. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Ziekenhuis en verzekeraar zullen zich gaan profileren met kwaliteitscertificaten en hiervan in hun onderhandelingen gebruik 
maken. 
O Ziekenhuis en verzekeraar zullen op basis van benchmark informatie onderhandelen. 
 
e. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
O Verzekeraars zullen het instrument van protocollering gebruiken om de kwaliteit en efficientie van ziekenhuis en specialist te 
waarborgen.  
O Verzekeraars zullen gebruik maken van de door het ziekenhuis en specialist opgeleverde DBC informatie om de kwaliteit en 
efficientie van de door hun ingekochte ziekenhuiszorg te waarborgen. 
 
f. Welk scenario acht u het meest waarschijnlijk over 5 jaar? svp één scenario aankruisen 
 O ziekenhuizen die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn 
 O verzekeraars die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn (cq. uit de zorgmarkt zijn gestapt) 
 O ziekenhuizen en verzekeraars die slecht presteren zullen failliet zijn 
 O geen enkel ziekenhuis/verzekeraar zal failliet zijn  
 
g. Wat is uw mening over de rol van toezichthoudende instanties in de ziekenhuismarkt over 5 jaar? 
O belangrijker dan nu   O even belangrijk als in de huidige situatie   O minder belangrijk 
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h. Welk rol zullen toezichthoudende instanties spelen over 5 jaar? (meerdere antwoorden mogelijk) 
O bewaking kwaliteit geleverde ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking wachtlijsten 
O bewaking inkoopbeleid zorgverzekeraars 
O bewaking transparantie ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking transparantie ziektekosten verzekeringen 
O bewaking concurrentieverhoudingen in ziekenhuiszorg markt 
O bewaking concurrentieverhoudingen in zorgverzekeringen markt 
O bewaking toegankelijkheid ziekenhuiszorg 
O bewaking toegankelijkheid zorgverzekeringen 
O bewaking klanttevredenheid patienten 
O bewaking klanttevredenheid verzekerden 
O ___________________________________ 
 
i. In hoeverre denkt u dat de invoering van marktwerking zal bijdragen aan een efficientere8 ziekenhuiszorg? (omcirkel svp de 
bijdrage waarbij 1 is zeer weinig, 10 is zeer veel)) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Toelichting________________________________________________________________ 
 
j. Denkt u dat de invoering van marktwerking zal bijdragen aan een hogere tevredenheid van patienten over de geleverde 
ziekenhuiszorg? (omcirkel svp de bijdrage, 1 is zeer weinig, 10 is zeer veel) 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10 
Toelichting________________________________________________________________ 
 
k. Hoe belangrijk zijn de volgende variabelen in de onderhandelingen tussen ziekenhuis en zorgverzekeraar?  S.v.p. aankruisen in 
hokje. 
 niet belangrijk enigszins belangrijk zeer belangrijk weet niet 
Een goed contract     
Betrouwbare DBC informatie     
Langdurige relatie personen aan 
de onderhandelingstafel 
    
Vertrouwen tussen personen aan 
de onderhandelingstafel 
    
Goede relatie RvB en specialisten 
ziekenhuis 
    
Goede kennis bij verzekeraar van 
ziekenhuis 
    
Goede kennis vraag naar 
ziekenhuiszorg bij de personen 
aan de onderhandelingstafel 
    
                                                
8 Efficienter betekent met dezelfde middelen meer doen. 
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l. Hoe zullen verzekeraars met een laag marktaandeel in een regio de ziekenhuiszorg gaan inkopen over 5 jaar? meerdere 
antwoorden mogelijk 
O met een contract met een verzekeraar met een hoog marktaandeel 
O met een productenboek waarin het ziekenhuis verrichtingen en prijzen aanbiedt 
O met een inkoopcombinaties gevormd door verzekeraars die ook een laag marktaandeel hebben 
O anders namelijk ______________________________________________________________ 
 
m. Hoe typeert u op dit moment uw relatie met de ziekenhuizen? svp per regel een cijfer omcirkelen 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer open, 5 = zeer gesloten) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer inhoudelijk, 5 = zeer procedureel) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer cooperatief, 5 = zeer vijandig) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = korte termijn gericht, 5 = lange termijn gericht) 
 
n. Hoe denkt u dat de relatie met de ziekenhuizen eruit ziet over 5 jaar na de invoering van gehele of gedeeltelijke marktwerking? 
svp per regel een cijfer omcirkelen 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer open, 5 = zeer gesloten) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer inhoudelijk, 5 = zeer procedureel) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = zeer cooperatief, 5 = zeer vijandig) 
1   2   3   4   5   (1 = korte termijn gericht, 5 = lange termijn gericht) 
 
 
 
 
EINDE VRAGENLIJST 
HARTELIJK DANK VOOR UW MEDEWERKING 
\ 
U kunt het ingevulde vragenformulier terugsturen in de bijgevoegde antwoord enveloppe of naar UMC Utrecht, Julius 
Centrum D01-335, tav prof dr A.J.P. Schrijvers, antwoordnummer 8419, 3500 VW UTRECHT 
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